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Preface 
 
 
This volume of the Hungarologische Beiträge is the product of 
two years’ co-operation of Hungarian and Finnish historians. It 
has become customary to publish their work in this series, the 
preceding one being the HB vol. 7 from the year 1996. Since the 
position of Hungarian Studies has now stabilized in Jyväskylä 
University, it is to be expected that we will be publishing more 
regularly in the future. This can be said also because the ‘Kádár-
Kekkonen’ topic is still very timely and has not by any means 
been exhausted yet. We set ourselves to work with the convic-
tion that these two statesmen and the conditions in their coun-
tries deserve to be studied concomitantly and that their situa-
tions under the shadow – dark in Finland, darker in Hungary – 
of the USSR and in the context of politics of the Cold War and 
détente resemble each other considerably. Of course, as sociolo-
gists use to say, the search for similarities presupposes search 
for differences. 
This volume could not have been brought to daylight with-
out many persons’ participation in its preparation. Thanks go to 
Professor Attila Pók from Budapest who arranged the Hungar-
ian co-operation. In Finland, the work of Phil.Lic. Mari Vares 
was essential in keeping the contacts to Hungary alive during 
the initial stages of the editing. David Wilson, MA, has done a 
great job in polishing our English. Petteri Laihonen, MA, the 
serial editor for Hungarologische Beiträge not only took care of 
the technical side but also gave valuable advice. 
                                     A. H. 
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Editor’s Introduction 
 
Anssi HALMESVIRTA 
 
 
The original purpose of this volume was to publish the papers 
read at the ‘Kádár-Kekkonen Symposium’ of the 5th Interna-
tional Congress of Hungarian Studies held in August 2001 in 
Jyväskylä, Finland. Thus it could be read as a companion vol-
ume to Professor Pritz Pál’s symposium papers on Hungarian 
foreign policy in the twentieth century.1 However, the present 
collection grew thicker than planned because it was decided to 
also include the contributions to the meeting of the Hungarian 
and Finnish historians in Budapest, August 2000, and the pa-
pers of the Tampere seminar of September 2002 dealing with 
roughly the same subject matter. 
The above-mentioned joint events carried on the tradition of 
co-operation well-established by Professor Olli Vehviläinen a 
couple of decades ago, and the aim here has been to promote 
dialogue and update our research: it was anticipated that dif-
ferent, problematic interpretations of the Cold War era in Hun-
garian and Finnish history would arise. Now that the late 
President Kekkonen’s diaries are published and the re-
evaluation of Secretary-General János Kádár’s life is under way, 
an opportunity to evaluate their careers and achievements in 
similar historical contexts has presented itself. It could, how-
ever, be assumed that in reconsidering the political history of 
the Cold War era, and how Hungary and Finland managed to 
get out of it, Hungarian and Finnish historians carry with them 
quite different tool-kits. Let us call to witness those Hungarian 
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historians and political scientists who compare the Sonderweg of 
the two countries since 1956, and who use the term ‘finlandiza-
tion’ (finlandizálás) in a quite positive, Hungarian manner, a 
manner which may be found disturbing to their Finnish col-
leagues.2 Finnish historians, for their part, have found the Fin-
nish political élite of the times deeply ‘finlandized’ (suomet-
tunut, as for example, in the extreme case when CPSU financed 
Kekkonen’s election campaign via KGB) and accustomed to de-
plorable self-censorship in Soviet matters.3 Bearing this contra-
diction in mind, and seen from the perspective of  Soviet secu-
rity interests, it may not have been amiss to study Kádár’s and  
Kekkonen’s regimes side by side, and assess how their Real-
politik was realized. Others have already tried to answer such 
tricky questions as how ‘indispensable’ their leadership in 
troubled times was (but how can we definitively ascertain that 
someone else could not have achieved anything as great as they 
did?). It has remained for the contributors of this volume to 
concentrate on less sapient issues. 
The book falls into three rather distinct parts: the first four 
articles (Borhi’s, Rentola’s and Vares’) deal with foreign politics 
and the question of statesmen’s ‘images’, the next two, Oikari’s 
and Nyyssönen’s, analyze the politics of power in culture and 
the politics of history, and the rest (Horváth’s, Varga’s and 
Pihkala’s) turn attention to social and economic aspects. The 
foreign policy section is the most coherent one and its articles 
can be read as complementary texts to each other. One basic dif-
ference, however, remains: the Hungarian contributors studied 
mainly Hungarian affairs, whereas the Finns attempted com-
parative studies with the aim of disentangling the Hungarian 
and Finnish power-political constellation and explaining their 
situations in a wider international context.  
In the part devoted to internal ‘politics of power’ the reader 
may feel uncertain: what does György Aczél’s ‘politics of cultu-
re’ under Kádárism have to do with the ‘politics of history’ after 
the change of the political system in Hungary? The connecting 
link lies in the nature of the policy itself. The holders of power 
in Hungary could by an ‘unholy compromise’ with the writers 
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and intellectuals in general define what could be said or written 
during the Kádár regime. After its collapse, what could be 
counted as a new and acceptable, official interpretation of the 
past – in Hungary it was encapsulated in the resurgence and 
reappraisal of the 1956 Revolution – was now to be written 
down by the opponents of the ‘old power’. They moulded the 
image of history to suit their own imperatives of the ‘politics of 
power’. Kádár’s heritage haunted them more than Kekkonen’s 
has haunted the Finns, since Kekkonen’s march was not tainted 
with blood and outright repression (‘consolidation’). For 
Finland, these kinds of analyses will be completed by the 
‘Kekkonen-Kádár’ project of the Academy of Finland (2001-
2003) in the near future, and its results will be published in a 
separate volume. 
Social-economic realities and planning in Hungary and 
Finland are studied in the last section of the book. It is a pity 
that Dr Horváth’s article could not yet be matched by one from 
a Finnish counterpart at this stage of the co-operation. Possible 
comparatively compatible ‘urban development’ plans based on 
idealized visions of community life can also be found in indus-
trialized Finland of the 1950s and the 1960s. As the two articles 
on economic planning show, there was fertile common ground 
in overall economic planning in spite of the fundamental ideo-
logical cleavage between the two countries in question. And if 
we look more closely at the ideological background of, for in-
stance, the social policies of Hungary and Finland in the late 
1960s and through the 1970s, we may be surprised to discover 
how Marxist Finnish sociology and social policy had become – 
a trend noted with pleasure by the Hungarian observers in 
Finland.4  
What becomes clear from Dr Borhi’s article is that Kádár 
could, by means of pragmatic foreign policy, wring advantages 
and concessions from both superpowers, the USA and the 
USSR. The process was cumbersome but accomplished succes-
fully. At the same time when Kádár remained faithful to Mos-
cow, he could by piecemeal methods gain international room 
for manoeuvre from the Americans in the 1960s by making 
ANSSI HALMESVIRTA 
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‘consolidation’ (1956-1963) look like ‘liberation’ in the end. 
Kekkonen’s policy was, in principle the same, although in a 
more peripheral context: in exchange for the trust (luottamus) he 
managed to retain in Moscow, he was able to co-operate with 
the Nordic countries, and approach the EFTA and the EEC and, 
from that basis, start soundings for détente and the Helsinki 
process with Kádár who backed him. Both benefited from this 
rapprochement strategy, which meant a gradual opening of the 
international arenas for them. Both established relations with 
the Third World and criticized heavily the USA during the 
Vietnam war, and honestly – not only liturgically as sometimes 
incorrectly stated – pursued the policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’ 
of the socialist and capitalist systems. In the end of the 1960s 
Kádár and his foreign ministers were ready to acknowledge 
that although the ideological battle – Finland was regarded as a 
highly valuable forum for scientific and cultural propaganda5 – 
had to be accelerated, Finland was in the category of those capi-
talist countries with which extensive bilateral agreements could 
be made. As Kádár himself, already in the midst of deepest iso-
lation in 1957, made the distinction, there were imperialist and 
capitalist countries. If Sweden was not an imperialist country6, 
Finland was even less so. From the end of the 1960s onwards, it 
was highly important for Hungary to send experts to learn 
Western scientific and technological innovation from such capi-
talist countries as Finland which promoted a ‘good neighbourly 
policy’ and already established intensive relations with the 
USSR. In these connections, finlandization became something 
very positive for Hungarian policy, since it was – paradoxically 
– Finland, not Hungary, which could gain favours (Porkkala, 
the lease of the Saimaa Canal) and favourable trade agreements 
with the USSR.   
Borhi’s conclusions concerning Kádár’s and Kekkonen’s 
tight-rope walking are corroborated by Dr Rentola’s findings 
from Kekkonen’s papers, which also demonstrate that the two 
were closer to each other than formerly believed. Kádár cer-
tainly had less space for manoeuvre than Kekkonen: no wonder 
that he welcomed Kekkonen’s directness and gestures of 
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‘friendship’ while hosting him in 1963. In 1969, when they met 
again, the atmosphere was somewhat spoiled by the repercus-
sions of the Czechoslovakian crisis, but in spite of that they 
could take credit for their long-lasting ‘mutual understanding’ 
and sense of political realities. The rhetoric of kinship provided 
‘bridge-building’ its conceptual framework, as Phil. Lic. Mari 
Vares attempts to show in her paper. In the sixties it was not 
only a handy camouflage behind which political considerations 
could be hidden, but it also meant genuine caution in avoiding 
any provocations that might tease the Eastern bear. Rentola il-
lustrates this with an example of the Hungarians avoiding pay-
ing their respects to Mannerheim’s grave during state visits. 
This attitude was reflected also in the Hungarian text-book on 
Finnish history in which the Finnish war-hero was made the 
greatest villain.7 Thus the negative side of finlandization was 
not quite uncommon in Hungary either. Both in Hungary and 
in Finland it was rather Lenin than domestic heroes that were 
celebrated, but surely it was Finland where this should have, at 
least for an outsider, seemed quite strange. 
Professor Vesa Vares argues that although the circumstances 
of the Cold War made it very difficult for both Kádár and 
Kekkonen to find true recognition, they were finally recognised 
(especially in Helsinki in 1975 they sat side by side) and appre-
ciated for their peacemaking efforts. The Americans and the 
British had changed their original low-key tune and the image 
of the two ‘foes’ was transformed into the image of ‘manage-
able parties’ in international diplomacy. This was one of their 
lasting successes. Kekkonen’s successor, President Koivisto, 
used this common ‘political capital’ to his own advantage, but 
in Hungary, it seems, it did not, at least for a while, pay any 
tangible results. 
Dr Nyyssönen’s article, even though it does not directly dis-
cuss Kádárism, throws light on the ways in which some delicate 
moment in history, in this case the very essence of Kádárism, 
the revolution of the year 1956, was politicized in the new sys-
tem. Typically for Hungarian political debate, political parties 
wanted to ‘own’ 1956 and pose themselves as the real heroes in 
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 12 
it. The darker side of this historical-political method has been 
that politicization boiled over and produced historical (megalo)-
mania. However, it was only a natural reaction to the Kádárist 
policy of the erasing of history from Hungarian minds. Had it 
not been Kádár himself who boasted to Kekkonen during his 
visit to Finland in 1973 that in Hungary 1956 was no longer 
“hardly remembered”.8 These were the times of deepest fin-
landization when also Kekkonen occasionally intervened in his-
torical debates by trying to teach the nation that it should real-
ize how significant a role the Soviet Russia had played in the 
formation of Finnish independence.  
In the political culture of the 1970s and the 1980s it was quite 
customary that Power regulated the content of the messages 
from the past as well as from the present. In this spirit it con-
trolled the intellectual life in general, and as Dr Oikari puts it in 
a Foucaultian language, Hungarian socialism had its own ‘pol-
icy of truth’, the lessons of which the people had to learn. Ac-
cording to György Aczél’s system of three Ts (tiltott = prohib-
ited, türt = tolerated, and támogatott = supported), it was, but 
only in principle, possible to convince the authorities that 
“socks with holes and a typewriter” should be exhibited at pub-
lic expense as a work of art.9 In times of serious economic prob-
lems, cultural policy became alarmist, ringing the bell of loom-
ing disaster in the ears of artists and writers who had not quite 
fulfilled the requirements and ideals of socialist realism.10 Oi-
kari’s doctoral thesis dealt with the same problematic in the 
context of Hungarian-Finnish literary and cultural relations, 
and she found that the ‘policy of translation’ was tied up with 
the same power structures.11 It may well be that here lies also 
the reason why the work of the Nobel laureate, Imre Kertész, 
was relatively unknown to the Hungarian reading public. His 
work was tolerated, though awarded, not supported, even dis-
couraged. It was obviously too ‘subjectivist’ for the ‘collective 
consciousness’ which was yet to be built in Hungary. 
Dr Horváth’s contribution to this volume proves that the 
building of a socialist model town on socialist ideals of man did 
not quite result in its planned objectives. Not everybody was 
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ready to live up to the ideals, and some started to form their 
own sub-cultures, so irritating to the authorities. The people 
forced to move into monstrous environment also tended to es-
cape back to the countryside. But, as both Dr Varga’s and Pro-
fessor Pihkala’s papers illuminate, the conditions in the coun-
tryside were changing for the worse. Periods of reform (1963–, 
1968–), during which the leash of the state was slackened and 
the agricultural co-operatives fared relatively well, were fol-
lowed by ‘conservative’ reaction (1972–1973), which halted the 
individual incentive in agriculture and caused serious damage 
in the national economy. In Finland, the founding of large state-
owned enterprises lasted until the 1970s. The ideology of plan-
ning was borrowed from socialism and favoured by the politi-
cal Left (1966–). While the flight from the countryside in 
Finland was in full swing, the planning officers were busy in 
industrial site and town planning, outlined a new, more democ-
ratic social policy and culture of science. For both Hungary and 
Finland the 1970s and 1980s were the great age of professionali-
zation. For Finland, in particular, it was an era of increased state 
intervention in the economy and culture by extensive bureauc-
racy, which was already a burden in Hungary. In hindsight, 
this growth brought forth the generation of scholars and scien-
tists which opened Hungarian-Finnish contacts in ever expand-
ing fields, now rather through various projects in the natural 
and applied sciences than through the traditional humanities. 
Hungarians were eager to import various technical innovations 
from Finland to Hungary, ranging from traffic safety systems to 
monitoring heart diseases and alcoholism. It remains for future 
studies to reveal the extent and significance of these relations 
brought about under the umbrella of the agreement of the two 
national Academies. It is only to be hoped that the present vol-
ume will encourage future research to take up themes left un-
explored here. 
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1 Magyarország helye a. 20. századi Európában. Szerkesztette – Sipos 
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nelmi Társulat. Budapest 2002. 
2 For controversial popular expressions of the same see e.g. in Kopátsy, 
Sándor, Kádár és kora. C.E.T. Belvárosi Kiadó, Budapest 2002; Büky, 
Barna, Visszapillantás a hidegháborúra. Balassi Kiadó, Budapest 2001, 
esp. 43, 53.  
3 Entäs kun tulee se yhdestoista? Suomettumisen uusi historia. Ed. Johan 
Bäckman. WSOY, Juva 2001; Vihavainen, Timo, Kansakunta rähmäl-
lään: suomettumisen lyhyt historia. Otava, Helsinki 1991. 
4 Halmesvirta, Anssi, ’Scientific Co-operation between Hungary and 
Finland, 1965-1980’. A paper read at the Tampere seminar, 3rd Septem-
ber, 2002 (unpublished ms. University of Jyväskylä, Dept. of History). 
5 Cf. Előterjesztés a kulturális és tudományos propagandáról (KKI). MOL, 
M-KS-288-22.cs-1971-34.ö.e; Feljegyzés (Dr. Szatmári I.) Helsinki, 1971 
julius 23. MOL, KÜM-XIX-J-1-j-Finn-142-002422/1-1971. 43.d. 
6 Földes, György, ”Kádár János külpolitikai nézetei (1956–1967)”. In Pritz 
2002, 139. 
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9 Aczél, György, ”Aspects of Cultural Policy”. The New Hungarian Quar-
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10 For the socialist ideals, see Szabó, Márton, Diszkurzív térben. Tanul-
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11 Oikari, Raija, Vallankäytöstä Suomen ja Unkarin kirjallisissa ja kulttuu-
risuhteissa (Unpublished thesis, University of Jyväskylä, Dept. of Lite-
rature 2001). 
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Foes Who Grew Better With Time: 
The Image of János Kádár and Urho Kekkonen in the 
West from 1956 to the End of the 1960s 
 
Vesa VARES 
 
 
1 Two Statesmen as Symbols and Images 
First of all, it must be noted, that this is not a study of János 
Kádár and Urho Kekkonen as such; no attempt will be made to 
clarify what kind of politicians they were and what kind of pol-
icy they actually pursued. That issue is still very controversial 
in their respective countries and the sources available for this 
study do not offer a possibility to answer those questions. 
Rather, the purpose is to clarify the image they had in the West – 
the “West” meaning in this case the United States and Britain. 
This also implies that the conclusions of this research are not 
judgements on Kekkonen or Kádár as such, but on the Western 
superpowers. Western opinions and views on these persons are 
the object. Kekkonen and Kádár are rather spectres and mirrors 
through which Western policy is illuminated as the actual ob-
ject of this study. The often very critical assessments on 
Kekkonen and Kádár are not taken as any value as such – the 
truth or falseness of those assessments are not as interesting as 
the attitudes which can be seen lurking behind them. The simi-
larity between reality and the image is of minor importance, 
because it was the image, not the actual reality, which deter-
mined the Western political line towards Finland and Hungary. 
In this sense the image was reality to the West, even if it was – 
VESA VARES 
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as it often was – actually erroneous or at least one-sided. This 
image was based on the information available to the West – not 
on archives nor on the benefit of hindsight.  
Kekkonen and Kádár are in fact quite good ‘tools’ for just 
this kind of research. Neither Finland nor Hungary was an is-
sue which would have been crucial to Western interests, and 
both were geographically and also in many cases mentally dis-
tant. Prejudices and expectations often prevailed, so the state-
ments reveal the mental climate. It could also be asked whether 
Kádár and Kekkonen also became kind of scapegoats in the 
Western psychology – especially Kádár for the tragedy and 
failure of the 1956 uprising, but also Kekkonen in ‘wasting’ the 
Paasikivi heritage and letting the Soviets interfere also in Fin-
nish internal affairs. 
However, one cannot talk about a real ‘enemy image’ or a 
method with which the bloc of one’s own is made more solid by 
‘creating enemies’. Both Kekkonen and Kádár were, after all, 
too insignificant for this from the American or British view-
point. One can say that there were expectations for both Kádár 
and Kekkonen, and their images differed in various periods, 
depending on how these expectations were fulfilled. Did the 
two statesmen live up to the expectation that they would at 
least try to keep the Soviet influence as minimal as possible 
with all the means at their disposal? Or did they let the bear in? 
The period in question extends from 1956 to the end of the 
1960s. Both Kádár and Kekkonen rose to power in 1956 – the 
former after the Hungarian uprising was crushed, the latter less 
dramatically in a presidential election. Both had also previously 
been members of the prominent political élite in their respective 
countries. The late 1960s is a suitable period to conclude the 
study because it marks an end of the consolidation era: both 
Kádár and Kekkonen were still in power, seemed very likely to 
remain in power for a long time and in fact did, and the Cold 
War had reached a new stage in which there was a real possibil-
ity that these former foes might perhaps be seen in a new role, 
as moderate stabilisers. This was even more so because the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia marked a much more dangerous fu-
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ture. Also the West was not planning its strategy as aggres-
sively and was not as confident of changes to its benefit in the 
near future as it had been ten years before. 
This study can be described as a history of diplomacy and in-
ternational relations. As such it might represent the very thing 
which the so-called ‘post-modern’ philosophy abhors as ‘old-
fashioned’ and ‘elitist.’ Even though there might be some truth in 
this, Finland and Hungary in Western policy actually do repre-
sent this old-school history of old-school diplomacy – especially 
during the Cold War years. A ‘post-modern’ effort to stress con-
tacts of ‘civic societies’ in these cases and periods would be too 
trendy in respect of the realities of the situation. However, from 
the late 1960s there were undoubtedly new possibilities in this 
area, but these will have to be considered from other standpoints 
in possible future studies*. The fact is that the nature for the pre-
sent study is ‘traditional’ because it would be quite artificial to 
pretend that any ‘post-modern’ or other state of affairs would 
have existed in this kind of case in the 1956-1968 era. 
It must also be added that the domestic events in the United 
States and Britain do not play a big role in the analysis of the 
motives of these countries. This is due to the fact that the circles 
which had opinions on Finnish and Hungarian issues were very 
small; domestic changes influenced only bigger issues, like the 
Cold War, fear of Russia and Communism, the situation in 
Germany, the Third World and Imperialism, etc. In fact, it does 
not seem that the Western policy line was particularly depend-
ent of the fact which party – Democratic or Republican, Con-
servative or Labour – was in power in the United States or in 
England. Because Finland and Hungary were not vital to the 
West, the policy concerning them was usually decided by the 
desk officers in the State Department and the Foreign Office; 
these issues seldom required a ministerial decision or comment. 
As previously noted, this study ends in the 1960s. It must, of 
course, be confessed that the available sources as well set the fi-
                                                          
* Cf. Oikari’s article. [Ed. note] 
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nishing point in the 1960s. The British archives are available 
only until the turn of the 1960s-70s and the American archives 
until the early 1970s. Because it has not been possible to check 
the National Archives at College Park for material on American-
Hungarian relations for this study, most American material is in 
Hungary’s case taken from the FRUS-Online series (Foreign Re-
lations of the United States) from their web-sites. The material 
concerning Finland was gone through at College Park in 1997. 
As far as the British material is concerned, the actual papers on 
Hungary in Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, have also been 
used, although not as extensively as in the Finnish case. 
Because of all this there might be more quotations from the 
British sources than their actual influence (compared to the 
Americans) would have warranted, but at least the material 
available to this study does not suggest that there would have 
been any serious divergence between the American and British 
lines. Not at least in the cases of countries like Hungary and 
Finland. The general trend seems to have been that the only real 
difference was that the British were a bit more moderate and 
cautious – which is of course not very surprising since their 
resources and influence in world policy were much smaller 
than the ones of the Americans. 
 
2 Hungary 
2.1 Aspect of the Cold War: Traitors to be Ostracized 
The factual events of the 1956 uprising and the biographical, 
personal history of Kádár will not be described here, since it can 
be assumed these are already known* and since this study has 
                                                          
* In today’s Hungary Kádár and his legacy are highly controversial is-
sues. See e.g. Rácz, Árpád (Ed.), Ki volt Kádár? Budapest, Rubicon-
Aquila, 2001. A balanced view is presented by Földes György in his 
“Kádár János (1912-1989)”. In Nagy képes Millennium Arcképcsarnok. 
100 portré a Magyar Történelemről. Szerk. Rácz Árpád. Budapest, Rubi-
con-Aquila, 1999, 355-361. Cf. Huszár, Tibór, Kádár János politikai élet-
rajza 1. köt. 1912-1956. Budapest, Szabad tér – Kossuth, 2001. [Ed note.]  
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to do with image, not with the actual events. More important is 
to remember the starting points for the West: Hungary was a 
country which had been under a very strict Stalinist control and 
which was in the enemy camp. Even the simultaneous dis-
agreements of crisis such as that over the Suez Canal were not 
relevant in the case of Hungary, where the West thought it 
could see the Cold War re-emerge violently from the Soviet 
side. 
After the national uprising was crushed it was thus crystal 
clear to the West who were the heroes and who were the foes. 
The Hungarian Communists were considered Moscow’s pup-
pets and henchmen, the real aggressor being the Soviet Union. 
The uprising was seen, as the British Envoy Leslie Fry defined 
it, as a ”revolt of a nation”, and it had been directed against 
Soviet exploitation and Communist oppression.1 
In practice, the new Hungarian leaders, Kádár included, 
were boycotted after the crushing of the uprising. The United 
States in particular aimed to deny credentials to the Hungarian 
UN Delegation because of the atrocities in crushing the upris-
ing. The American view can be seen also from the motivations 
for a UN solution, which the US Legation made to its British 
counterpart in Budapest: 
 
a) It should comprise a series of steps, and not be a ’package’ pro-
posal. b) The measures proposed should be such that no formal ac-
ceptance of them either by the Russians or by the Hungarians was 
necessary. c) It should appeal to the ’uncommitted’ nations. d) It 
should consist of measures which could be carried out within the 
existing Hungarian constitution. e) It should, if possible, be able to 
show some advantage to the Soviet Government. 
 
As such, there was also an aspect of Realpolitik; it was per-
ceived that not much could be done and that the Russians 
would need some face-saving measures. But on the whole the 
American line was uncompromising. The American Legation 
suggested that it would also be demanded that Hungary should 
withdraw such legislation (it is illuminating that the word “leg-
islation” was in parenthesis), which made arbitrary arrests, in-
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carcerations, summary trials, etc. possible. The UN should also 
demand new negotiations about the stationing of Soviet troops 
in Hungary, more cultural freedom, reducing the pressure of 
the party in schools, increasing the number of workers’ councils 
and the widening of the government. It was, of course, taken 
for granted that these conditions would not be met, but as the 
Soviets would reject them, it would be a propaganda victory for 
the West.2 
The American National Security Council – which drafted the 
policy lines to be approved by the President – also claimed that 
the uprising was a moral victory against Communism in the 
long run. This, of course, was partly an ideologically ‘compul-
sory’ interpretation and revealed, in fact, that the West had no 
means to influence events behind the Iron Curtain. The NSC 
considered, however, that there were possibilities for evolu-
tionary development of the satellites, and thus they could dis-
tance them more and more from old-time Stalinism and the 
influence of Moscow. The future looked most promising in 
Yugoslavia and in Gomulka´s Poland. 
Compared to them, Hungary was totally black. 
 
The present Communist regime in Hungary, in consolidating its 
physical control of the nation, has followed a policy of terror and 
intimidation clearly intended to wipe out all resistance. Although 
the Hungarian people continue to despise this regime, a surface 
calm prevails and the normal pattern of life under Soviet Commu-
nism has resumed… 
Because Hungary has become an important psychological fac-
tor in the world-wide struggle of the free nations against expan-
sionist Soviet Communism, U.S. policy must maintain a delicate 
balance; it must seek to encourage the same evolutionary devel-
opments as in the other nations of Eastern Europe, without com-
promising the symbol which Hungary has become. More restraint 
will be required in dealing directly with regime officials than in 
certain other nations of the area, and the timing of U.S. moves will 
be of great importance.3 
 
In 1958-59 the NSC defined Western goals in Soviet-
dominated Eastern Europe. The general line was not totally 
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militant nor black and white in its perceptions. Of course, there 
would be a continuous refusal to accept the status quo of Soviet 
domination over the nations of Eastern Europe as permanent, 
and there would be a continuous affirmation of the right of the 
dominated peoples to national independence and to govern-
ments of their own free choosing. However, simultaneously it 
was assumed that the West had to deal with the present Com-
munist governments, not to expect them to be overthrown in 
the foreseeable future. Even so, also in this document Hungary 
was presented in the most negative light4: 
 
There has been no progress toward the achievement of U.S. policy 
objectives in Hungary. In the absence of any favorable change in 
the Hungarian regime's defiant and uncooperative attitude toward 
the UN and its efforts to deal with the problems arising from the 
1956 revolution, U.S. relations with Hungary remain strained, and 
the United States has continued successfully its efforts to keep the 
Hungarian situation before World opinion and under active con-
sideration at the UN. 
 
The British may not have disagreed with the general line, but 
having far less superpower resources, they could usually rec-
ommend no alternative action. Mere propaganda would not 
help much if nothing concrete would be achieved. As the Brit-
ish Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Patrick Reilly, pointed out to 
the Foreign Office, the Soviet Union took no heed of interna-
tional pressure, and if the UN tried to deny the Hungarian cre-
dentials in the UN, it would only reveal the impotence of the 
UN. The only possible way to get any results would be high 
level talks with the Soviets – for example between the Secretary 
General of the UN and the Soviet Ambassador in the UN.5 
It is hardly surprising that Reilly´s colleague in Budapest, 
Leslie Fry, emphasized more the moralistic view, in conjunction 
with a certain pragmatism: 
 
While I agree that the Russians should logically be our main target, 
it seems to me to be going too far to say that ’to take action against 
the Hungarians would be hitting the wrong target’. 
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There was nothing illogical about hitting the secondary tar-
get, “the Hungarian puppets”, if you could not hit the main 
one, “their Russian masters”. Neither did Fry take very seri-
ously the threat that Hungary would in return expel the West-
ern Legations from Budapest.6 The atrocities which he had wit-
nessed in Budapest clearly made him the most militant 
representative of the British diplomatic corps. 
When Fry wrote to his superiors a critical evaluation of the 
UN plan of the Americans, he seems to have seen even that as 
too moderate. According to him, the UN representative or 
group should not be a negotiator in any normal sense of the 
word, but “an ’educator’ seeking to convince the Russians that 
concessions should be made to the Hungarian people”. Of 
course, the Russians would not accept proposals put to them; 
but they might initiate something else, if they would be con-
vinced that world opinion demanded it and that they would 
not lose thereby.7 
On the whole, however, the British were more moderate, or 
at least less convinced of the usefulness of propagandist ges-
tures. This became evident on a small scale when the Inter-
Parliamentary Union was summoned in London in 1957 and 
Hungary planned to send the hard-line communist Sándor 
Rónai as the Hungarian representative. Fry recommended that 
Rónai should be denied access, and his further advice on how 
the Hungarians should be approached was not particularly dip-
lomatic. He recommended that it be expressed:  
 
that, as the Kadar Government was imposed on the Hungarian 
people by force of Russian arms, a delegation from a ’Parliament’ 
consisting solely of Kadar’s stooges can hardly expect to be recog-
nised in this country as representing the people of Hungary and to 
complain to the Delegation. 
 
This was too much for the desk officers: they admitted that 
the British could mention oppression and that the British peo-
ple regarded with horror ”the executions, arbitrary arrests, po-
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litical prisons and concentration and forced labour camps 
which are now such prominent features on the Hungarian 
scene”. But it was doubtful whether Fry’s suggestion would 
pay off in any way. In the first place, there would be several 
other delegations at the Conference of whom much the same 
thing could be said; and in the second, it was hardly logical si-
multaneously to tell people that they were mere stooges and 
then go on to protest to them about what their Government was 
doing.8 The realities of Realpolitik were getting more important 
as time went by. 
The British felt also that the Hungarians saw or wanted to 
see British policy as more moderate than that of the other West-
ern countries. Especially during Prime Minister Harold Macmil-
lan´s visit to the Soviet Union in 1959 the Hungarian attitude 
towards the British approached, according to the British, ”even 
cordiality and I was forced to listen to clumsy exercises in 
wedge-driving through contrast between British flexibility and 
American-German intransigence”.9 Naturally, the British did 
not want to see their moderation in this light or take the role of 
a deserter.10 Even so, their comments on American policy on 
Hungary were less and less enthusiastic: the standard British 
line was that, repulsive as the Kádár Government was, the 
American approach had been proved ”sterile” and it was in the 
interests of the West to do whatever they could to promote con-
tacts with the Hungarian nation and to prevent the traditional 
links from being broken.11 Whereas the American line empha-
sized the isolation of Hungary, the British thought the same 
goals could perhaps be achieved better from within. 
The Americans held to their own line. When State Secretary 
Christian Herter approved in November 1960 that the Legations 
in Bucharest and Sofia should be raised to the status of Embas-
sies, he specifically stated that this would not apply to Buda-
pest, since “our current relations with Hungary are anomalous 
and wholly negative”.12 
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2.2 Kádár: the Quisling of 1956 – or a Lesser Evil? 
Seen from the starting points and policy strategies mentioned 
previously, it is hardly surprising that the Western view on 
Kádár’s person was extremely suspicious and negative. At best, 
Kádár was seen as a mediocrity and a victim of circumstances 
who had had no choice if he wanted to save his own skin. At 
worst, he was seen as a traitor and a quisling, who had joined 
the Russians because of personal ambition. What was worst and 
most ominous – according to this interpretation – was that he 
had not done this because he had to, but because he had 
wanted to gain power in Hungary. Even his personal honesty 
was in doubt, because he had first joined the Nagy regime but 
then deserted it and seemed to have willingly adopted the role 
of a Soviet puppet. In this interpretation it was also taken for 
granted that Kádár had no popular support at all; he was uni-
versally considered a traitor. In fact, some of the Western spec-
tators thought the Hungarian people were so disgusted with 
him that even the Soviets would have liked to replace him by 
another, less hated figure.13 
In January 1957, envoy Fry distinguished Kádár from Imre 
Nagy in these terms: 
 
M. Nagy, his loyalty confronted during the brief days of freedom 
with a choice between Moscow and Hungary, stood steadfast by 
his own country. But his partner in power, M. Kádár, had already 
betrayed her; and the Russians, as reward, set him up as head of a 
puppet government in the provincial town of Szolnok.14 
 
A “Personality”-report on Kádár was hardly more merciful: 
 
Never of first-rate ability or great strength of character, Kádár on 
his emergence from prison [1954] was unable to decide which 
brand of communism to support. On August 12, 1956, he publicly 
dissociated himself from the Rákosi-Gerő line, but when in the au-
tumn he entered the short-lived second Nagy Government, al-
though himself a non-Muscovite, he made common cause with the 
Russians. It is worth noting, however, that after Nagy´s Govern-
ment fell Kádár was called on to form a Cabinet while he was on a 
visit to the U.S.S.R. and he was thus without any freedom of choice 
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whatsoever… the workers´councils (banned except in the factories) 
which, though disembodied, are still influential, treat Kádár with 
complete contempt. Kádár, in short, is a leader without a follow-
ing. His past record suggests that he would prefer Communism 
shorn of its worst excesses, but that, although he owes his life to 
the Nagy reforms, he would not go further along the path towards 
’liberal’ Communism.15 
 
However, the most sinister interpretation of Kádár’s motives 
gave way gradually to a view which at least admitted that 
Kádár was not the most Stalinist alternative: there were still 
even worse options among the old Rákosists.16 But even this 
might not be a cause to change the opinion, because even in this 
case Kádár would hardly have space to manoeuvre. As one of 
the Foreign Office officials put it colourfully: 
 
Thus, while it may still be true that there are moderate and extrem-
ist factions within the party, their interests at the moment largely 
coincide: they must hang together if they are not to hang sepa-
rately.17 
 
At any rate there was no hope on the horizon. 
But it seems that now, paradoxically and gradually, Kádár 
had become to represent some sort of “lesser evil”, compared to 
the old Rákosi guard. And if there were to be hope of any im-
provement or even the end of deterioration and oppression, it 
would probably be connected in association with his name. A 
short time later the defeat of the Molotovians in Kremlin was 
seen as an advancement for Kádár.18 However, in the Western 
eyes Kádár’s position was still very unstable and there was cer-
tainly no respect connected to his name. And the bottom line at 
the end of 1957 was still that the resistance of the Hungarian 
people against Communist oppression was strong.19  
 
2.3 A Gradual Change to the Better 
Gradually, however, also the West had to adapt itself to the 
situation. Besides, even though the Kádár regime was still con-
sidered emotionally repulsive, no onlooker could deny that the 
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situation in Hungary seemed to be normalising – and the econ-
omy even prospering. Even the NSC admitted this in 1958: 
 
A certain degree of moderation has been evident in the economic 
policy of the Hungarian regime. Collectivization of agriculture re-
mains the ultimate goal, but Kadar has asserted that this will be 
achieved by ‘Leninist’ persuasion rather than ‘Stalinist’ coercion. A 
degree of private enterprise among artisans and small tradesmen 
has been tolerated though not encouraged, and there has been an 
effort to keep the market reasonably well supplied with consumer 
goods. With the aid of extensive grants and loans from the Soviet 
Union and the other Communist nations, the Hungarian economy 
has recovered from the effects of the revolution more rapidly than 
had been anticipated, though grave economic problems remain.20 
 
Although the aspect of economic development was often 
partially moderated with the expression ”according to Eastern 
European standards”, it was still  a fact. On one hand, this was 
a positive development. On the other, it could be also politically 
worrying: would the Kádár regime thus be able to ‘buy’ the 
popular support which the people of Hungary had thus far de-
nied him? At the same time, the belief that the Hungarian peop-
le would continuously resist oppressive regime diminished. 
Also, Kádár’s personal position and standing seemed to 
change. Even this was a dilemma with at least two aspects. On 
the one hand, if one took the moralistic view of 1956, it was not 
mentally comfortable to see how the quisling and demon of 
1956 was becoming tolerable. On the other hand, if Kádár 
gained more personal authority, it was not inconceivable that 
he would some day be able to stand up against the Soviets, at 
least on some issues. 
The execution of Imre Nagy produced a shocked moral out-
cry, but even that did not have any permanent effect. The 
Americans did not, in fact, blame Kádár for the execution in 
their own secret negotiations. The execution was considered a 
factor which, if anything, would tend to damage his position. 
The Head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, expressed his conviction 
that the signal for the executions had almost certainly come 
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from Moscow and that they had been intended as warnings 
first to Tito and thereafter to Gomulka. “He (Dulles) thought it 
likely that in the sequel Kadar would drop out of the political 
picture quite soon.”21 
But despite Dulles’ comment above, at least the British did 
not expect Kádár to fall soon, and when Kádár visited the So-
viet Union in April 1958, the West considered his position in 
Hungary safe: the extremists had not gained the upper hand.22 
In late 1959 the British also concluded a new ”Personalities”-
list in which they analyzed the leading circles of Hungary and 
even some of the potential opposition forces. It should be added 
that according to the information of the archive catalogue an 
even more extensive list also exists, but this is still secret. 
The analysis of the list available is, however, very illuminat-
ing. Kádár is, of course, the obvious target of interest, but also 
some other personalities are worth mentioning.  
 
Kádár, János: Immediately after the revolution, Kádár offered 
many concessions to the workers and the revolutionary councils, 
including the principle of multi-party free elections and the with-
drawal of Soviet troops. At this time he did his best to represent 
himself as a moderate. But his term of power has been marked by 
steadily increasing repression in all fields and the elimination of 
most of the political concessions won by the Revolution. It has 
been rumoured that, particularly in the summer of 1957, he fa-
voured the introduction of a more moderate line but was over-
ruled. His speeches have been harsh, he accepted without protest 
the execution of Nagy and his associates in June, 1958, and, what-
ever his personal views, he appears to be a reliable tool in the 
hands of his Soviet masters, ready to carry out any excesses which 
are demanded of him. It is believed that his nerve and will-power 
have never recovered from his sufferings in prison; but his public 
appearances present a facade of confidence and determination. The 
great majority of Hungarians detest him as devoid of every vestige 
of political and moral integrity.23 
 
But it is illuminating that this critical tone seemed to be more 
and more the compulsory mental adherence to the old moralis-
tic values, which, however, would no more be permitted to 
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stand in the way of a pragmatic policy. It would have been too 
much to admit to an erroneous analysis, but the very fact that 
Kádár had remained in power and was likely to be the strong 
man in the future also made it essential to find also good sides 
of him. And at the very least his success had to be admitted.  
Besides, the other characteristics showed that there was no 
better option. To take a couple of examples: 
 
Kiss, Károly: Kiss is one of the key figures in the party today and is 
thought to be in favour of repressive policies. He is the main party 
organiser and disciplinarian and has been largely responsible for 
carrying through the reconstruction of the party since the revolu-
tion. 
 
Marosán, György: He did not play a prominent role in the revolu-
tion of October, but has since repeatedly declared that he voted in 
favour of calling in Soviet troops at the outset on October 23… Ma-
rosán has been one of the Kádár régime’s principal spokesmen 
since its inception, although less has been heard of him in recent 
months. He has made numerous speeches at party meetings and 
Workers’ Conferences, the majority marked by their harsh uncom-
promising attitude. His style is extremely coarse and the published 
versions of his speeches are carefully edited. He has frequently 
stated that there can be no question of the revival of a separate So-
cial Democrat Party... He is uneducated and regarded as some-
thing of a buffoon; but he is dangerous. 
 
Münnich, Ferenc: He is a tough and determined Communist who 
would have been happy to share responsibility for the excesses of 
Rákosi but for his personal friendship with Rákosi’s victim, Rajk. 
He is still said to distinguish himself from those members of the 
leadership who are out and out Rákosists, but he is probably as re-
actionary and inflexible as they are. His allegiance to the Soviet 
Union is probably absolute. 
 
It is interesting that the personality of Ernő Gerő is not com-
mented on at all – his career is only cited as an extended cur-
riculum vitae.24 
 The difference between the British and the American atti-
tude about tactics became clearer and the British were very con-
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scious of it. The Head of the Northern Department, R. H. Ma-
son, answered to the Budapest Legation: ”I entirely agree with 
your view that we must try to encourage a more forward policy 
towards Hungary by the NATO powers as a whole. The Ameri-
can attitude has been an obstacle to this, but we must hope that 
the new Administration [that of Kennedy] will be prepared to 
take a more positive view.”25 
    Thus necessity became a virtue, and it is of minor practical 
consequence whether this was due to a conversion or tactical 
considerations. A year later it was essentially Kádár’s authority 
and personal respect which was emphasized in the British 
analysis, and this trend became more and more obvious in the 
following years.26 A phrase which was frequently repeated was 
that it was accepted that although Kádár would never be able to 
get the real confidence of the Hungarian people, the Hungari-
ans thought Kádár to be the best Prime Minister they were 
likely to get. He was essentially a mediocrity who had risen to 
the top because of events – but Hungarian history was full of 
men who in similar circumstances had adopted the realistic 
policy of doing what was possible. One Hungarian writer had 
even called him the Hungarian Christ because ”some one had 
to save the Hungarian people”.27 And even after Khrushchev 
fell in October 1964 the British did not think that this would 
harm Kádár’s position.28 
    Also, the American image of Kádár was gradually chang-
ing, although the Americans were slower in this mental reha-
bilitation process and did not concentrate so much on Kádár’s 
person. They saw the situation of Hungary in a wider scale – as 
a part of the Communist bloc and as one in which only the So-
viet Union really mattered. When Kádár visited the United Na-
tions, the Americans did not meet him and restricted his trav-
els. Even so, after Kádár had visited the UN the American atti-
tude began to show more signs of interest in him. 
    A report which was issued from ”a reliable source” in De-
cember 1960 described Kádár’s informal comments during this 
visit. They were also thought to be interesting because it was 
assumed that Kádár had actually wished that they would reach 
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the Americans. This is most probably plausible, since the com-
ments show Kádár’s desire to convince the Americans of two 
starting-points: he was in power to stay, but he was also a 
pragmatic man. He would bear no grudge for the suspicions 
and the boycott, and he was a man with whom one could have 
dealings with – only a few circumstances had to be understood 
at first. And thirdly: it paid off to take him seriously, since he 
was no puppet. 
 
Since the events of 1956, there have been a lot of childish (gyerekes) 
things going on between our two countries. I want to be frank with 
you. Both the U.S. Government and we Hungarians have been act-
ing like a couple of kids. Periodically, we expel one another's dip-
lomatic representatives: one American for one Hungarian. I don't 
think this is an intelligent (okos) thing to do. Let us explore the pos-
sibility of an understanding.  
 I don't like the Germans (I mean Adenauer's Germany) but to 
illustrate my feeling on this subject, I would use the German word 
`Realpolitik' to describe the way this matter should be treated. We 
do not hate the Americans. After all, let us be realistic: Who are 
we? We are only a ‘little louse’ (kis tota [sic!])  in this big world. 
However, the prerequisite for normal relations is a willingness on 
the part of the U.S. Government to recognize the hard facts. The 
People's Republic of Hungary is an accomplished fact. It is here to-
day. It will stay here tomorrow. All you have to do is to recognize 
this fact. The rest is simple. We could then resume normal diplo-
matic representations instead of this ridiculous (navetaeges [sic!]) 
Charge d'Affaires business. 
The U.S. Government talks about Hungary being a Soviet satel-
lite. Now on this subject let me tell you the following. It has cost 
the U.S.S.R. a lot of money to help normalize our conditions after 
1956. Today we are happily engaged in constructive work. Our 
people enjoy freedom. No more of the Rakosi terror. Believe me, 
we don't take people to prison in the middle of the night any more. 
If you don't believe me, then talk to our writers, our intellectuals 
who were released from prison. Talk to Tibor Dary [Déry], the 
writer. And all this nonsense about Khrushchev dictating every-
thing in Hungary – it is simply not true… 
Let me assure you, once the U.S. recognizes that there was such 
a thing as the People's Republic with Kadar as its leader, we would 
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not have a single problem. I cannot emphasize that strongly 
enough. 
I must tell you in earnest: We have no illusions concerning the 
possibility that the U.S. will become a socialist or a communist 
state. We Hungarian Communists are realists. We know that your 
country is capitalist, and it will not adopt our system. (Source: Mr. 
Kadar, this does not seem to be in line with Mr. Khrushchev's re-
mark to the effect that our grandchildren in the U.S. will live under 
Communism.) 
What makes you think that we have to go along with every-
thing our Comrades say? We Communists like to argue with each 
other. That is the democratic thing to do. The principal thing is that 
the East and West must co-exist in peace and that we must negoti-
ate. Take this present UN debate. It is much better to shout (kisbalai 
[sic!]) at each other than to shoot (loni [sic!]) at each other.29 
 
The message is clear: Kádár wanted to show that he was not 
a man who would hang himself for any dogma. He even took 
the trouble to emphasize his peasant (!) origin and love for na-
ture and animals, even to joke about how he would not like to 
live in New York: “Not enough trees and (laugh) too many po-
licemen.” And then he appealed to American nationalism by 
confessing his and his people’s admiration for Ulysses Grant. 
The document does not, however, reveal the American reaction 
to Kádár’s words. 
Even as the image of Kádár became better, one thing still an-
noyed even the British: they thought that Hungary was buying 
internal independence by being extra loyal and rigid in foreign 
policy.30 The Americans had even more to complain about, 
since according to their view Hungary was one of the most ea-
ger supporters of North Vietnam and so vehement in its con-
demnation of ‘American imperialism’. In 1965 there even oc-
curred a demonstration of Asian and African students in Buda-
pest against the American Legation, and the sanctity of the Le-
gation premises was violated – according to the Americans, 
with no effort on the part of the Hungarian authorities to pre-
vent this. 
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2.4 The end of the 1960s: Stability and Expectations 
At the end of the 1960s the image of Hungary and Kádár had 
become relatively stable and even positive – if one bore in mind 
the starting points and the obvious differences. 
Also, the American policy line had softened remarkably. The 
standard line, which can clearly be seen in the document Chang-
ing Patterns in Eastern Europe in 1964, was now that the Com-
munist regimes were there to stay in Eastern Europe. But now 
they were seen as representatives of national communism, and 
they would consciously and methodically attempt to free them-
selves as much from the dominance of Moscow as possible. In 
this way the Communist bloc would loose its monolithic na-
ture. 
It was assumed that this political evolution was not likely to 
proceed at a speed which would threaten the Communist re-
gimes as such, but the logic of this development would make 
the difference – against Moscow anyhow. The national Com-
munist regimes were now the main force which could oppose 
Moscow in Eastern Europe, so it was not practical any more to 
treat them as oppressive and undemocratic quisling govern-
ments, but to try to develop relations with them. It was also 
assumed that the Soviets would consider direct military inter-
vention in Eastern Europe only in extreme circumstances, when 
they believed vital Soviet interests to be threatened. Even the 
fall of Khrushchev did not change this analysis.31  In any case 
the principle was that the United States should improve its rela-
tions with Eastern European countries – even to strengthen 
their Communist regimes.32 
All this was a far cry from the old moralistic view which 
drew a sharp distinction between the cause of the free, democ-
ratic world and that of the evil communist bloc. No immediate 
victory was in sight; probably there was even some thought of a 
possible convergence of the two systems in the long run. 
As the British Ambassador in Budapest, Alexander Morley, 
stated in his Annual Report in January 1967: 
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the Hungarian leadership abjured old-fashioned dogmatist Com-
munism and became committed to the search for a new brand of 
Communism, aimed at giving the people of this country material 
benefits similar to those enjoyed by their neighbours to the West… 
I have the impression that if it is possible to combine a workable 
economic liberalism with full public ownership of production and 
strict central political control, which to us are the essence of com-
munism, it is as likely to be seen in Hungary as anywhere…. Con-
trary to the usual stereotype of how Hungarians behave (which is 
not always wrong) the Hungarian party and governmental appara-
tus has been moving slowly and methodically. 33 
 
The Hungarians had noticed the change and seemed to sense 
that they did not need to be begging to be released from the 
boycott. They knew it was in the interests in the United States 
to dispell the old animosity. So thus Hungary could wait and 
make its peace with the Americans on its own terms. The 
chargé d’affaires in Washington, János Radvanyi, could afford 
even a slightly sarcastic tone in his negotiations with the 
Americans: 
 
As to RFE [Radio Free Europe], Radvanyi said that Premier Kadar 
had decided to cease jamming of this station to bring some humor 
into the life of Hungarians, since RFE broadcasts were so ridicu-
lous they could not be taken seriously… Radvanyi next adverted to 
Cardinal Mindszenty. The US, he said, should put pressure on the 
Vatican to find a solution of the case. It was unfortunate that there 
was no provision in the Catholic Church for the pensioning of 
Cardinals, he continued, since this might permit a solution of the 
issue.34 
 
True, the Vietnam issue was still stressed by the Hungarians, 
but even here the Americans now seemed apt to interpret it in a 
new light. It was now considered to be mostly lip-service and 
necessary political currency which enabled a greater degree of 
internal independence to be bought from the Soviets. The issue 
was not in reality important to Hungary, so the West could af-
ford this price. Hungary was considered to be much more 
moderate than the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Re-
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public, and it was also understood to take a charitable view on 
the reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1967-68. It was thought that 
Kádár would not allow himself to be forced either to follow the 
Czech model or to actively attack it.35 
In May 1968 the British Ambassador Millard had a long talk 
with Kádár and naturally sent a long report to London. Kádár’s 
remarks resembled those he had made in 1960 (the ones which 
were probably addressed to the Americans): he thought the 
quarrels were mostly due to misconceptions, and as he had as-
sured to the Americans that he foresaw no socialist revolution 
in America, he now assured that he did not want to destroy the 
British Empire. But there was even more confidence in his tone 
now: he was firmly in the saddle and would remain so. And he 
pointed out that even though political relations with the West 
Germans were bad, the Germans had made an effort to develop 
economic relations. The British should do the same: 
  
Reverting to this theme of the need for our two countries to under-
stand each other, Kádár said that we would be aware of what had 
happened in Hungary during and since the war. They had suffered 
much, and for the events of 1956 they had paid a very high price. 
They were not now going to sell cheaply what had been won. If I 
knew the Hungarians, I would know that this was how most of 
them felt. 
 
Concerning the Czechs, Kádár took an almost patronising 
tone: the Czech reforms were not a threat to socialism, and in 
many ways the Czechs were now catching up with the Hungar-
ian reforms: ”They were dealing with their problems in their 
own way, and he was confident of their ability to succeed.” 
The Ambassador’s analysis to London ended in a manner 
which combined respect with a somewhat calculating tone: 
 
To some extent the strength of Kádár’s position is the lack of credi-
ble alternatives. Hungarians are cynical about their leadership and 
of course they have no means of changing it, but he is the best First 
Secretary they have. More positively his prestige is due to his 
strong personality and the relatively humane quality of his rule. 
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Although there is little communication between Government and 
people, the Hungarians sense that under the pressures of office he 
has revealed statesmanlike qualities. Many are disposed to give 
him credit for this, although there is much else about the regime 
which they would condemn. The policy of reconciliation has pro-
duced results and to a limited extent Kádár has capitalised national 
feeling. From this brief contact he appears confidently in control.36 
 
The desk officers in London agreed – and were especially in-
terested in Kádár’s views on the Czech reforms and their fu-
ture.37 
Kádár had a roughly equivalent meeting with the American 
representative. This was all the more important because this 
marked the final normalisation of US-Hungarian relations. And 
also in this meeting he played the part of the good-humoured 
father of the nation – and of a statesman who was big enough to 
forgive his counterpart’s blunders. In a sense, he had a valid 
opportunity to pose as the winner in the US-Hungarian contro-
versy, since this was the first time an American Ambassador 
had met him after the long boycott. “There was no false mod-
esty, and he spoke with the assurance of someone who is not 
only party boss but the real power in this country.” 
According to the Ambassador, Kádár had emphasized the 
need for peaceful coexistence as the only rational approach be-
tween countries whose systems were based on differing theo-
ries of society. It might not have been possible to say this 
twenty years earlier, when the pressure of ideological differ-
ences had been much more intense, but the basic problem now 
was to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war between the two su-
perpowers. And once again, referring to the previous bad rela-
tions between the USA and Hungary, Kádár made a practical 
analogy: 
  
He had compared the situation at that time as similar to two box-
ers who had been slugging at each other for seven rounds (from 
1956 to 1963). Neither could hope to knock the other out, neither 
was prepared to capitulate, and neither could ultimately hope to 
gain very much from the contest. Hungary was not prepared to 
VESA VARES 
 36 
come on its knees to the US, and he knew the US was not prepared 
to assume this posture before Hungary. As I knew, he went on, the 
UN problem had now been solved in an acceptable way. If we ap-
proached current problems in the same spirit which had finally led 
to a solution of the Hungarian question in the UN, based upon re-
alistic acceptance of the facts of life, then there was good possibil-
ity of advancing towards agreement in other areas… Both sides 
would, of course, indulge in propaganda against each other, but 
firm and realistic acceptance of this truth would not let the possi-
bilities of improving our relations be submerged by such propa-
ganda. 
…Kadar was in an obviously relaxed, good humoured, some-
times semi-ironic mood. He was well-briefed and had apparently 
carefully thought out the line of argument he wished to use. He 
seemed to enjoy playing the role of a confident leader big enough 
to forget the past, and hopeful for betterment of Hungarian-
American relations though very mindful of present difficulties.38 
 
Even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia no real fears were 
expressed about Hungary’s own reforms in the field of eco-
nomic freedom and the extended self-government of the people 
– at least as long as the Hungarians were allowed to decide 
these things themselves. 
Hungary was one of the occupying powers in the Czecho-
slovakian crisis, but this did not destroy Kádár’s record and 
image in the Western eyes – rather the reverse. Of course, it was 
noted that Hungary had participated in the invasion, but 
simultaneously it was taken for granted that this had been 
something which Kádár would have wanted to avoid; he had 
finally had to accept it in order not to endanger Hungary’s 
position towards the Soviets. No enthusiasm was detected on 
the Hungarian side, rather extremely half-hearted efforts to find 
excuses for the invasion, excuses which they did not in fact take 
seriously themselves, but had to perform as some obligatory 
lip-service. It was evident that the Hungarians had no wish to 
see the Cold War positions return. 
As far as Kádár himself was concerned, there were different 
interpretations whether his position had weakened or not, and 
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a British letter reported also a joke: ”A current joke here is that 
among the telephones on Kádár’s desk, it is easy to tell which is 
the hot line to Moscow, because it has only a receiver.” Also the 
American report included a joke: ”Why are the five armies still 
in Czechoslovakia? They are trying to find the guy who called 
them to help.”39  
In 1968, the standard tone seems to have been that Kádár 
had tried to ride on two horses at the same time and had been 
forced to participate in the invasion – and, had the Czech re-
form policy succeeded, would have ”tried to manoeuvre him-
self into a Dubcek-like posture and tried to ride the whirlwind”. 
In any case it was thought to be essential that the West would 
do nothing to blame Hungary or harm its position. It was in the 
Western interests that contacts with Hungary would increase 
and the Hungarian economic reform survive, because in the 
long run this would strengthen Hungary´s freedom towards the 
Soviet Union.40 The American conclusions were no different.  
It is also interesting to see that whereas in Leslie Fry´s time 
the Legations had been more critical towards Kádár than the 
desk officers in London, now the tables were turned in this re-
spect. Yet again the occupational hazard of diplomats – identifi-
cation with the local conditions – was at work, but this time it 
meant a sort of identification with Kádár’s policies, not with his 
opposition or his victims, as after 1956. Moralizing was now 
absent. 
At any event, in the late 1960s the image of Kádár had thus 
stabilised. It was more positive than negative, and it was ex-
pected to improve, not deteriorate. Hungary belonged, of 
course, to the opposing bloc, but bearing in mind this starting 
point and Hungary’s conditions and possibilities, the results 
were as good as could be expected. The Hungary of Kádár did 
not seem to be very rigid, orthodox or sincerely convinced 
about its own Socialism as such. It was anything but ideologi-
cally expansive and it seemed to want to absorb as much mar-
ket economy and political breathing space as it possibly could 
without provoking the Soviets. This did not mean implementa-
tion of capitalism or democracy as such, but it was pragmatic 
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policy which caused very little trouble to the West. Hungary 
represented the status quo in a liberal shade and this was the 
best that was expected of it – especially after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and the declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
And the riddle of János Kádár remained in many sense un-
solved. As the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Northern 
Department in the Foreign Office, P. Hayman, stated: ”The 
enigma about Kadar remains: how has he been able to combine 
a record of close association with the Soviet Union (in 1956 and 
at other times) with an appearance of national leadership?”41 
The answer remained uncertain, but more important was that 
Kádár had indeed succeeded. 
 
3 Finland 
3.1 Moderate goals: Maintaining the Paasikivi Line 
Finland was in many sense a very different case compared with 
Hungary. It was a neutral country, or at least striving to be neu-
tral; there were no Russian troops in Finland; the country was a 
democracy and had a multi-party system, free elections and a 
press which on the whole was free. However, there are aston-
ishingly many similarities: the Soviet shadow, the tightening 
Soviet grip, a strong leader who remained in power for a long 
period, suspicions in the West, increased political freedom and 
independence and hence a new view towards the formerly dis-
liked national leader. 
In the case of Urho Kekkonen, there are many interpretations 
on how successful he in fact was in maintaining Finnish inde-
pendence and neutrality. According to his supporters, he was a 
genuine success: he managed to obtain recognition of Finnish 
neutrality in the West and thus to win over Western confidence. 
This was something which the cautious Paasikivi had not dared 
even to attempt. In particular the American and British recogni-
tions of Finnish neutrality in 1961 are taken as evidence of 
Kekkonen’s success, the Summit of European Security in 1975 
in Helsinki being the final jewel in his crown. This was conclu-
sive confirmation of the fact that he had become a true Euro-
pean statesman of the first order. 
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According to Kekkonen’s opponents and critics, these 
achievements were not necessarily due to the merits of 
Kekkonen, but something which would have been achieved 
anyhow – possibly achieved even earlier, had Kekkonen not 
been so pro-Soviet in his speeches. The critics emphasize that 
Paasikivi had operated in much more difficult circumstances, 
held his own against the Russians in domestic policy and also 
enjoyed much more personal respect and confidence in the 
West than Kekkonen. According to them, Kekkonen allowed 
the Soviets to interfere with internal Finnish issues and domes-
tic policy – the so-called Finlandisation* – which Paasikivi had 
managed to avoid. The main point of the criticism is that the 
basic line had been set by Paasikivi and that Kekkonen had 
played the Soviet card to his own benefit to gain a political he-
gemony in Finland. Kekkonen had also created a stifled mental 
climate in Finland and weakened the Finnish backbone by de-
manding that the friendship with the Soviet Union should be 
treated as a virtue, not as an uncomfortable necessity. 
But what was then the Western view on Finland? How much 
did the internal conditions of Finland matter to it, and what 
was expected from the Finnish leaders and thus also from 
Kekkonen? 
Finland was a sort of a reluctant test-case for the Russians, 
but also for the West. As such it was not vitally important to the 
West. It was useful mainly for the fact that its independence 
denied the Soviets many military and political advantages 
which membership of the Warsaw Pact or becoming a Soviet 
province like the Baltic countries would have given them. It 
was useful also in the sense that the collapse of Finland would 
weaken other small nations threatened by Communism, as the 
American National Security Council (NSC) concluded in the 
                                                          
* Cf. the Hungarian positive meaning of “finlandising” (finlandizálás). 
Romsics, Ignác, Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Trans. Tim Wilkin-
son. Budapest, Osiris 1999, 309; Kende, Péter,”Afterword”. In The Hun-
garian Revolution of 1956. Ed. Litván, György. London, New York, 
Longman 1996, 168-169. [Ed. note] 
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1950s.42 But, not being vital, Finland might also be expendable if 
the price – for example Sweden’s possible membership of 
NATO – would be tempting enough. In any case, Finland 
would never be defended by NATO troops: it was recognized 
that the country lay in the Soviet-dominated sphere of interest. 
The NSC stated in 1954 its moderate goals concerning 
Finland: 
 
To review NSC policy with respect to Finland with a view to con-
tinuance of an independent, economically healthy, and democratic 
Finland, basically oriented to the West, (but with no attempt to in-
corporate Finland in a Western coalition) neither subject to undue 
reliance on Soviet Bloc trade nor vulnerable to Soviet economic 
pressure.43 
 
In 1959 the NSC also stated: 
 
Furthermore, if Finland is able to preserve its present neutral status 
– that of a nation able to maintain its independence despite heavy 
Soviet pressure – it could serve as an example of what the United 
States might like to see achieved by the Soviet-dominated nations 
of Eastern Europe.44 
 
Finland was a warning of what a neutralist Scandinavia 
might become, yet it was not Eastern Europe by any real stan-
dards, and it could be seen also as a positive prospect when the 
Eastern European Bloc was concerned; perhaps it could be a 
model for the ”Finlandization” of Eastern Europe? 
It was clear that more was expected and hoped for on the 
part of Finland than from that of Hungary, because Finland had 
some space to manoeuvre – which a Warsaw Pact country like 
Hungary could not have, especially after 1956. So it was impor-
tant that Finland would not make too many compromises and 
put this room for latitude in manoeuvre in jeopardy. The Fin-
nish statesmen were expected to defend the degree of ‘Wester-
ness’ they had. It was expected that they would preserve the 
status quo, make the necessary concessions to the Soviets to keep 
them content, but simultaneously defend their right to take care 
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of their own domestic affairs without any interference from 
Moscow. Domestic drifting towards Communism would be a 
blow to Western interests in the Cold War and would disturb 
the whole balance in Northern Europe. 
A sort of a test case was the ability to keep the Communists 
out of the government. The standard American and British line 
in the 1950s and 1960s was to support co-operation and coali-
tion governments between the Social Democrats and the Agrar-
ian Union, no matter how much they or their leaders might be 
distrusted as individuals. This was called “the red soil” gov-
ernment in Finland. The most important aspect in grading the 
importance of the Finnish parties was ultimately not a question 
of which party was ‘right’ in internal disputes or even the most 
pro-Western one. The most important thing was to guarantee 
Finnish domestic stability and to avoid an internal chaos, in 
which the trade unions and the farmers’ union struggled for 
material and social benefits. This struggle would undermine the 
democratic parties, strengthen the Communists and thus make 
Finland more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Stability was also 
the highest goal considered possible to achieve. 
It was accepted that the SDP and the Agrarian Union (later 
the Centre Party) were the only forces imaginable which occu-
pied a position to control the economic interest groups and 
make them stabilise the economy. The red soil government was 
also considered the only coalition strong enough to make a 
stand against Communist and Soviet demands and threats. In 
theory, the National Coalition Party (the Conservatives) was 
clearly the most pro-Western and anti-Communist party as 
such, but it was left in the political wilderness for pragmatic 
reasons. Co-operation with this party would provoke the Rus-
sians and antagonize Leftist parties, the Agrarian Union and 
President Kekkonen – and whereas these could do much harm 
to Finnish stability, if left in Opposition, the Coalition Party 
could not. Thus, it was expendable. The desirability of the red 
soil government was due to tactical considerations and was a 
means, not an end. This standard line did not even depend on 
what party was in government in the USA or in Britain, nor on 
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the personality of the Ambassadors or the desk officers in 
Washington and London. 
This sort of government had been the norm in the 1950s; 
however, between 1959 and 1966 this coalition became impossi-
ble because of the bad relations between the SDP and the 
Agrarians, or, between the SDP and Kekkonen. 
So no pro-Western heroism was required, because it was 
taken for granted that any exaggerated move towards the West, 
let alone help on the part of the Western Powers, would only 
provoke the Russians to demand even more than they had 
originally intended. In short, it was expected that the Finnish 
President and Government would maintain the status quo of the 
mid-1950s. 
Paasikivi seemed to have managed all the essentials of this; 
of Prime Minister Kekkonen´s abilities and intentions or even of 
his bottom-line sympathies one was not always equally sure. As 
a British memorandum, which could be compared with the 
American NSC outlines, stated in 1955: 
 
…the attitude of the Finnish government towards Russia has of 
late been unnecessarily subservient. This is principally the fault of 
Dr. Kekkonen, the Prime Minister, an able and an extremely ambi-
tious man who, though no Communist or fellow traveller, is pre-
pared to follow almost any policy which will suit his personal 
book and further increase his popularity with the weak and ageing 
President Paasikivi, whom he hopes to succeed at the next Presi-
dential elections… there is a risk that he may allow his ambition to 
outrun his country’s interests.45 
 
The West also seemed to appreciate a cartoon by Kari 
Suomalainen, the leading Finnish cartoonist, which appeared in 
Helsingin Sanomat, in 1954, when Kekkonen ousted Ralf Törn-
gren from the Premiership and became Prime Minister himself 
again. The cartoon depicted a mass of Soviet-type soldiers car-
rying Törngren away and Kekkonen saluting the soldiers from 
a balcony. The text was: ”Long Live the People’s Republic of 
Kekkoslovakia!” It is significant that both the American and the 
British ministers sent the cartoon to their foreign ministries. 
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Since the West could not do much to defend Finland politi-
cally, not at least in the area of foreign policy, the Finnish do-
mestic forum was the only one in which the Communist and 
Soviet influence could be fought effectively – without a risk of 
an American-Soviet conflict over Finland. The best weapon 
would be to aid the non-Communist parties and to further non-
Communist co-operation.46 And this should be done with as 
little noise as possible. 
Despite the criticism of Kekkonen it was mostly taken for 
granted in the Western diplomatic circles during Paasikivi´s 
Presidency that Kekkonen would become the next President. 
Kekkonen’s political talent was considered to be a class of its 
own in Finland; moreover, he was clearly the favourite of the 
Soviets, and the forces opposing him could not join their 
forces.47 But after he indeed was elected, the fears seemed to 
become true, and the first real evidence of subservience seemed 
to come during the Hungarian uprising. The Finnish attitude 
was considered very evasive. When the British Ambassador in 
Helsinki asked the Finnish Ambassador in London whether 
Finland would contribute to the work of the UN Special Commit-
tee on the Hungarian Uprising the Finnish colleague expressed 
reluctance. The London officials were not surprised: as one of 
them noted in the minutes with a short but illuminating sen-
tence: ”This is what we expected.”48 And after the Nagy execu-
tion it was yet again Kekkonen who was seen as the culprit in 
Finland or at least as the censor whose line prevented some of 
the moral outcry which the executions would have deserved 
from every democratic and free man.49 
 
3.2 Rock Bottom – Permitting Soviet Interference 1958-62 
The convictions of Kekkonen´s sins were accentuated even 
more after the so-called Night Frost Crisis in 1958-59 and Note 
Crisis in 1961. It is not possible to describe these crises in detail 
here, but in both cases the Americans and the British thought 
they could see their worst fears being confirmed: they thought 
that Kekkonen was yet again making undue concessions to the 
Soviets – concessions which Paasikivi would not have made. 
VESA VARES 
 44 
 The Night Frost crisis came after the 1958 elections. The 
Communists became the biggest party (50 out of 200 MPs), but 
the negotiations to form the new Government brought a pleas-
ant surprise for the West. Instead of the dreaded popular front 
government just the opposite emerged: a coalition government 
of all parties except the Communists. Even Kekkonen’s party, 
the Agrarians, participated. The most influential position was 
held by the anti-Kekkonen Social Democrats, and also the ostra-
cism of the Conservatives was ended. In Western eyes, this was 
even better than the red soil government: a government with 
such a substantial parliamentary majority would effectively 
isolate the Communists. Western diplomats sensed Kekkonen’s 
coolness towards the new Government, but as the American 
Ambassador reported to Washington, ”all Emb contacts as-
sume, and we agree, Communists will not repeat not be admit-
ted to government unless President Kekkonen in effect goes 
nuts”.50 It was recognised that Kekkonen could not prevent the 
government from being created, and it was expected that the 
government would control his undue subservience to the East. 
 However, when the West was satisfied, it was evident that 
the same reasons would make the government anathema for 
the Soviets. The discontent was soon apparent: the trade nego-
tiations were cancelled, and Ambassador Lebedev left the coun-
try without even the usual courtesy visit to President 
Kekkonen. The relations between the two countries froze to a 
zero-point. 
 Kekkonen´s own attitude towards the Government had been 
negative from the very beginning, since he regarded the Gov-
ernment as dangerous in foreign policy and consisting of his 
most ardent opponents in domestic policy. The question of his 
actual role in the making and breaking of the government is 
still debated among Finnish historians, but it can be said with 
certainty that he and the Soviets had at least some co-operation 
against the government – and both were trying to bring about 
its downfall. For example, Kekkonen inquired through his po-
litical confidant Ahti Karjalainen whether the Soviets would 
continue resisting the Government without compromise to the 
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end – because only then could he use his authority in the game 
against the government.51 
 Whereas Paasikivi, ten years earlier, had defended a gov-
ernment in a somewhat similar situation against Soviet discon-
tent (the first Fagerholm Government in 1948-50), Kekkonen 
seemed to work against his government right from the start and 
then to give in to the Russians almost immediately – if not even 
to collaborate against the Government. Finally, the Government 
resigned. 
 In the Western Embassies, Kekkonen was seen as the culprit. 
It was thought that the Soviet pressure would not have war-
ranted such submission on his part, especially since the Ameri-
cans had promised to give economic aid, and now he had set a 
dangerous precedent and the Soviet influence in Finnish do-
mestic matters had increased. As the British Ambassador Doug-
las Busk put it: 
 
President Kekkonen is apparently genuinely persuaded that the 
degree of submissiveness to Russian wishes indicated in his speech 
is necessary to the safety and prosperity of his country… the Presi-
dent is still playing party politics… apparently granting the Rus-
sians the right to object to any government and from that it is but a 
short step to a Russian right to choose a government… The Presi-
dent may think he is adopting ’divide et impera’ as his motto, but it 
may work out as ’divide et Russia imperabit’. At the very least the 
Russian appetite must surely have been whetted. 52 
 
The Western image of Kekkonen was of course partly a 
stereotype. But Kekkonen did not improve this image – of 
which he could hardly be ignorant – in his meetings with the 
Western diplomats, especially in the years 1959-60. He repeat-
edly stressed to them that the real danger to world peace was 
not the Soviet Union at all, but the unwise, revanchist policy of 
Western Germany. He also maintained that the Soviet Union 
was in ascendancy in the Cold War, whereas the West had suf-
fered many setbacks.53 
It has often been said that the Western diplomats had too 
one-sided contacts and listened too much to Kekkonen’s oppo-
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nents. According to their reports, however, Kekkonen and his 
supporters were listened to as well; it was especially those opin-
ions of Kekkonen mentioned above (and thus given by himself) 
which made them most worried, not the horror stories of his 
opponents, which were taken with  a pinch of salt. 
Kekkonen’s opinions, of course, led to negative reactions in 
the West. It was difficult to decide whether Kekkonen had ca-
pitulated mentally or let the fear or even some sort of pro-
Soviet conversion guide him. However, the Western conclusion 
was not that disenchantment should lead to distancing oneself 
from Kekkonen. It was taken practically for granted that he 
would be re-elected President in 1962, so the West had to find 
ways to influence him, not to discredit itself by backing his ad-
versaries, who had little chance of defeating him. The West 
should rather try to improve Kekkonen’s knowledge of the 
world situation and particularly make him aware of American 
might, compared to that of the Russians. At the same time the 
West should maintain a low profile in Finnish affairs in order 
not provoke Kekkonen and the Russians.54 ”Finland must walk 
a tightrope; the local Blondin is the only one available, so we 
must try to guide him”, was a sentence used by more than one 
diplomat. 
Even the question of inviting Kekkonen for a state visit to the 
United States and to Britain was seen in this light. So, paradoxi-
cally, when Kekkonen made these visits to both England and 
the United States in 1961, this seemed to be a recognition of 
neutrality, and the Finns made the most of them. But, in fact, 
the invitations were not proof of Western recognition of 
Kekkonen’s policies or his success or authority, but quite the 
reverse. 
How can this paradox be explained? One must bear in mind 
that Kekkonen was not accused of being a traitor or an agent of 
the Kremlin. He was almost always, also in the most critical 
Western analysis, considered to be a Finnish patriot. His great-
est error was not a lack of patriotism, but one of judgement: he 
had made a wrong assessment of world politics and the out-
come of the Cold War, since he had overestimated Russian 
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might and underestimated American. State visits were consid-
ered the only means to try and influence him and to make him 
see that Finland had a chance to hold its own against the Sovi-
ets. It was also considered useful to talk about Finnish neutral-
ity most when it was considered to be at its weakest and in a 
danger – because this was the only way to make it as difficult as 
possible for the Soviet Union to crush it. So the invitations for 
state visits and recognitions of Finnish neutrality during these 
visits were paradoxically not the fruit of Kekkonen succeeding 
in convincing the West, but of his failure to do this.55 It was an 
effort to ”convert” him, and this would be done with a carrot, 
not a stick.56 
The success, seen from the Western point of view, was mea-
gre. Kekkonen maintained his official line and gave no signs of 
‘hidden’ Western sympathies. A disillusioned British memo-
randum stated after Kekkonen’s visit that Kekkonen had be-
haved in London as if he recognised that the Soviet Govern-
ment had a right to involve themselves with Finnish internal 
politics, and he had betrayed a leaning towards the Soviet point 
of view in world politics.57 Another one stated: ”It must be hard 
to be a good Finn. What disappointed me most about the whole 
visit was the President’s pointed omission of any indication that 
he was basically on our side.”58 
In October 1961, when President Kekkonen was still on his 
state visit to the United States, a crisis erupted which damaged 
Kekkonen’s reputation even further in Western eyes. The Soviet 
Union sent a diplomatic note to Finland and suggested that 
consultations based on agreements in the 1948 Treaty of Friend-
ship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance should be com-
menced due to the rising militarism and revanchism in West 
Germany. The ‘true’ motives of the Note are a constantly de-
bated issue in Finland, and the main question has been whether 
Kekkonen had some collaboration with the Soviets in order to 
ensure his re-election. 
While it is not possible to describe the aspects of the Note 
Crisis with any degree of confidence here, the result was that 
Kekkonen´s name became more suspect than ever in Western 
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eyes. First the West had considered that Finland was in real 
danger and that the Note was a threat also to Kekkonen, who 
should now defend Finland; the Americans were ready to give 
extensive economic and even diplomatic support – they had 
agreed on this with the British already in April 1961. 
But when Kekkonen yet again gave in, agreed with most of 
the Soviet arguments and attacked his domestic political oppo-
nents in his speech, suspicions rose. These suspicions gained 
more substance from the stories of a Soviet defector that 
Kekkonen and Krushchev had arranged the note together. 
Kekkonen travelled to Novosibirsk to meet Krushchev, and 
when the Soviets dropped their suggestion for consultations at 
almost the same time that Kekkonen´s rival stepped down from 
the presidential elections, the Western analysis began to see 
some sort of conspiracy. This time the West was disappointed 
not only in Kekkonen, but also in the whole nation, which 
seemed to have no fight left in itself against the Soviets – where 
had the spirit of the stubborn nation of the Winter War gone? 
 
3.3 The Pessimistic View Stabilises – Slippery Slope to the East? 
The American and British views on Kekkonen’s personality 
during these crucial years can also be traced from various re-
ports in different forms. They are presented in a most illuminat-
ing way in two documents: a British ”Personalities” list of in-
fluential Finns, consisting of 217 names, written in 1959, and an 
over 60-page ‘mini-biography’ of Kekkonen, A Study of the Ca-
reer and Policies of Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland, which was 
written in the American Embassy in 1963. The latter even in-
cluded notes. 
Neither of these documents favour the interpretation that 
Kekkonen was in any way a sinister demon, a traitorous power-
hungry satellite or an agent of the KGB. Neither was, in fact, 
based on information taken exclusively from anti-Kekkonen 
circles – as has repeatedly been suggested by Kekkonen’s sup-
porters when the question of Kekkonen’s strained Western rela-
tions are debated. Both documents were reasonably neutral and 
attempted to give an unbiased view. 
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The key sections of the American ‘biography’ were in the in-
troduction and in the conclusion. Since these confirm the analy-
sis already alluded to in this study, they are cited here quite 
extensively59: 
 
Urho Kaleva Kekkonen is the unchallenged ruler of Finland and he 
is likely to remain so for many years to come. At 62 he has just be-
gun his second six-year term as President of Finland. A third term 
seems probable and a fourth term is within the realm of possibil-
ity… He likes the Presidency which he actively sought and for 
which he evidently considers himself well qualified. No individual 
even remotely threatens his political pre-eminence. There is no 
current prospect of a coalition of domestic opponents capable of 
reducing Kekkonen´s authority and eventually turning him out of 
office. In the unlikely event that Kekkonen at some point proves 
unable to protect his own position, the Soviet Union can be ex-
pected to take steps to preserve his authority. 
 
Kekkonen had effectively monopolised Finnish foreign pol-
icy and had also made use of it as no predecessor had done be-
fore. And no one had made domestic developments serve for-
eign policy or used foreign policy for domestic political pur-
poses like him before. His domination of Finland was primarily 
the product of the application of political skill and calculated 
exploitation of fear of Russia, and he had also remained active 
in partisan politics. Contrary to the idealized view of the Fin-
nish President as a unifying force, he had continued to be the 
real leader of his Agrarian Party and had controlled the actions 
of the Cabinet during most of his presidential term. And no one 
had dared to challenge him – it was known that it would be 
useless to try to convert him, and he would retaliate by discred-
iting his opponents in Russian eyes. To make the President’s 
task even easier, he often had the support of the large Commu-
nist Party and factions of the other parties; his opponents were 
disorganised and lacking in skilful leadership. 
The ‘biography’ described a very autocratic leader and per-
sonality: 
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Kekkonen is not a popular President. Confident, tough, often re-
sentful of advice, and markedly sensitive to criticism, he seems to 
have few close friends or confidants. He neither seeks nor received 
the adulation or affection of his people. His relationship to them is 
cold, distant. The public seldom sees the congeniality of which 
Kekkonen is capable. He is offensively pedagogical in his attitude 
toward the Finnish people. Kekkonen asks for their confidence 
while often demonstrating that he has little confidence in them. He 
does not appeal for understanding and cooperation; he demands 
it. Despite his unassailable political position Kekkonen is seldom if 
ever magnanimous or conciliatory, even in moments of national 
crisis. He tolerates corruption in high places and deals harshly with 
opponents. Even among some of those who would not consider de-
nying him their support, Kekkonen has incurred an intense dislike. 
 
But even so, Kekkonen’s views had a popular following:  it 
was taken for a fact that Finland could not rely on the support 
of western nations despite their sympathies. And Kekkonen 
had concluded that the greater confidence the Soviets had in 
Finland, the freer Finland would be to develop its western asso-
ciations. Within the limits he had set for himself, Kekkonen in-
deed desired considerable contact with the West, which was de-
monstrated by his visits to the West in the previous two years. 
 
Outwardly Kekkonen appears confident that he has been succes-
ful, even remarkably succesful, in protecting Finland´s independ-
ence. This is an attitude he must adopt, however, and it is at least 
questionable that he really believes Finland´s position is as secure 
as he pretends. Nevertheless, despite the doubt he may have, the 
trying moments in relations with the Soviets, and the irritation and 
possible serious concern caused him by those who suggest he may 
have undermined Finnish independence, Kekkonen has a taste for 
the burden he has assumed and seeks to retain. He seems to be 
stimulated by his encounters with the Russians and he has had the 
satisfaction of seeing his domestic political position reinforced as a 
consequence of these encounters. In 1961 he told an American au-
dience that he found it fascinating to conduct Finland’s foreign af-
fairs. Even shortly after what must have been a harrowing journey 
to Novosibirsk later that same year Kekkonen said privately that it 
was thrilling and stimulating to be President of Finland. 
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It can easily be seen that the tone was critical and not very 
respectful, but it was not hopeless; and Kekkonen was certainly 
not considered to be a mere stooge or a mediocrity. The main 
worry was still that he would overreach himself in his zealous-
ness to appease the Soviets at almost any price. It is rather a 
picture of a ruthless nationalist who was too convinced that 
only he could save Finland and nothing could change his grand 
plan to do this. 
The British personalities-list made the same kind of remarks: 
 
One of the ablest men in Finland. His sardonic humour and cyni-
cism are unusual in a Finn; his colleagues do not entirely like him, 
perhaps partly because they do not understand him, and he is easi-
ly criticised. Although a die-hard Finnish patriot during the early 
part of the war, he is now prepared to follow the ’Paasikivi line’ of 
ostensible friendliness towards the Soviet Union. The apparent 
change of Soviet foreign policy in a more moderate direction has 
probably increased the support for such a policy and most Finns 
feel that it is the only realistic line for their country to pursue. But 
this policy has, in the past, been deeply distrusted in Finland, 
where it has been held to be a dangerous substitute for a tougher 
reaction to Soviet pressure. The prolonged Government crisis of the 
autumn of 1958 and early 1959 showed the President in a poor 
light. In the first place he was clearly not playing an impartial role, 
but favouring his old party, the Agrarians; in the second he allowed 
himself to be alarmed by Russian coldness and showed a subservi-
ence to the Russians which much decreased his popularity. 60 
 
This is not the place to argue whether these analyses were 
actually valid. However, they represent the attitude which lay 
behind Western suspicions of Kekkonen’s person. 
During the 1960s these suspicions gradually diminished, but 
at intervals it always seemed that there was a new cause for 
suspicion of Kekkonen´s uncritically pro-Soviet views and dic-
tatorial leanings. For example, in 1965 Kekkonen stated in Mos-
cow that Finland could only be neutral during peace; in the 
West this was seen as a deviation from official neutrality and as 
yet another concession to the Soviets, and the American State 
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Department Assistant Secretary expressed American surprise at 
this to the Finnish Ambassador and inquired whether there had 
been a change in the Finnish foreign policy.61 The Finns assured 
him that this was not the case. 
In domestic policy, Kekkonen´s role in defeating the Agrari-
ans’ chairman V. J. Sukselainen because the Soviets had criti-
cised him was regarded in an American analysis as ”another 
succesful foray into Finnish domestic affairs” by the Soviets. It 
was not even the Soviet interference that was the worst, it was 
the fact that Kekkonen had made extensive use of it.62 The Brit-
ish called the spectacle ”unedifying”.63 
What was then to be done? Kekkonen was there to stay, but 
he seemed unapproachable. If you compare the Western view 
of him it might even seem to be a worse case scenario than that 
of Kádár – at least Kádár was gaining more freedom from the 
Soviets and increasing domestic freedom. 
The only option to control Kekkonen seemed to be to 
strengthen Finnish civic society and to let the eulogy of Finnish-
Soviet friendship go past unnoticed. As a British Foreign Office 
official put it in 1965: ”while leaving President Kekkonen free to 
flirt with the Russians as much as he likes”, connections be-
tween Finnish and Western individuals and organisations 
should be reinforced. ”What we need, I think, is a strong pro-
Western public opinion in Finland capable of preventing Presi-
dent Kekkonen from going too far with the Russians.”64 
 
3.4 The Late 1960s: the Old Foe as the Guarantor of Stability 
In the late 1960s, however, the Western image of Kekkonen im-
proved significantly. This was due to many reasons. The Cold 
War entered a new phase or gave way to détente, the old dip-
lomats with the old personal stereotypes of Kekkonen moved 
on away, and, most important of all, the worst fears had not 
materialised. Finland had not become a satellite or lost its de-
mocracy. Quite the contrary, it seemed to gain more breathing 
space as it carefully, step by step, joined the economic integra-
tion of the West. So Kekkonen’s cautious policy now seemed to 
THE IMAGE OF KÁDÁR AND KEKKONEN IN THE WEST  
 53
have gained dividends and not to have led Finland finally 
down the ‘slippery slope’. 
Kekkonen, even with all the traditional misgivings attached 
to him, was no longer looked upon as a spineless dictator. He 
was still not ‘liked’ in any true sense of the word, and he was 
still difficult to influence and too pro-Soviet. But the emotional 
repugnance against him had disappeared, and, like Kádár, he 
seemed to guarantee stability. He now seemed to be the elder 
statesman, who guaranteed that Finland would maintain the 
status quo and even move slowly to the Western model of soci-
ety – and all this was still the best that could be expected. 
There was also a new reason to have a better opinion of 
Kekkonen. In the 1950s and early 1960s it had seemed that 
Kekkonen’s policy meant more compliance and even possible 
‘fellow-travelling’ radicalism than that of other Finns (the 
Communists were, of course, a case of their own). The Social 
Democrats and the Conservatives in particular, and even the 
grass-roots Agrarians and the civic society in general had pre-
viously been considered much more reliable. 
In the late 1960s, however, a new danger seemed to be loom-
ing in Finnish foreign policy. This was the emergence of the 
young New Left radicals, the new intellectual élite of Finland, 
which was the counterpart of the radical generation in Western 
Europe. They were not usually Communists, but nevertheless 
they characterized the West as ”Imperialist” and ”reactionary”, 
and, even if they did not advocate outright Warsaw Pact policy, 
they overwhelmingly favoured the Soviet interpretation of dé-
tente to the Western interpretation. Especially the Social De-
mocratic Party – previously so reliable – was influenced by 
these young New Left intellectuals. Seen especially from the 
American point of view, these radicals, some of whom were 
recruited in the Foreign Ministry of Finland, were very outspo-
ken about Vietnam, Latin America, etc. – issues which were 
inconvenient for the Americans. 
Compared to them, Kekkonen might be difficult, obstinate 
and a bit too close to the Soviets, but he was traditional and 
stable. He had voiced no opinions about Vietnam and had ad-
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vocated strict Realpolitik which meant that no idealist surprises 
were to be expected from him. Since there was now a warning 
example also in the Western world, and this only next door to 
Finland – Sweden and especially Prime Minister Olof Palme, 
who took a very moralistic stand on the Vietnam issue and was 
very anti-American also in other matters – Kekkonen seemed a 
much better option than before. The confidence was also 
strengthened by the fact that the Finnish society – if you did not 
count the new intellectuals – seemed to be far from breaking 
apart, rather it was on the move in the right direction, towards 
Scandinavia and Western Europe.65 
And now Kekkonen was admitted to be the best interpreter 
of Finnish interests and Finnish space to manoeuvre. As the 
British Ambassador in Helsinki, David Scott Fox, had analysed 
already in 1967: ”President Kekkonen can, I think, probably be 
trusted to understand better than anybody how far Finland can 
safely go. He seems to be moving Finnish neutrality very cau-
tiously into a position where it is less slanted towards the Soviet 
Union, although we should not be surprised if he feels obliged 
to throw an occasional sop to Cerberus in the process.” And, 
what mattered most to the West, was the fact that the develop-
ment in Finland seemed to be tending to move gradually to-
wards the Western way.66 
After the crisis in Czechoslovakia a British official reported 
on the moods of Kekkonen and the Finnish people: 
 
… virtually nobody denies that in the things that matter, he is 
Finland, and that when he speaks to the outside world he is both 
honest and accurate in his interpretation of the way that Finland 
thinks and feels. If he pretended to us that he was entirely free to 
go his own way in foreign affairs, he would misrepresent both the 
facts and the beliefs of his own people… And behind him, and 
identifying with him to an astonishing degree, are a people who 
desperately want to be part of the West, who are afraid of the pre-
sent and the future, and who badly need a boost.67 
 
In these estimations Kekkonen was by no means a spineless 
man of compliance, nor even primarily anymore an over-
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ambitious and power-hungry partisan politician. It seems that 
now he was thought to have a cunning plan to not only defend 
Finland’s neutrality but also to gain even more space for ma-
noeuvring. And while he was seeming to be able to achieve 
this, the official lip-service to Soviet friendship was not of 
equivalent importance. It also seems that the West was now 
counting on the fact that Kekkonen did not take this lip-service 
seriously either. 
Even the fact that the Communists had entered the Govern-
ment in 1966 – although as a very junior partner compared to 
the Social Democrats and the Centre Party – was not held 
against Kekkonen now. This had been the test-case before, and 
when the Communists joined the government in 1966, there 
were initial worries. But now it seemed rather that in integrat-
ing the Communists within the government Kekkonen had ac-
tually managed to tame them. In the beginning of the 1960s the 
participation of Communists in the Government would have 
been regarded as the final taming of Kekkonen. 
One would not have been so optimistic in this, had not also 
the image of the Communists and Left-wing socialists changed. 
The new generation was not considered to be the same as the 
old, Stalinist monolith, which had only echoed their Russian 
master’s voice. According to the West, even the extreme Left 
had now made its choice: it was more important and paid better 
dividends – in fact it was the only way to gain any dividends – 
to integrate within Finnish society, not to be a crony of the Rus-
sians without a will of their own. The Stalinist fervour of the 
young intellectuals in the early 1970s caused some concern, as 
did the Exceptional Law in 1973 (Kekkonen´s re-election was 
ensured without a regular election). But by and large the stabi-
lisation of Finland’s international status and domestic policy 
had given the West what it mainly wanted; the 1970s seemed 
safe, and at the very least the Conference of European Security 
and Co-operation in 1975 – Finland acting as the host – secured 
Finland’s position. Also the Soviet policy seemed more predict-
able than before. 
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On the other hand, the Finnish debate about finlandization 
has stressed that the 1970s were actually more dangerous than 
the 1960s. This was so because the previous unpleasant inevita-
bility – the close relations with the Soviets – had now been 
made a virtue. Self-censorship, discrimination on foreign policy 
grounds and Kekkonen’s dominant position had meant a men-
tal capitulation, a limited democracy and a limited freedom of 
opinion. In the 1960s everyone, except the Communists, had 
still thought in terms of necessary compliance, not in terms of 
collaboration or true friendship with the Soviets. In Finnish 
eyes, this transformation was the actual ‘slippery slope’. 
However, this was not equally important to the West. And 
thus the circle was completed in the early 1970s. The West, even 
though it might have some complaints on individual issues and 
think that Finnish neutrality had some odd pro-Eastern flavour, 
now believed genuinely in Finnish neutrality, the recognition of 
which had been more a tactical concern to it in the 1960s. And it 
now had this belief in Finnish neutrality for the very same rea-
son for which it had not had this belief previously: namely, 
President Kekkonen. 
 
4 Closure 
So the formula in both Kádár’s and Kekkonen’s image is aston-
ishingly similar: moral dislike – disapproval of erroneous policy 
– a recognition of other, worse alternatives – the improved im-
age of the old foe whom you at least knew – a feeling which 
was not admiration but some sort of appreciation of the 
achievements anyhow – satisfaction with the stability and even 
respect. This suggests that basically the phases of the Cold War 
and the grand strategies in it decided the image, not their do-
mestic policy or democratic freedom. This was even more so 
since one could never do much else than hope for the best and 
do nothing concrete. But also the persistence and traditionalism 
of Kádár and Kekkonen was an important factor: when one 
could not expect revolutionary improvements, no news was the 
best news. 
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Except for the process of Sovietization and the anti-Soviet upris-
ings, which were discussed from the viewpoint of Soviet-
American conflict, Eastern Europe has not been the focal point 
of Cold War historiography. That ethnically and politically di-
verse entity appeared as a passive object of power politics, not 
an active participant in it.1 This one-sided approach must have 
been due to a variety of factors. Firstly, it was hard to conceive 
Cold War Eastern Europe, or even parts of it, as more than in-
struments of Moscow’s will. Nations of limited sovereignty 
could hardly be expected to pursue independent foreign poli-
cies. The possible exception was Ceausescu’s Romania, which 
was widely regarded as a maverick state that occasionally frus-
trated Soviet imperial aspirations. Nonetheless few if any 
scholars, were inspired by Romania’s alleged Sonderweg. In the 
public image the Soviet zone, in spite of all its impressive and 
colourful cultural heritage was seen as a grey bufferzone led by 
dull, if not spineless, party bosses who were little more than 
lackeys of the Kremlin. Second, most of the satellites were not 
even potentially powerful enough to exert any influence on 
power politics whatsoever. Their importance in the Cold War – 
and in scholarly writings that deal with it – was derived from 
the fact that they were caught in the middle of Soviet-American 
hostility. Finally, there are technical difficulties: until the ar-
chives of at least some of the former communist states were 
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opened, researchers had little reliable evidence on Eastern 
Europe’s external relations. 
A view of the Cold War ”from the other side” may reveal 
important information that could contribute to our understand-
ing of this still highly controversial conflict. In broad terms it 
may shed light on the relationship between ideology and 
pragmatism in the foreign policy of a communist, that is ideo-
logically constructed, state. Understanding the foreign policy of 
a Soviet client could add to our knowledge of communist im-
ages of the Western world, its notion of peaceful coexistence 
and other significant aspects of international relations in the 
years leading to détente. 
This paper will address the following issues. How did János 
Kádár, one of the important and most innovative figures of the 
contemporary communist movement, whose economic experi-
mentations gave a ray of hope to theorists of convergence, think 
about basic issues of war and peace? Was a communist leader-
ship necessarily in agreement about all issues of international 
relations or were there differences concerning the relationship 
between socialism and capitalism? How and to what extent did 
the Soviet Union influence the external politics of its client? 
How was US policy towards the Soviet bloc as envisioned in a 
multitude of policy papers actually put into practice? A crucial 
issue was the impact of psychological warfare, or, as President 
Truman aptly called it, the struggle for the hearts and minds of 
men. Was the United States as ineffective in shaping attitudes 
behind the Iron Curtain as it is generally and with some justifi-
cation believed?  
Foreign relations have a lot to do with discrepancy between 
foreign and self-images. America’s self-image was, and still is, 
problematic. Critical domestic observers, with Americans 
among them, have depicted the US to be self-centred and impe-
rialistic. Others, on the opposing side of the spectrum, like to 
see it as enlightened, democratic and even messianic to the 
point of being self-sacrificing.2 But what was America’s image 
on the other side of the Iron Curtain? These are some of the is-
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sues that the archives of a former Soviet satellite allow us to 
address. 
The concrete context within which these broader issues will 
be addressed is in itself a significant chapter in the Cold War: 
the normalization of US-Hungarian relations in the framework 
of important change in Washington’s approach to the eventual 
rollback of communist influence in East-Central Europe. This 
bilateral relationship was no less significant from the perspec-
tive of the Kádár regime. These were the years of domestic con-
solidation, which were to some extent hampered by the re-
gime’s lack of proper international legitimacy. A legitimacy that 
could not be achieved without the active acquiescence of the 
United States, which in turn would be granted in return for a 
relaxation of domestic repression. The other thread the paper 
will follow is the fate of Cardinal Mindszenty, who found refuge 
at the US Legation in Budapest. The struggle over the Catholic 
primate evolved into a game of nerves between a nuclear super-
power and a small Soviet client state. 
 
1 The Context of Hungarian-US Relations   
János Kádár’s career was marked by a paradox. Kádár, like his 
predecessors, came to power after a failed revolution, instituted 
massive reprisals, resulting in many deaths.3 Yet, by the end of 
his life he emerged as a paternalistic figure with genuine popu-
lar support, perhaps even affection.4 Moreover he was a turn-
coat and was widely thought to have betrayed the revolution. If 
ever there was one, Kádár’s was a puppet regime. He was car-
ried to Budapest literally in a tank; his cabinet was put together 
behind closed doors in the Kremlin. Even though the Soviet 
leadership selected Kádár to administer their rebellious prov-
ince, he had little reason to feel secure. Failure would definitely 
lead to his removal.5 Hungary’s fallen dictator Mátyás Rákosi 
was not idle in his Moscow political asylum, but was bombard-
ing the Kremlin with petitions urging his return. Rákosi felt that 
the cause of communism was betrayed regretted nothing and 
was poised to reintroduce an unrelenting Stalinist regime. Al-
though the Soviet leadership announced that Moscow’s rela-
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tionship with the fraternal states would need to be placed on a 
new, more equal footing6, Khrushchev may have toyed with the 
idea of reintroducing him should Kádár fail. In 1957 Khru-
shchev paid a visit to Hungary, which was being held under 
Soviet military administration. Although he received a welcome 
befitting emperors, including triumphal arches at the locations 
of his visit, he did not dispel fears of Rákosi’s return. Moreover, 
Kádár’s position was imperilled within the Hungarian party by 
both diehard Stalinists and party liberals.  
It was not until the first years of the sixties that he was able 
to consolidate his position. Eventually Kádár and Khrushchev 
developed cordial relations to the extent that when Khrushchev 
was removed in 1964, Kádár expressed his disapproval to 
Brezhnev. Of course, having owed his position to Khrushchev, 
he had personal reasons to be resentful. But his loyalty was not 
tied to a single leader. Kádár, like Rákosi or even Imre Nagy, 
owed almost unconditional allegiance to the international 
communist movement. And, just like his predecessors, Kádár 
did not doubt that the Soviet Union alone was the legitimate 
leader of that movement, which status gave the Soviets a licence 
not to be mindful of the country’s sovereignty. Even Nagy 
thought that it was all right to work out political problems with 
Soviet assistance. Hence interests of the (imagined) community 
of fraternal (communist) peoples superseded the interests of 
their nation: in fact the two coincided. This does not mean that 
Kádár was unable to think in national terms, or even in national 
characteristics. On one occasion he professed to understand the 
Hungarian soul, which, according to him liked ”fairs, pocket 
knives, goulash, but not the narrowing of norms”.7 
Kádár and others accepted the primacy of the Soviet Union 
in international affairs. As Prime Minister Münnich once put it, 
”by virtue of its position Hungary cannot take the initiative in 
international politics, which was the prerogative of the Soviet 
Union”.8 Kádár explained that Hungarian-Soviet friendship 
was founded on the ideological community of the two coun-
tries. He added that Hungary’s national interests coincided 
with those of the Soviet Union.9 He supported Moscow’s lead-
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ership in ideological matters and took Moscow’s side in the 
Sino-Soviet dispute: ”Hungarian communists have always be-
lieved that the touchstone of internationalism was always and 
still is today the comradely-principled relationship with the 
Soviet Union. There is no anti-Soviet communism and never 
will be”.10 Kádár’s loyalty was obviously dictated by geopoliti-
cal considerations as well – the proximity of the Soviet Union as 
opposed to China. The brutal efficiency with which the Soviets 
put down the revolution must have left a deep imprint on his 
consciousness, regardless of what he may have said about 
”friendly assistance” afterwards.  
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that Kádár was honest 
about his ideological affinity with the Soviets. Moreover, he had 
little taste for Mao’s belligerent anti-capitalist rhetoric. He en-
thusiastically espoused peaceful coexistence and championed 
the cause of world peace. This was clearly revealed in a letter to 
Brezhnev occasioned by Khrushchev’s dismissal. The former 
leader was reproached for having taken members of his family 
to international gatherings. But, according to Kádár, ”one is 
more credible” about his desire for world peace when he can 
show that he has grandchildren to worry about.11 When the 
Soviet inspired Hungarian efforts to mediate in the Vietnam 
crisis broke down, Kádár was genuinely disappointed. Al-
though he distributed blame for the failure equally between the 
Americans and the Chinese, he harshly condemned the latter: 
”Next time our Chinese friends should take their own grandfa-
thers for fools and not us”, he fumed.12 Like his counterparts in 
Moscow, Kádár thought that peaceful coexistence did not rule 
out ideological struggle with the capitalists, even though he 
lacked the Soviet optimism about communism’s prospects in 
the Western world. Ideological belligerence left a deep imprint 
on Hungary’s relationship with the United States, which for a 
while was the country’s second most important foreign rela-
tionship after the Soviet Union. 
In the early 1950s US-Hungarian contact consisted of little 
more than the exchange of abuse. Party leader Rákosi was 
dogmatic even by Stalinist standards, which made his regime 
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highly unpalatable. Relations remained frigid even though in 
1953 Beria and Molotov accused Rákosi of making overtures to 
Eisenhower. Washington saw the 1956 revolution as a low cost 
opportunity for rolling back Soviet power through self-
liberation, even though the US leadership viewed Imre Nagy 
with a large measure of mistrust. Immediately before the revo-
lution relations seemed to improve slightly, primarily because 
facing grave economic hardship the Hungarians were ready for 
minor political concessions in return for increased trade.  
The Soviet crackdown put an end to these overtures at a time 
when America was placing its policy toward Eastern Europe on 
a new footing. Instead of undifferentiated economic, political 
and cultural embargo the building of closer ties was envisioned 
in the hope of mellowing the communist regimes, fostering con-
flict between them and the Soviets and countering communist 
indoctrination of east European societies. This policy would not 
be implemented unconditionally. Rather, it was predicated on 
the communist leaderships’ willingness to liberalize their re-
gimes, toning down anti-American measures and propaganda. 
As we shall see, the Kádár government was unwilling to take 
the steps required to normalize relations and thereby qualify for 
better treatment. Until 1967 Hungary remained one of the last 
three countries in the world which had only Legation level dip-
lomatic contact with the US.   
In the aftermath of the revolution the objective was to induce 
the Hungarian regime to relax and ultimately to halt political 
reprisals and repression and eventually to raise relations to a 
”bloc normal” level. Hungary, on the other hand, wanted the 
US to put an end to the regime’s international non-recognition. 
Considering that the two political systems were worlds apart, 
these were no small aims to be achieved even in an interna-
tional environment which was, albeit slowly and indecisively, 
changing towards a relaxation of tension and away from rigid 
bipolarism. 
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2 From Non-Recognition to Political Amnesty, 1957–1963  
Kádár’s foreign policy was dictated by two main motives: the 
iron logic of bipolar conflict and the conviction that interna-
tional relations were about the historic struggle between pro-
gressive and reactionary forces. The confines of Hungarian ex-
ternal relations were set by Soviet imperial interests. Washing-
ton, ever since 1948, encouraged Titoist deviation within the 
Soviet bloc, namely the triumph of ‘national’ communism, 
which would take national interests sufficiently into account to 
oppose the Soviet Union. Hungary took a different path. Para-
doxically Kádár wanted to placate mass resistance by relaxing 
central control of the economy, cultural affairs and the free 
movement of people and ideas. On the other hand, by declaring 
that he could not conceive of anti-Soviet communism he shat-
tered any hope of Titoist dissent. Welcoming the first US 
Ambassador to Budapest, Martin J. Hillenbrand, Kádár insisted 
that the US ”should not even dream about something like the 
aggression in Vietnam in this region.”13  
It was clear that the US would not be able to support its ob-
jectives in Eastern Europe with armed forces ”and therefore 
could not be interested in provoking counter-revolutionary 
situations”. Hence, according to a Hungarian appraisal, the 
United States was out ”to improve its position in the people’s 
democracies, to widen its mass appeal, to drive a wedge be-
tween the country in question and the Soviet Union, and as in 
the Polish case to extend economic assistance with the open 
intention of promoting the establishment and development of a 
more independent political line”.14  If this was the case, one asks 
what drove the Kádár regime towards a state that questioned 
even its legitimacy? Firstly, it nilly-willy followed the example 
of bloc nations like Poland, which was building better relations 
with the US, chiefly economically. Soviet-American economic 
and cultural ties were expanding. In addition, the country was 
still struggling economically, making it imperative to expand 
commercial relations with the Western world, including the 
United States. Like the Soviet Union, the Hungarians were ea-
ger to receive the most favoured nation treatment. Most impor-
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tantly, however, the US held the key to the regime’s interna-
tional legitimacy. In order to consolidate itself, the leadership 
needed to relax the ideological straitjacket on its foreign rela-
tions. 
In a recent article Nigel Gould-Davis argued that the policy 
of ideological states sometimes reflects traditional motives like 
security concerns and pragmatic thinking. Under certain condi-
tions pragmatism may even temporarily gain the upper hand, 
or at least complement the ideological elements in order for the 
triumph of ideology.15 Kádár, who took great interest in foreign 
policy, thought that concessions were needed for the victory of 
communism. Like Khrushchev or Malenkov he believed that 
the survival of human civilization was more important than the 
world-wide triumph of Marxism-Leninism. Reflecting on the 
diminishing role of ideology, he explained that ”the Hungarian 
government sincerely accepted peaceful coexistence”, which 
”perhaps may not have been possible twenty years ago, when 
the force of ideologies was stronger, but at present the greatest 
problem is to avoid a nuclear war among the great powers”.16 
He saw no contradiction between peaceful coexistence and 
ideological struggle: ”peaceful coexistence and the struggle 
against imperialism exists simultaneously… [there will be a] 
third world war, or we have to tolerate each other, exist to-
gether”.17 Anti-imperialist struggle though, meant more than 
just ideological competition: it was also an imperative to sup-
port ”fraternal” states, like North Vietnam.  
As far as the United States was concerned Kádár consciously 
used the German term Realpolitik (even though he claimed to 
dislike Germans). He sought to appear as a dedicated commu-
nist politician, who accepted the existing distribution of power. 
Unlike some of his comrades, Kádár was aware of his country’s 
insignificance in world politics, using the expression ”tiny flea” 
to describe its position. He once had to dine in the company of 
Khrushchev and Kennedy’s ambassador-at-large, Averell Har-
riman. He felt distinctly uncomfortable in their company. ”I 
would be satisfied if the great powers just left us to live”, he 
confessed after the event.18 Kádár had fewer illusions about the 
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future of communism than the Soviets. While Khrushchev and 
Mikoyan confided to Eisenhower and Kennedy respectively 
that the communist revolution would at some stage triumph in 
the United States, Kádár, in a conversation meant for the ears of 
the US leadership, expressed his doubt. ”I must honestly admit 
that we have no illusions about the triumph of socialism or 
communism in the United States. We, Hungarian communists, 
are realists”.19 Perhaps we shall never know what this devoted 
communist thought about these matters at the bottom of his 
soul. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that he was dwelling on the 
same ideas whether he was talking in the UN, to American dip-
lomats or the Hungarian Politburo. 
Hungarian-US relations were ultimately the function of the 
Moscow-Washington relationship. In 1958 the Hungarian For-
eign Office opined that ”the improvement of our relationship 
with the United States is subordinated to the development of 
the international situation and to the extent that the success of 
Soviet policy, to which as a matter of course we also have to 
contribute, will be able to make the Americans change their 
openly anti-socialist politics”.20 In 1959 the Political Committee 
made the normalization of bilateral relations contingent upon 
the outcome of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit21; later the 
Vietnam War impeded more amicable relations. In the words of 
the Foreign Ministry, ”it is understandable that the United 
States’ aggression in Vietnam and its international consequence 
influences Hungarian-US talks”.22 Deputy Foreign Minister Béla 
Szilágyi admitted to Assistant Secretary of State John M. Leddy 
that bilateral relations ran into trouble primarily because of 
America’s policy in Vietnam, Cuba and the Middle East and 
only on ”a second level” because of bilateral issues.23  
Ultimately, US-Hungarian relations were dictated in Wash-
ington. Right after the revolution President Eisenhower ex-
plained to Tito that the US was concerned by the fact that the 
Soviet Union was extending its power into the heart of Europe, 
which posed a threat to world security. There could be no re-
laxation of tension in Europe until the Soviet Union returned to 
its own borders and released Eastern Europe.24 Several factors 
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suggested a revaluation of America’s tactics for the 1960s. First 
of all, the Eisenhower administration had to deal with domestic, 
as well as foreign recriminations: to wit that US propaganda 
encouraged armed struggle against the Soviets in Hungary 
without any prospect of Western intervention. Moreover, it 
started to look as though the communist regimes were consoli-
dating themselves and were there to stay. What even a few 
years before seemed inconceivable became a possibility: as time 
passed by, people would get used to communism. Economic 
conditions would improve, Soviet occupation would become 
less conspicuous, communist indoctrination would stick, par-
ticularly among the youth, which had no experience of its own 
in any other way of life. The rapprochement between the gov-
ernments and their people made efforts to isolate the bloc satel-
lites pointless.25  
The US leadership was not unanimous about the path to 
take. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to stick to the old policy 
on the grounds that there was no chance for independence 
without fighting. Therefore passive resistance and guerrilla ac-
tivity was to be supported, but only when the US was ready to 
stand up against the Russians. Dulles prevailed in the debate 
and the new NSC paper discarded force as a means to end So-
viet occupation. Since the isolation of Iron Curtain states did 
not bring the desired results, the expansion of contacts would 
be the order of the day.  The long term objective was still the 
restoration of independence and political pluralism, but only 
through slow change. East Europeans would be encouraged to 
achieve their goals only gradually. The US was ready to restore 
its traditional (otherwise never too close) links with Eastern 
Europe. This would be done on a country by country basis. 
Hungary would be a special case because its evolutionary proc-
ess was to be encouraged without compromising the symbol it 
became in the combat against communism. 
Economic relations were an important part of the debate 
about the new approach. Eisenhower had favoured the expan-
sion of trade practically since he had entered office. He believed 
that trade would serve political aims and not financial profit. 
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Dulles disagreed with any general statement on economic rela-
tions and opposed the Commerce Department’s proposal to 
encourage the US business community for trading with the sat-
ellites. Finally, consensus was reached in the formula that Wash-
ington would strive for ”normal” economic contact with the sat-
ellites on an individual basis in order to increase American influ-
ence and to reduce dependence on the Soviets. The doctrine of 
liberation was officially discarded.26  
US-Hungarian relations reached a new low point after the 
revolution. The appointed minister, Edward Wailes did not 
present his letter of credentials and left. Under the pretext that 
US diplomats were spying, the Hungarian authorities de-
manded that the Legation reduce its personnel, which in itself 
might have provoked the cessation of diplomatic relations.27 On 
the Hungarian side, Prime Minister Münnich broached the idea, 
but no one else was willing to go that far.28 Nonetheless the 
government spokesman accused the Americans of espionage 
and subversive activities, and the Foreign Ministry protested 
against such alleged activities in a diplomatic note.29 The frigid 
atmosphere resulted from the Soviet intervention and the 
events that transpired in its aftermath. The United States 
wanted to put an end to the trial, execution or incarceration of 
the participants, while for Hungary the main issues were the 
Hungarian question and the suspension of the Hungarian cre-
dentials in the UN, as well as Mindszenty’s asylum at the US 
Legation. 
Although the UN was powerless against the Soviet interven-
tion and the initial mass reprisals, it was able to exert diplo-
matic pressure on the Kádár regime for the sake of political lib-
eralization. In January 1957 the UN set up a committee of five to 
investigate the Hungarian question in the hope that the com-
mittee could force the Hungarian authorities to accept UN ob-
servers. Simultaneously the US broached the rejection of the 
Hungarian mandate in the world organization, which would 
have amounted to exclusion from the UN. In spite of accusa-
tions that he was using a double standard in making a distinc-
tion between Hungary and the Middle East, Eisenhower re-
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jected the proposal and settled for the suspension of the man-
date. Clearly, Hungary’s ejection from the UN would have cre-
ated a dangerous precedent. Neverteheless, the committee of 
five and the suspension of its mandate brought the Kádár re-
gime – and indirectly the Soviet Union – into a precarious situa-
tion. It is hardly surprising that Hungary concentrated all its 
efforts to bring this situation to an end. But the price to pay was 
way too high, at least initially. For the sake of normalization 
Budapest was required to fulfil all UN resolutions, receive the 
world organization’s observers, grant safe conduct for 
Mindszenty and appease the Hungarian people.30  
As the new government consolidated its hold, these condi-
tions would change. In 1957 Kádár eliminated the Central 
Workers Council, the ”right wing party opposition”, that is 
Imre Nagy and his associates, were facing trial, Rákosi and 
Gerő were exiled in the Soviet Union, and, most importantly, 
Kádár enjoyed Khrushchev’s backing.31 A leading State De-
partment official advocated more flexible policies on the 
grounds that the internal situation in Hungary was consolidat-
ing, internationally the revolution was on its way to oblivion, 
and it was doubtful whether world public opinion could extract 
the regime’s liberalization.32 But the President’s speech on the 
first anniversary of 1956 signalled that a reappraisal of Wash-
ington’s stance was not yet timely. In response the Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry even recommended the suspension of diplo-
matic relations, but Kádár rejected the proposal. Instead, a 
harshly worded démarche was drafted, but at Soviet advice it 
was not delivered.33 In the meanwhile change for the better took 
place in the way diplomacy was practiced. Hungary’s chargé in 
Washington, Tibor Zádor, took the initiative to recommend cer-
tain measures to placate the Americans, which would include 
the ”revision” of the case of arrested US employees and the de-
cision to downsize the US diplomatic mission in Budapest. 
Zádor offered his Legation’s services for diplomatic overtures.34 
At his own initiative he negotiated with Senator Karl Malone on 
developing commercial contacts. Such individual moves would 
have been inconceivable prior to 1956. In January 1958 the For-
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eign Ministry made a recommendation to the party leadership 
for normalizing US-Hungarian relations.  
Soviet policies were conducive for such initiatives. Khru-
shchev launched a peace offensive, and although he would not 
discuss the status of Eastern Europe, he pulled out all Soviet 
troops from Romania and one division from Hungary as well. 
The Political Committee discussed a general plan for normaliz-
ing relations with the Western world and in April Foreign Min-
ister Endre Sík talked about the prospect of an ”initiative” con-
cerning the US. As it turned out this would have been an offer 
for exchanging ministers – since 1956 both Legations were 
headed by chargés – but in May he told the US chargé, James 
Ackerson, that the initiative was taken off the agenda.35 Ack-
erson speculated that Khrushchev stood behind the affair, but 
this is unlikely in view of the fact that the Hungarians had con-
sulted with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko about the 
proposal, who had expressed his consent.36 The affair was of 
slight significance: the US had no intention of exchanging min-
isters whatsoever. But it does reveal that Americans may have 
misunderstood the power relations in Eastern Europe. In all 
likelihood Minister of the Interior Béla Biszku halted Sík’s ini-
tiative, which was inimical to relaxing the restriction on move-
ment that applied to US diplomats. Disagreement with the So-
viets, it seems, did not necessarily mean more liberal policies, 
but occasionally less liberal ones. It was a mistake to think that 
Moscow alone stood behind the satellites’ anti-Western stance.  
Imre Nagy’s execution suddenly revitalized waning interna-
tional interest in Hungary. Soviet intervention in Hungary was 
once again in the limelight, meaning that the Hungarian ques-
tion could be kept on the UN agenda. The State Department 
considered severing diplomatic relations.37 This did not tran-
spire, but the renewed campaign in the UN caused serious dif-
ficulties for the Hungarian regime. The Political Committee 
prepared a ”counter offensive” for the XIIth session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. This consisted of publicly ”revealing” that the 
US diplomatic mission in Budapest was a ”spy centre”, plus an 
announcement that with the latest executions legal proceedings 
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against the participants of 1956 had come to an end. During the 
debate Münnich suggested that the Americans ”go home”, but 
the éminence grise of Hungarian foreign policy, the otherwise 
conservative Dezső Nemes disapproved.38 While the Hungari-
ans were launching their diplomatic offensive, the US was busy 
arranging the rejection of the Hungarian credentials even 
though China’s position in the UN39 required a two third major-
ity in the General Assembly.40 In this critical situation Sík an-
nounced that legal proceedings had been terminated. In an im-
mediate rebuttal the US representative, Cabot Lodge, announ-
ced that four more revolutionaries had been imprisoned a few 
days before. Lodge’s unexpected statement foiled the incoher-
ently constructed diplomatic offensive. The State Department 
pushed for the rejection of the Hungarian credentials to put 
psychological pressure on the Soviets41, but the President 
backed down. 
Political repression was not the only obstacle in the way of 
normalization. Mindszenty’s status eventually turned out to be 
a more complicated issue and would remain unresolved until 
1971. The Cardinal was granted asylum at the US Legation on 
4th November, while Soviet tanks were drawing a cordon 
around the Budapest Parliament. The same was denied to a 
member of the Nagy cabinet, the smallholder Béla Kovács, who 
had spent long years in Soviet captivity. The surprising thing is 
not that asylum was denied Kovács, but that is was extended to 
Mindszenty. Using a diplomatic building as a place of asylum 
was contrary to international law and US custom. Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk once admitted that the Cardinal’s position was 
rather sensitive and was exceptional in the US practice of not 
granting asylum in its diplomatic missions.42 But this state of 
affairs was not altogether undesirable from the Hungarian per-
spective. Mindszenty was considered a criminal, yet trying him 
would have been politically suicidal in view of the public out-
rage a trial would have entailed. Therefore, for a while both 
parties remained bashfully silent about the affair. 
The death of Pope Pius XII put an end to the policy of head 
in the sand. Without the State Department’s consent, the US 
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embassy in Rome approached the Sacred College of Cardinals 
suggesting that Mindszenty be summoned for the conclave. 
Since the Vatican thought that there was a chance that the plan 
would work, the State Department instructed the Legation in 
Budapest to negotiate with officials on the College’s behalf. In 
the meanwhile Washington decided that if the Hungarians re-
leased the Cardinal, the US would guarantee that he would not 
be allowed to assume a public or political role. Unfortunately, 
however, the guarantee of silence was not included in the note 
delivered to the Foreign Ministry in Budapest.43 As it turned 
out, Mindszenty had no desire to leave his refuge and gave in 
only after lengthy persuasion. All in vain, since the reply was 
unequivocally negative. The Foreign Ministry asserted that 
Mindszenty’s status was against international law and US regu-
lations; his fate constituted a Hungarian domestic affair and 
”could not form a part of Hungarian-US talks.” US diplomats 
drew the correct conclusion that the Hungarians were, for the 
time being satisfied with the status quo.44 
Soon Hungary’s image in the US started to turn for the bet-
ter. A CIA estimate dating from 1959 found a strong measure of 
consolidation and deemed that mass uprising could not be ex-
pected.45 The Legation advocated economic and political con-
cessions, including readiness to drop the Hungarian question in 
the UN.46 Although the Hungarian chargé in Washington re-
ceived no instructions for even exploratory talks with US offi-
cials, at his own initiative he spelled out the conditions for di-
rect talks. The essence of these was that Hungary would not 
even consider any recommendation or demand that was di-
rected at implementing change in its social order, or was ”de-
signed to offer unilateral advantages to the country’s oppo-
nents”.47 His negotiating partner, Assistant Secretary of State 
Livingston Merchant hinted that Washington was less inter-
ested in domestic issues than in the satellites’ relationship with 
Moscow. He used Yugoslavia as an example, which was almost 
an ally: not because of its political structure, but because of its 
independent foreign policy. 
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But, in the case of Hungary, there was no sign of even a mi-
nor rift with Moscow. Official analyses presented the interna-
tional arena though as a struggle between progressive and reac-
tionary forces, where the task was to defy ”American imperial-
ism”. The Foreign Relations Department of the party’s Central 
Committee nevertheless proposed bold measures for improve-
ment: in order to ”liquidate” the Hungarian question it recom-
mended the solution of the Mindszenty question, but without 
granting any concessions ”of principle”, or surrendering ”the 
prestige and sovereignty of the Hungarian People’s Republic”. 
Hungary’s initiative would be contingent upon the outcome of 
the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting scheduled for May 1960. 
Betraying considerable misperception as to their possibilities in 
the international arena, the Hungarian leadership hoped that in 
return for Mindszenty the Americans would consent to the re-
moval of the Hungarian question. But even their Mindszenty 
formula was rigid: as a ”compromise” solution they offered that 
the Archbishop should be held under house arrest somewhere 
in Hungary; whether he would be allowed to leave the country 
was up to the “international situation”. In the latter case silence 
would have to be imposed on him.  
If the Hungarian question could be done away with in return 
for Mindszenty, as the Kádár regime hoped, it would have been 
a low price to be paid indeed. In spite of all the rhetoric, 
Mindszenty’s position could hardly have been more favourable. 
It provided opportunities for verbal attacks on the US; a new 
ecclesiastical structure was established and, most of all, it 
spared the authorities from having to arrest him. Any kind of 
change in his status would be undesirable, since if he were 
“seized by the authorities, it would occasion renewed propa-
ganda about his ’martyrdom’.” This meant that if released, 
Mindszenty could become just as uncomfortable for Hungary 
as he was for the Americans while he was sitting in the Lega-
tion. Hence the conclusion that if his silence could be guaran-
teed, thus ruling out any ”cold war attack” on Hungary from 
the part of the Cardinal, it would be worthwhile showing flexi-
bility and allowing him to leave the country. The trick was not 
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to show what a relief it would be to get rid of him; instead this 
option was to be presented “in an offensive manner” to make it 
seem like a great concession. To make the deal work the coop-
eration of the Vatican and of Mindszenty himself would be 
needed. Budapest insisted on depriving Mindszenty of his ec-
clesiastical function as the Archbishop of Esztergom (which 
meant that he was the Primate of Hungary).48 The Hungarians 
waited for the American side to make the first move so as not to 
give the impression that they were eager for a deal: an own ini-
tiative was envisioned only in case the great power summit was 
a success. Since the summit broke down because of the U 2 af-
fair, the whole matter was abandoned.49 But the episode re-
vealed that the Kádár regime was capable of showing a meas-
ure of imagination in its diplomatic manoeuvring. 
In April 1961 Foreign Minister Sík thought the time had come 
for a significant initiative. In return for jump-starting US-Hun-
garian relations, he was ready to relax the travelling restrictions 
concerning US diplomats.50 Since this would have been a bold 
step – similar restrictions existed for US diplomats in the Soviet 
Union – Sík had to consult with Soviet Ambassador Ustinov. 
Ustinov informed the Foreign Minister, János Péter, that the 
USSR agreed with the proposed measure. This was not enough: 
Sík needed the consent of the staunchly conservative Minister 
of the Interior, since the movement of foreigners fell under his 
jurisdiction. Foreign policy was sometimes constrained by do-
mestic power relations. 
Finally, in January 1962 the State Department spelled out the 
conditions for normalization of bilateral relations. The US was 
in a position to stop UN actions against the Kádár regime and 
thereby open the door for bilateral talks in case domestic 
changes of such magnitude occurred in Hungary that would 
convince the American public and legislation that the conces-
sion was justified. Aside from the fact that Hungary did not en-
vision more far-reaching concessions than letting Mindszenty 
out of the country, the other problem was that the US condi-
tions could be conceived as interference in domestic affairs. 
Even though many aspects of the Soviet Union’s presence con-
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stituted a violation of Hungarian sovereignty, vis-à-vis the West 
Hungary wanted to appear as a sovereign state, which guarded 
itself from imperialist encroachments.51 
The conciliatory measure the State Department expected was 
a statement to the effort that no one was sitting in prison in 
connection with 1956 anymore. This would be the only moral 
foundation that could protect the US government in the face of 
domestic criticism.52 Considering that the government had al-
ready granted partial amnesty to political prisoners this was not 
an impossible condition. But the regime clearly thought that it 
owed the cause of progress to resist American imperialism. In 
the UN Deputy Foreign Minister Péter Mód accused the Ameri-
cans of tying the normalization of bilateral relations to a politi-
cal amnesty. The US claimed that the Hungarian chargé had 
misunderstood what was said to him: amnesty was not a pre-
condition, since that would constitute interference in Hungary’s 
internal affairs. 
The counsellor of the Legation in Budapest came up with a 
face-saving formula, claiming ”he needed some kind of a theat-
rical measure, but he does not dare pronounce the word am-
nesty”, because it ”could be conceived as interference in Hun-
gary’s domestic affairs”. Zádor’s successor in Washington, 
János Radványi who had Kádár’s personal instruction to nor-
malize bilateral relations53, found the statement acceptable and 
informed the State Department that “the Hungarian Govern-
ment would study every serious, well-founded proposal”.54 
However, the Foreign Ministry rejected the formula.55 Radványi 
lost his self-confidence, and thought it better to adopt a hard-
line stance vis-à-vis the Americans, while asking his Foreign 
Minister to provide ”professional guidance” to interpret his 
communications with the Americans. Under Secretary of State 
George McGhee reaffirmed that Hungary had to make an un-
ambiguous gesture to show that the 1956 events were perma-
nently closed. He added that this was not a condition, but a 
”suggestion” only. When he reported the conversation to Bu-
dapest, Radványi, in order to make sure that there would be no 
misunderstanding, added the English original to the translation 
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of the key word, ’suggestion’. Perhaps to avoid getting rebuked 
once more, the chargé changed his previous stance and told 
McGhee that the American proposal was not new either in form 
or content and ”still constitutes interference in our domestic 
affairs”. In his report to the Foreign Ministry he accused the 
Americans of being ”captives of their own propaganda”: they 
”immerse their own public opinion with the poison of hatred” 
and therefore not even out of self-interest ”are they able to 
break their own circle”. Nevertheless he informed Péter that the 
government would not challenge Congress or public opinion 
because of the Hungarian question. He thought that “within the 
subversive framework of the Kennedy administration” the 
Americans strove for normalization.56 Who can tell whether 
Radványi offered his sincere appraisal of American attitudes or 
was he only satisfying the expectations of his superiors?  
Be that as it may, Radványi recognized that Hungary had 
few options. His superiors did not reject the renewed US offer 
off-hand, but decided to wait.57 Taking the initiative, the Ameri-
cans approached the representative of the Hungarian news 
agency in Washington, Dénes Polgár, obviously because they 
thought that Polgár could communicate directly with the party 
leadership. The message they wanted to get through was for the 
Hungarians to understand that the amnesty was needed to pac-
ify domestic opinion. If the Government in Budapest declared 
amnesty for the people sentenced for their role in 1956 on their 
”own initiative”, the Hungarian question would be dropped, 
negotiations could be started to ”mutual satisfaction” on ex-
panding commercial and cultural relations and the Mindszenty 
issue. As if reading the minds of the Politburo, a word of warn-
ing was added: normalization could begin only if the Ameri-
cans had the question removed; but not if it was allowed to 
”sleep” otherwise. The ball was clearly in Hungary’s court.58 
But Budapest still hoped that Mindszenty would suffice for 
the deal, although the Cardinal himself refused to hear about 
leaving his refuge even in the (unlikely) case that he were of-
fered the possibility of resuming his ecclesiastical function. The 
papal nuncio in Washington agreed and was assured that 
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Mindszenty could stay.59 The Pope himself thought that, as the 
spiritual leader of the Hungarian people, it was undesirable for 
Mindszenty to leave, which would have a dismal effect on the 
people.60 Nevertheless, the Vatican was not inimical to sum-
moning him and in 1962 jointly with the Americans raised the 
possibility of his attendance of the Synod, after which he would 
be shunted to one side.61  Budapest drew the conclusion that it 
was winning the long-standing diplomatic game. The Politburo 
asserted that the Americans wanted to get rid of their guest, 
and therefore their demands were placed lower and lower. 
Therefore a diplomatic ‘package’ was assembled, which con-
tained a new element, the return of the crown jewels62 in return 
for Mindszenty’s departure to the Vatican, where his silence 
would have to be guaranteed. They thought they were doing a 
favour, since “the US could rid itself of both the Hungarian 
question and Mindszenty”. At the same time the removal of the 
Hungarian question had “domestic political significance”, 
could have a “democratizing effect on the hostile émigré ele-
ments” and was also significant from “the perspective of the 
Soviet government”. In return for the Hungarian question the 
Government was ready to close 1956 within “a reasonable 
time”.63 Of course there was an element of truth in the argu-
ment. It was getting harder and harder to keep Hungary on the 
UN agenda and Mindszenty’s presence was problematic.  
Radványi was instructed to make the necessary diplomatic 
moves, which came about after consultation with the Soviet 
Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Dobrynin 
agreed with the “principle and execution” as well.64 Head of 
State Department Office of Europan Affairs Harold Vedeler told 
Radványi that if the Hungarian government carried out the 
amnesty publicly, as a first step the US would see to it that the 
Hungarian question was removed. All other matters – cultural 
exchanges, economic relations and the exchange of ministers 
would be discussed subsequently. The crown jewels were not 
even mentioned.65 At this point Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Davis delivered a written document – but emphatically 
not a note – on the US condition. This document opened a new 
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chapter in Hungarian-US relations. In order to avoid the sem-
blance of interference in domestic affairs, the wording was care-
fully chosen. The United States expressed its hope that at its own 
initiative Hungary would release the persons still in prison be-
cause of their participation in the events of 1956 and would make 
this fact public. In this case Washington would see to it that Sir 
Leslie Munro’s mission would be terminated, no anti-Hungarian 
resolutions would be passed and the mandate would be ac-
cepted. In addition the US would make a declaration calling 
attention to changing conditions in Hungary and would reaf-
firm that further discussion of the Hungarian question would 
be counterproductive. Then talks could start on lifting restric-
tions on the travel of official personnel, US assets in Hungary, 
sending of ministers, cultural exchanges, family unification, and 
the fate of József Mindszenty. Davis presented the document to 
Radványi for his ”personal use” as the ”text of his unofficial 
declaration”.66 In spite of its high confidentiality, at his Gov-
ernment’s instruction, the chargé showed the document to Do-
brynin, who as his ”personal opinion” declared that if Hungary 
had ”decided to make certain domestic political steps anyway, 
we [the Soviet Union] can only agree”.67 In spite of the ambas-
sador’s statement Radványi still considered that the amnesty 
was tantamount to ”surrendering our principles”. 68 
The Cuban missile crisis interrupted the talks, but in No-
vember Khrushchev assured Kádár that the conditions were not 
unacceptable.69 At the VIIIth Congress of the HSWP Kádár an-
nounced that 95% of those sentenced for ”counter-revolutio-
nary crimes” had been released, Deputy Foreign Minister Mód 
publicly hinted that his Government was considering a general 
amnesty, which was finally announced in April 1963. In May 
the credentials were accepted and at the end of the year the 
Hungarian question was taken off the UN agenda.  
American diplomacy thus played a significant role in the 
general amnesty, which was an important landmark in the lib-
eralization of the Kádár regime. As a memorandum worded in 
the Foreign Ministry later put it: ”the Hungarian Government, 
in order to eliminate the ’Hungarian question’ from the UN agenda, 
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granted amnesty to those still in prison… the Hungarian ques-
tion… was a serious burden to Hungary and the rest of the so-
cialist world”70 (emphasis added). This was a considerable suc-
cess for US diplomacy in a part of the world where success had 
evaded it ever since the end of the war. It is another matter that 
the general amnesty was not fully implemented. The Hungar-
ian question was difficult to keep in the focus of world attention 
such a long time after the events, and therefore the US got a lot 
in return for relatively little. The episode showed that diplo-
matic pressure behind the Iron Curtain could work, since by 
now countries like Hungary actually had a stake in expanding 
contacts with the West and enjoyed Soviet support in this quest. 
It was not until the end of 1963 that Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mód approached his counterpart, Averell Harriman, in order to 
start the talks envisioned in the Davis memorandum. Harriman 
informed Mód that the crucial issue was Mindszenty. He ex-
plained that the key to the good Polish-American relationship 
was Warsaw’s political independence and quoted Khrushchev 
to the effort that ”the children have grown up, they are harder 
to control”.71 The notion that the satellite regimes were begin-
ning to assume a nationalistic creed in their foreign, but mainly 
in their domestic politics was gaining currency in Washington. 
Such developments pointed towards the realization of the long 
standing hope for anti-Soviet dissent in Eastern Europe. A new 
and less inflexible relationship was taking shape between Mos-
cow and the satellites. This was partly due to changes in Soviet 
politics, but more importantly to the fact that the communist 
leaderships recognized that they had more room to consider 
their own national interests.72 
Such appraisals failed to take into account the individual 
traits of local administrations. As far as the Hungarian one was 
concerned, it was not ’looking for an opportunity’ to distance 
itself from Moscow. Kádár’s pro-Soviet stance stemmed from a 
variety of factors, including personal conviction. In return he 
exploited cordial relations with Moscow for domestic liberaliza-
tion. On the other hand, the US wanted to see spectacular acts 
of defiance. It was enough to demonstrate a certain distance 
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from Moscow to curry favour, even if the domestic system was 
dictatorial. A case in point was Ceausescu’s Romania. In spite 
of the oppressive traits of his rule Ceausescu was hosted by two 
presidents. Moreover, Romania received MFN status, which the 
domestically far more liberal but, in terms of foreign policy, more 
pro-Soviet Hungary was never able to get. Kádár’s reforms were 
nevertheless appreciated and within the region the US accorded 
special attention to Hungary. 
Therefore, when in early 1964 Hungary recommended bilat-
eral talks on ”a mutually acceptable basis” to resolve out-
standing issues,73 the response was positive. The National Secu-
rity Advisor believed that long-term, fundamental advantage 
could be derived from increasing American presence in Buda-
pest, since Hungary had gone further than any other satellite in 
destalinization and the process was continuing.74 Talks on po-
litical, economic and cultural affairs got under way in Budapest 
in May 1964, but there was no breakthrough. In order to end 
the impasse Secretary of State Dean Rusk invited his Hungarian 
colleague for a private conversation. The meeting was in itself 
of great significance as the highest level US-Hungarian personal 
contact since 1946. Rusk discussed a whole range of interna-
tional issues and treated Péter as an equal partner throughout 
the conversation. Péter wanted to speed up the negotiations 
with an exchange of ministers. He was authorized to tell Rusk 
that Mindszenty could leave the country in return for guaran-
tees for his silence. Péter tied the settlement of US financial 
claims – for example indemnification for nationalized American 
property – to the relaxation of the trade embargo, but the US 
wanted to go about it in a reverse order. Rusk held out the pros-
pect of granting MFN status to Hungary. The Secretary recom-
mended a gradual approach: the solution of easy issues first, 
leaving the complex ones for later.75 Mutual goodwill was 
clearly not enough: when it came to the technical details the 
difficulties were hard to overcome. 
One of these was the Mindszenty affair. In an unofficial par-
ley with Kádár, Harriman revealed that this problem was the 
greatest obstacle to the normalization of bilateral relations. Har-
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riman turned theatrically to Khrushchev, who was also present, 
asking him to ”use his influence so that US-Hungarian relations 
should be normalized”.76 Even though these conditions were 
acceptable to the US, the stumbling blocks were the Vatican and 
the Cardinal himself. The Vatican wanted to retain Mind-
szenty’s position as head of the Catholic Church even after his 
departure and admitted that it would be hard to keep him for 
making political statements.77 Mindszenty refused to leave, 
claiming that this would be negligence as far as his ecclesiastical 
duties and his loyal priests were concerned.78 For propaganda 
reasons the Kádár regime insisted that Mindszenty should ap-
peal to the Presidential Council for clemency, which would be 
published in the press. Moreover they wanted him divested of 
his function as Archbishop of Esztergom together with guaran-
tees of silence.79  
Even though political relations were by and large frozen, on 
another level US infiltration was more successful. For the first 
time ever, in 1965, the United States participated at the Buda-
pest International Fair, making it possible to introduce the 
Hungarian public to the feats of American technology and con-
sumerism, a task that formed an important part of the design to 
transform the communist regimes with peaceful, evolutionary 
means. The dangers of this policy were not lost to the party 
leadership. The Political Committee devoted several sessions to 
the theme of ”imperialist loosening propaganda”. Deputy 
Prime Minister Jenő Fock complained that the claim, according 
to which ”imperialist propaganda in Hungary is unable to rock 
the masses’ confidence in the Socialist system and to reduce the 
attraction of Socialist ideas”, ”is not true”, “it is capable of re-
ducing it and is reducing it”.80 Attributing socialism’s lack of 
mass appeal to external subversion, the party’s leading organ 
found that the US (and the FRG) were ”striving to set the social-
ist states against the Soviet Union and each other to disorganize 
the socialist system from inside, to stir mistrust, dissatisfaction 
towards the society’s leading party, the government, and ulti-
mately against the social order, and hence to prepare the resto-
ration of capitalism in the socialist states”. Attempts to ”loosen 
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up” the socialist states ”manifested themselves most of all in 
their differentiated treatment”. Cultural and scientific contacts 
were used so that ”under the pretext of peaceful coexistence 
they opened the door to bourgeois ideology and its products”. 
Hence the Politburo’s conclusion was in stark contrast with the 
State Department’s gloomy prediction that the youth, in par-
ticular, would get accustomed to and accept communism. 
Washington officials would have read the following lines with 
satisfaction:”the loosening propaganda plays a role in that 
within society as a whole, but particularly among the intelli-
gentsia and the youth, love of the West, nationalism increased, 
which is coupled with the underestimation of the results of so-
cialism”.81 
Since these attitudes were antithetical to basic communist 
doctrines – socialism as the highest form of social organization, 
and internationalism – the foundations of the system were at 
stake. Little could be done. There was no way back to the isola-
tionism of the Rákosi years. The relative openness of the con-
solidated Kádár regime left the door ajar to Western influence. 
Doubtlessly, the door would open wider and wider. The only 
option was to compete with Western propaganda in providing 
access to Western culture from domestic sources. From the 
American perspective it obviously did not matter whether the 
source was RFE [Radio Free Europe] or Hungarian State Radio. 
State propaganda would have to be tailored to satisfy demand. 
In the words of Deputy Premier Kállai ”the youth does not ask 
or need a full explanation of Marxism but the satisfaction of 
their needs and in the meanwhile adequate propaganda” 
would be provided under its guise. One had to point out the 
”swinishness” of imperialism, but that was not enough. Na-
tional feelings and ”national self-esteem would have to be taken 
into consideration, popular American musical programs such 
as Teenager Party would have to be counterbalanced by domes-
tic programming”. Perhaps it was already too late to turn the 
tide. Kállai complained: if Ifjúsági Magazin (Youth Magazine) 
”was a communist journal in spirit, I do not know what commu-
nism means. It is but a propaganda forum for Western life style 
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without critique… There is not a single socialist hero in it, but the 
Beatles”.82  
Official relations were hindered by the Vietnam War, as a re-
sult of which Hungary suspended the ongoing bilateral talks.83 
The US Legation reported that the Hungarians considered Viet-
nam as the most important element of bilateral relations and 
their harsh propaganda campaign was hardly reconcilable with 
their suggestions for normalization. Just like the Soviets, Hun-
gary was suffering from its own Vietnam syndrome. Through-
out 1965 and 1966 Hungarian diplomacy was busy arranging 
for a political solution. Kádár was very unhappy with China’s 
influence, which the Hungarians believed was forcing the Viet-
namese to wage a hopeless war, as well as with Vietnam’s un-
helpful attitude: holding back information while demanding 
unconditional support. As a culmination of these efforts, on 
October 6 1966 Péter informed Rusk that the Vietnamese were 
”in a position to negotiate”, were ”not interested in occupying 
South Vietnam” and expressed his ”conviction that Hanoi is 
ready to respect the 17th parallel”. Rusk deemed this ”new and 
very important information”, but North Vietnam distanced it-
self from Péter’s statements, after the Foreign Minister made 
them public at a press conference.84   
Moderate members of the leadership realized that US eco-
nomic support was needed, but this would not be forthcoming 
unless Hungary satisfied outstanding American claims. None-
theless, considerations of socialist solidarity and the cause of 
(communism) overrode this consideration. Kádár could not 
afford to surrender his regime’s ideological legitimacy for 
pragmatic reasons. As opposed to some, he did not want a 
complete breakdown either. He argued for the continuation of 
talks with simultaneous ”political attacks”. When the Foreign 
Ministry proposed that government officials should not visit 
the American stand at the Budapest Fair and that the US be 
condemned for its aggression in the opening speech, he re-
sisted. He thought it unwise to discriminate against the Ameri-
can exhibitors or to use such a non-political forum for anti-
American propaganda. Unlike some of his colleagues, he be-
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lieved that such measures would be counterproductive. This 
realization sprang from his purported understanding of his 
people. ”For years”, he argued, ”I have struggled to eliminate 
this strongly political matter, because this is not good from our 
perspective. The Hungarian soul likes fairs, pocket-knives and 
goulash, it does not like smaller norms”. 
Kádár rejected the proposal that the recipients of Ford Foun-
dation grants cancel their invitations, and the use of the com-
poser Zoltán Kodály’s US visit for political protests. He af-
firmed that the normalization of US-Hungarian relations was 
possible in spite of Vietnam – after, of course, consultation with 
Moscow.85 Kádár was pragmatic to the point where his ideo-
logical convictions were not compromised. In this spirit, in 
April 1966, the Hungarians accepted an American offer to re-
new talks. Emphasis would now be on financial and economic 
affairs. Cultural relations would be kept ”on level”, because 
they were claimed to serve the American interest.86 In October 
1966 Péter discussed normalization with Rusk and urged the 
exchange of ministers irrespective of the Mindszenty question. 
As a turning point in the Hungarian attitude he asked for US 
mediation between Hungary and the Vatican. Rusk made it 
clear that Mindszenty was an obstacle, but agreed that ”we 
should get rid of this old bone stuck in our throats”.87 
Mindszenty’s presence was getting increasingly burden-
some. Not only because the stubborn old man insisted on shar-
ing his political views with his hosts, but also because in 1965 
his tuberculosis broke out again. Small wonder that the chargé, 
Elim O’Shaughnessy, exclaimed that the solution was hopeless, 
or should they ”poison him?”88 Since Mindszenty refused to 
leave, and the Vatican refused to guarantee his silence in any 
case, the Americans expected Hungary to come up with a pro-
posal since they could not just ”throw him out”.89 The Vatican 
found that the Cardinal was obstinate and could not ”see a 
chance for solution”. This at the same time meant that there was 
no point in maintaining the US-Hungarian diplomatic impasse. 
On 11 November 1966 Assistant Secretary of State John Leddy 
informed the Hungarian chargé that the US was ready to raise 
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its representation to embassy level on a mutual basis. 
Mindszenty almost foiled it by threatening to walk out of the 
Legation if the US Ambassador set foot in Hungary. It took the 
Vatican’s envoy, Cardinal Casaroli’s diplomatic skills, to talk 
him out of it.  
Péter told the first American ambassador in Budapest, Mar-
tin J. Hillenbrand, that bilateral talks could be pursued concern-
ing the ”international situation” only.90 He ruled out the possi-
bility of rapid development even though the experienced am-
bassador, who according to Hungarian information was con-
sidered to be friendly towards the Soviets in Washington cir-
cles, expressed his desire to make progress in bilateral relations. 
Kádár’s welcoming thoughts expressed, that there was no turn-
ing back either. In what can be conceived as his political credo 
he told the ambassador that the majority of people supported 
improved relations with the Americans and the leadership had 
to take this sentiment into account. Hungary fully supported 
peaceful coexistence, the prerequisite of which was the mutual 
recognition of each other’s political system.91 If all world leaders 
had been this explicit about the conditions of peaceful coexis-
tence, the world would have been a safer place to live in. 
 
3 Conclusion 
This decade of US-Hungarian relations was as turbulent as 
world politics in general. At first glance little was achieved. 
Mindszenty was still sitting in his self-chosen exile. Mutual fi-
nancial claims were unsettled, bilateral trade was negligible, 
cultural relations lagged behind the rest of Eastern Europe. But 
these raw facts do not tell the whole story. In 1957 there was no 
government in Europe with a worse image in the US than 
Kádár’s. By the mid-60s, it was gaining a measure of apprecia-
tion as a result of liberalization. What was misunderstood in 
Washington was that liberalization did not necessarily mean a 
rejection of Soviet policies. In Hungary it was the other way 
round. Kádár’s allegiance to Moscow permitted far-reaching 
economic reform and more tolerance for cultural diversity than 
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elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Paraphrasing Marx, reform 
helped dig the regime’s own grave.  
Washington’s new approach to psychological warfare, Teen-
ager Party versus Marx’s Das Kapital, was causing serious con-
cern by winning the hearts of the younger generation. This was 
made possible, in part, by the fact that Hungary in late 1963 
stopped jamming foreign broadcasts. Washington scored one of 
its few diplomatic successes behind the Iron Curtain by extract-
ing a general amnesty for the participants of the revolution. 
Initially they offered Mindszenty in return for the settlement of 
Hungary’s status in the UN. But the US persevered in demand-
ing amnesty noticing that their opponents had a serious stake in 
normalization.  
Kádár’s Hungary rejected military confrontation with the 
West for any conceivable purpose and, in tune with Soviet pol-
icy helped to find a political solution to the crisis in Vietnam, 
but at the same time provided economic assistance to Hanoi, 
reflecting Kádár’s ambiguous stance towards the Western 
world. Communist functionaries regarded the US as an imperi-
alist power, which opposed and oppressed the progressive 
forces of the world. On this point, to quote Vojtech Mastny, 
there was no double book-keeping. The same harsh terms were 
used behind the padded doors of Politburo meetings as in pub-
lic rallies or the press. Few comrades doubted its economic and 
technological power. But only some realized its immense cul-
tural potential. In a Politburo debate on cultural contacts a 
member reminded his comrades that the Ford Foundation had 
more money than the annual Hungarian GDP. 
Soviet guidance was sought in important matters, but their 
advice was not always heeded. In certain cases the Soviets were 
more flexible than the Hungarians.92 There were differences of 
opinion within the party leadership, as well as between the 
dogmatic Interior and the Foreign Ministries. The latter took an 
active part in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. 
On at least one occasion Kádár overruled it in favour of less 
rigid policies. The diplomatic mission in Washington occasion-
ally took the initiative. By the mid-60s Kádár sided with the 
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reformers. Unlike some colleagues he recognized that, even 
with Soviet backing, his country was not a player in world af-
fairs and realized America’s importance in gaining interna-
tional legitimacy. Kádár could be pragmatic to the point where 
pragmatism did not compromise his ideological conviction. He 
did not allow the conflict in Vietnam to completely halt the 
process of normalization, yet there was no question as to where 
he stood. He was a self-confessed Realpolitiker, which served the 
preservation of socialism at home. Kádár never noticed that even 
a small measure of it would eventually undermine the regime 
he did so much to build. 
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In the political conditions prevailing after the Second World 
War, both Hungarians and Finns deemed it prudent not to re-
call the special relationship between the two brother nations, 
based on their common linguistic ancestry. Both countries now 
belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, and everybody 
knew how suspiciously the Russians eyed any kind of ‘nation-
alism’ but their own. Of course, during the racial heyday there 
had also been some overstatements, which nobody cared to re-
member, like Admiral Horthy’s proposal to import some tens of 
thousands of able-bodied young Finnish males to Hungary to 
add a northern component to national characteristics.1 
After 1944, the Finnish mainstream thinking emphasized the 
Nordic cultural, social and political heritage more than ever, 
because that was seen as the only legitimate channel left to 
avoid Russian influence. The linguistic and ethnic aspects were 
bypassed, which led to a break in Finnish relationships with 
Hungary and Estonia, abandoned to the mercy of their fates. 
The Finns could only afford the barest survivalism on their 
own. 
Paradoxically, however, the Soviets tended to include 
Finland and Hungary in the same category.2 Since the social 
conditions were very much different in the two countries, this 
was not due to any Marxist thinking, but rather to national and 
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ethnic considerations. Both were non-Slav nations, and hence 
not to be linked in Stalin’s ‘Pan-Slavist’ designs 3; both were 
former German allies, and thus in a comparable position as far 
as international law and relations between the victorious pow-
ers were concerned. Even in the domestic life of the two nations 
some features looked similar to a Russian eye, like the position 
of Mannerheim and Horthy before and during the war, and the 
importance of the agrarian parties. In 1944 and in the years im-
mediately after that, the Russians tended to ignore the crucial 
difference between the two nations, which was the fact that 
Finland succeeded in avoiding occupation by the Red Army. 
Things seemed to proceed rather smoothly even without that. 
This convergence theory of the Soviets was most visible on 
three occasions. 
In October 1944, when Andrei Zhdanov arrived in Helsinki 
as the head of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, he had 
Stalin’s orders to proceed carefully, so that the interim peace 
agreement would not be spoiled by a pro-German coup and 
occupation as in Hungary. Perhaps the Arrow Cross move-
ment, which has a contradictory reputation in the history of 
Hungary, did the Finns a favour, because the Soviet policy in 
Finland could have been harsher without the deterrent of Hun-
garian developments. Now the Finns were able to gain time, 
and, as the saying goes, nothing is so constant as the temporary 
state of affairs. Many of the structures, institutions and channels 
built between Finland and the Soviets during the nine months’ 
respite before the end of the general war in Europe in May 1945 
remained in force until the very end of the Soviet Union.4 
Secondly, and self-evidently, Finland and Hungary belonged 
to the same group during the final peace negotiations.5 This 
point need not be elaborated on here. 
Even after that, the Soviets saw a surprisingly close similar-
ity between the two countries. When Europe was definitively 
divided into two camps during the summer of 1947, the Soviets 
harshly criticized the Finnish Communist Party for their under-
achievement and moderation (which originally had been 
strictly ordered by the Soviets themselves in 1944), and praised 
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Hungary as an example of what was to be done, e.g. by using 
the security police. Not even the Finnish comrades would be 
able to manage without some bloodletting, Zhdanov predicted.6 
In January 1948, Zhdanov ordered the Finnish communist lead-
ers to follow the Hungarian way and get their opponents ar-
rested for a conspiracy with the western powers. That would 
open the way to further victories.7 The communists, who con-
trolled the secret police, fabricated a conspiracy case and in-
vited a Hungarian party representative to advice about the cor-
rect line. For various reasons, however, these preparations were 
abandoned and Stalin finally settled for a security treaty with 
the bourgeois Finnish president, J. K. Paasikivi. This course of 
action was deemed reasonable in Moscow because of the bitter 
experience of difficulties involved with the total submission of 
the Finns, acquired in the Winter War in 1939 to 1940. We were 
clever “not to do it” in Finland after the war, Molotov later re-
called, because those stubborn people would have inflicted “a 
festering wound” in the Soviet body.8 
In 1947-48, Finland and Hungary definitively took different 
paths. But for some time even after that, the connection be-
tween Hungary and Finland was made by Finnish and Russian 
communists in situations that seemed to involve an Eastern 
European perspective even for Finland. This was clear during 
the volatile strike movement of August 1949, when ‘Uncle’ 
Rákosi was consulted and used as a channel between Stalin and 
the Finnish communist leadership.9 Inkeri Lehtinen, who was a 
former Comintern official well versed in Soviet attitudes, at that 
time once again praised the Hungarian example.10 
In the early 1950s, when the divergence of paths became evi-
dent and definite, this kind of Zhdanovist connection between 
Hungary and Finland was gradually forgotten. But perhaps 
some traces remained, so easy was it for Khrushchev to make 
the connection again. 
 
1 1956: The Crucial Year 
The dominant statesmen of the post-war period in the history of 
Finland and Hungary, Urho Kekkonen and János Kádár, both 
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came to power in the turbulent year of 1956. As far as political 
background was concerned, they came from opposite camps. 
Kekkonen served as a soldier in the White army of 1918, was 
then an officer of the secret police, and as an agrarian politician 
always a staunch nationalist and anti-communist. Kádár was a 
communist from his youthful days, from clandestine activities 
to building a people’s democracy, and he had experienced both 
right-wing and Stalinist persecution. 
In power, the two leaders had to deal with and force their re-
luctant nations to adapt to the Soviet Union after crushing con-
frontations with the Russians. For both of them, the Soviet Un-
ion was and remained the main issue, not only in foreign pol-
icy, but also as far as the national existence as a whole was con-
cerned. In different conditions, they both adopted a similar 
kind of tactics, thinking that loyalty to the Soviets would finally 
pay off and the two nations would gradually gain new latitude 
and independence. They did, but the process was slow and 
painful, and a new backlash could lurk right behind the next 
corner. This fed the idea of their personal indispensability and 
made both statesmen cling to power to the very end, until they 
were involuntarily forced to loosen the grip by their advanced 
age and frail physical condition, that is, until 1981 and 1988 re-
spectively. Undoubtedly, both Kekkonen and Kádár considered 
themselves to be the one and only person able to conduct the 
complicated eastern relations and to deal with “those people”, 
as Kádár described the Kremlin gang shortly before the Czecho-
slovak occupation in 1968.11 Both Kekkonen and Kádár seem to 
have developed a rather disillusioned view of the Kremlin, 
based on their intimate contacts with the Soviet leaders and 
probably also on their earlier experience of state security affairs. 
Of course, Kádár was much more of an insider than Kekkonen 
ever became. 
The Soviet intervention to suppress the Hungarian revolu-
tion in 1956 brought Kádár to power and was a seminal experi-
ence for him. For Kekkonen, it was his first difficult test as head 
of state. He had to balance on a tightrope between the upsurge 
of Finnish popular solidarity towards the brother nation on the 
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one hand, a feeling he tended to share himself, a pan-Ugric na-
tionalist as he was since his youth, and on the other hand, the 
necessities of the coolest Realpolitik, maintaining the vital rela-
tions to the Soviet Union. The Soviets keenly observed Finnish 
reactions, not only for general reasons, but also for the particular 
fear that the popular support for the Hungarian cause might 
later on develop into a Finnish movement to support Estonians.12   
Conferring with his predecessor Paasikivi, Kekkonen took 
the traditional Finnish nationalist stand, adopted already by 
Snellman in 1863, during the Polish uprising. Although the un-
happy fate of the damned ones was lamented, expressions of 
solidarity would not help them. Condemning the Russian ac-
tion would hurt Finnish relations to the huge eastern neigh-
bour, who would always stay there right beyond the border, if 
not closer. “There is no choice: we must keep a cool head, even 
with the heart full of pain, when the death is spreading out on 
unhappy, hopeless people”, Kekkonen advised the foreign min-
ister.13 In the United Nations, Finland could only afford to refer 
to centennial Hungarian traditions of freedom; in the vote itself, 
Finland abstained. 
The neutrality of Finland his life’s work, Kekkonen must 
have been startled by the role played by the idea of neutrality in 
the decisive phases in Hungary. In a last ditch effort to avoid 
imminent intervention the Hungarian government announced 
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact treaty and proclaimed neu-
trality.14 Although the word was not yet invented at the time, it 
can be said that Imre Nagy’s government aimed at the ‘Finlan-
disation’ of Hungary.15 While the deliberations were going on 
in the Soviet politburo, Khrushchev himself, at a Turkish Em-
bassy reception a couple of days earlier, seems to have gone so 
far as to envisage a neutral status for Hungary similar to that of 
Finland.16  
‘Neutrality’ and ‘Finland’ were thus mentioned on the imme-
diate eve before a full-scale military intervention.17 Kekkonen 
had every reason to be nervous. Probably for that reason he at 
first even made an exception to his own golden rule of distance 
and offered himself as a mediator in Budapest.  The Soviets did 
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not respond.18 Then, to alleviate possible suspicions, he assured 
the Soviets that Finland would never unilaterally abrogate the 
1948 Treaty. Here, as in other cases when he was certain that 
Soviet records would remain closed, he even deemed it appro-
priate to pay some lip service, criticizing the Nagy government 
and accusing the western powers for provoking the situation in 
Hungary.19 (On the other hand, of course, the fate of Hungary 
once again showed to Kekkonen how willing and able to help 
the West would be in case of real need.) 
Although Kekkonen swore by the 1948 Treaty, in fact he was 
planning to reduce its force, no doubt alarmed by Hungarian 
events. Through his confidential KGB channels, he proposed to 
the Soviet leadership an international treaty, by which both 
NATO members and the Soviet Union would promise not to 
attack each other through the territory of Finland. Then the 
1948 Treaty would be needed only secondarily, as he said. 
Kekkonen tried to sell the plan by hinting at the propaganda 
advantages offered by a possible refusal, but Khrushchev did 
not take the risk of their approval and discreetly turned down 
the proposal.20 
Perhaps Kekkonen’s initiative was a factor in the Soviet as-
sessment that a restoration of discipline was needed in Finland.  
A rather pungent ingredient was added to the 1956 experience, 
when CPSU leaders, attempting to push the slow Finnish com-
munists into an offensive, cited the Hungarian intervention as a 
valiant example of the fact that the Soviet Union would never 
desert friends in need. If Finnish comrades would be able to 
acquire stronger positions, they could count on Soviet support, 
even by military means. When this information reached 
Kekkonen via the security police, he must have been shocked, 
even though the Soviets probably spoke at a more general level 
than was reported.21 Later on, this information was partially 
and incorrectly leaked to the press, in the form that the Soviets 
had been looking for a Finnish Kádár.22 
Paradoxically, the painful 1956 experience was to form the 
basis for later relations and mutual understanding between 
Kádár and Kekkonen. 
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First, as Kádár later acknowledged to Finnish communist 
leader Hertta Kuusinen, Kekkonen’s stand in 1956 did not cre-
ate further difficulties for his regime, and he was thankful for 
the consideration. “When the situation was bad and other neu-
tral countries acted badly towards Hungary, we noted that the 
government of Finland was correct.”23 Thinking about Kádár’s 
experiences from the UN visit and his isolation, this was far 
from negligible. 
Second, both Kádár and Kekkonen had to push through their 
line despite domestic popular disapproval, in order to avoid 
further calamities. This condition drew them closer to each 
other. 
And third, the significance of the 1956 Revolution for Hun-
gary became comparable to that of the Winter War for Finland.  
Since the Soviets knew that the unconditional submission of 
these two nations would demand a considerable price, in terms 
of military force and international prestige, the Kremlin was 
prone to allow more latitude to these clients than it would have 
been willing to give in other circumstances. The Winter War 
and the 1956 Revolution were the basis for Kekkonen’s and 
Kádár’s Soviet policies also in the sense that they created a kind 
of backbone for the national identity, so that concessions to the 
Soviets could not immediately shake the foundations of na-
tional psychology. Having showed they were also able to fight, 
both nations could afford concessions without breaking their 
self-esteem. 
Of course, dealing with the Soviets neither Kádár nor 
Kekkonen could ever, ever even hint at this kind of significance 
of the 1939 and 1956 experiences, if they came to think of them 
at all. On the contrary, they both had to condemn their prede-
cessors’ incorrect actions and stupid policies. 
These convergent trends became visible only after some time. 
Immediately after the 1956 shock Hungary seemed to float ever 
further away, as Kekkonen later confessed to have thought.24 For 
some time after 1956, even some national-minded Finnish com-
munists feared that the new Hungarian communist leadership 
would stress the Soviet factor in their national history (in 1919, in 
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1944, in 1956) too much, which would then “easily lead into the 
thought that Hungarians’ own efforts are of lesser value.”25 In 
1959, one moderate communist seemed to have been rather sur-
prised that his visit to Hungary was “as a whole positive.”26 
 
2 The 1960s bridge-building 
The conditions for a Finnish-Hungarian rapprochement ma-
tured after 1962, in the conditions of an international thaw after 
the Cuban missile crisis. The period of crises was followed by a 
calmer phase between Finland and the Soviet Union.  In Hun-
gary, after the anti-Stalinist 22nd CPSU Congress, Kádár was 
finally able to initiate his project of reconciliation and re-
construction.27 International conditions became favourable, 
when the ‘Hungarian question’ was dropped from the UN 
General Assembly list of problems to discuss. 
Kekkonen began to plan visits and other action to revitalize 
Finnish relations with Hungary and Estonia.  
In connection with his official visit to Yugoslavia in May 
1963, Kekkonen visited also Hungary, “in private”, to avoid 
criticism.  His first impressions of Kádár were very favourable; 
the Hungarian leader “seemed to be a really agreeable and sen-
sible man. Quiet, plain, modest. Quiet humour, tinged with 
irony at his own expense. Spoke openly about the 1956 events.”28 
Leaning on his personal confidence with Khrushchev, Kek-
konen finally succeeded in arranging a trip even to Estonia, 
where he surprised everybody and especially the KGB watchers 
by delivering his main speech in an Estonian purer than most 
leaders of the Soviet republic could manage. Even today, Kek-
konen’s trip is remembered by Estonians as a major step in their 
long struggle to regain their independence.29 
In both Hungarian and Estonian cases, Kekkonen had a prize 
to offer to the Soviets: in case official relations would be allo-
wed to flourish, Finnish contacts to emigrants would naturally 
cool off. In foreign countries, the emigrants would be swallo-
wed up in two or three generations, while those who stayed 
would forever be the nation, he assessed. To the Swedish am-
bassador Kekkonen explained that to himself, as to his genera-
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tion, both Estonia and Hungary had been deeply felt emotional 
causes, although in 1944 contacts had to be cut off, and in 1956 
Hungary seemed to float even further away. Now the situation 
seemed to allow a revitalization of contacts, which could mean 
a lot also in the very long run. “History does not end up today.  
We often talked with [President] J. K. P[aasikivi]: if the S[oviet] 
U[nion] would change.” So, the relations to Hungary and to 
Estonia had to be built thinking not only about the present, but 
also preparing for the distant day when the Soviet Union and 
the camp controlled by it would change.30 
Ideological considerations did not prevent Kádár from de-
veloping closer relations with Finland. When the Finnish Com-
munist Party chairman complained about various difficulties 
created by Kekkonen’s policy which thwarted all efforts, Kádár 
commented with a smile: “So help you God” and then began to 
praise Kekkonen. According to Kádár, Khrushchev had compa-
red the Finnish President to “a swordsman, who crosses imme-
diately, straight and honest.”31 
So, the Soviet leader apparently had given a green light.  
Both Kádár and Kekkonen were very much Khrushchevites, 
they both owed a big part of their power to Nikita Sergeevich’s 
intervention, and they both got on well with the muzhik style of 
government. In the Summer of 1964, Kádár predicted to his 
Finnish comrade that the successor in the Kremlin, most proba-
bly Brezhnev, would no doubt continue the line.32 Even after 
Khrushchev became a non-person, Kekkonen tried to contact 
him, and Kádár sent a telegram of condolences to his widow. 
Khrushchev’s dismissal in October 1964 was a profound 
shock both for Kádár and Kekkonen. It soon became clear that 
the ‘party line’ would not continue unaltered in the Kremlin.  
The Soviet unpredictability was once again suddenly demon-
strated, and in a very disquieting way. On the one hand, an ex-
perience like this tended to press Kádár and Kekkonen closer to 
each other, but on the other, they had to proceed more cau-
tiously, and initially the latter trend was stronger. The process 
of rapprochement between the state leaders was halted for 
some years. 
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To Finnish communist leader Hertta Kuusinen, Kádár rather 
openly criticized the way Khrushchev was ousted, which had 
brought about ”a wave of concern” in Hungary. Kádár criti-
cized Soviet political culture, where everybody was united and 
unanimous under the same slogans, and the next day of an op-
posite opinion, also unanimously. “Unity should not be pro-
claimed in an exaggerating way; it can help at a given moment, 
but later on it may backlash against yourself.” One of the Hun-
garian leader’s associates put it even straighter: “If we want to 
retain confidence, we should speak the truth.”33 
Kádár admitted that the ’biological aspect’ was also valid, 
that is, Khrushchev’s advanced age (he was 70). “Growing old, 
a person becomes crazier. How to solve the issue? I’d have a 
prescription, but it cannot be used because of its inhumanity.  
That is, our leaders should be checked every day and when 
they reach the top they should be shot before they have time to 
grow old. Of course, this was a joke, but we should find appro-
priate ways to remove people into retirement.”34 (In 1982, when 
Kádár himself turned 70 and had quite some experience of Soviet 
gerontocracy, he probably did not recall this modest proposal.) 
During the first years of the Brezhnev regime, Kádár’s influ-
ence in Finland was mainly felt through the Communist Party, 
where Hungarian attitudes provided tactful support for the lib-
eral-minded moderate wing.35 Inside world communism, MSzMP 
assumed a mediating role between the Moscow camp and emerg-
ing Eurocommunism, and this became so well-known even in the 
West that Hungarians were soon seen ”as usual to have played 
the role of intermediary.”36 For the majority wing in the Finnish 
CP, this mediation was entirely welcome, providing them with 
new latitude in their silent effort to achieve some distance from 
Moscow. In 1968, their confidence in Kádár’s moderate state-
ments misled Finnish communist leaders into believing in a set-
tlement between the Soviets and the Czechs. Two weeks later, 
the occupation shock was then so much the worse.37 
Kekkonen learned about Hungarian influence and was satis-
fied with it. From his point of view, it was far from negligible, 
since strengthening moderate, national-minded Communist 
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thinking was a main element in his long-term strategy and even 
in short-term power play, communists being a party in govern-
ment after 1966. Also in the field of state relations, important 
new steps were taken, particularly in cultural affairs, where a 
cooperation treaty was signed in 1967 on a Finnish initiative. 
 
3 From the Prague Shock to European Security 
The occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 created common in-
terests between Finland and Hungary, and this time they were 
real, strong and specific, of a raison d’état type. Between the 
states, that kind of common interest should be counted as the 
solidest one. 
During the action itself, Kekkonen and Kádár were in extre-
mely different positions. Despite his close contacts with the So-
viets, Kekkonen was basically an outsider, to whom nothing 
was told about the preparations. He was especially hurt, realiz-
ing that the Soviets had outright lied to him, “to a person like 
myself.” Usually, when something important happened in the 
Soviet Union, Kekkonen was given information, in many cases 
similar to that received by eastern European allies, but this time 
he was kept in the dark. 
Kádár for his part was an insider and an important accom-
plice in the Soviet plans. He had to demonstrate diplomatic 
skills similar to those adopted by Kekkonen in relation to Hun-
gary in 1956, but he was much closer to the events and had to 
take a direct part in the Soviet action. Feelings and judgements 
about the appropriateness and consequences of the Kremlin 
policies had to be suppressed and a ‘realist’ attitude adopted.38 
Although the position of the two statesmen was rather dif-
ferent, they both seem to have experienced a depressing shock.  
Kádár was “sulking in his tent,”39 and Kekkonen went so far as 
to reveal his feelings to the British ambassador, who was sur-
prised by the open bitterness of the man who usually held his 
cards very close to the chest as far as his dealings with the Sovi-
ets were concerned.40 
After the occupation, the basic foreign political interest of 
both Kekkonen and Kádár was to avoid Czech-type develop-
KIMMO RENTOLA 
 110 
ments in their own countries and in their relations to the un-
predictable Soviets and to find new, stabilizing elements on 
which to build their positions. But this had to be done cau-
tiously, so that the Soviets would not be provoked into some 
kind of preventive action. The only way open for these two 
statesmen was to further some pro-Soviet efforts and to mould 
them in such a way as to strengthen the position of their nations 
as a kind of diminutive and hardly discernible by-product of 
the overwhelming process, where the Soviets would have 
something considerable to gain. 
The initiative for a European security conference, presented 
by Finland and eagerly developed by Hungary, must be inter-
preted in this light. 
Of course, also the general situation had to be favourable, 
and in 1969 it was, the Soviets wary of the Chinese threat and 
the Americans in trouble with their Vietnamese mess.  Both 
sides had something to gain in a European compromise. 
Basically to promote the CSCE initiative and to find new 
ways to further it, Kekkonen in September-October 1969 made 
a carefully balanced visit to Romania, Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia. Prague was selected to please the Soviets, who wanted 
international recognition for the Husák regime, and Bucharest 
to show ability to defy the Soviets and go where Nixon had 
gone; Kekkonen had no sympathy for Ceausescu, ”a charmless, 
monotonous, humourless chap [...] with boundless egotism and 
greed for power.”41 And then Budapest, which was where the 
Finnish President really wanted to go to. To show that the Hun-
garians should not be blamed for the Czech occupation and to 
take a new symbolically very important step, the Finns agreed 
to approve visa-free travel between the two nations. Hungary 
was the only socialist camp nation whose citizens were allowed 
to Finland without a visa. 
The Finnish record of the three hour one-on-one discussion 
between Kekkonen and Kádár is short and unsatisfactory 42; in 
part perhaps reflecting the fact that not every card was shown 
right away, many things were left unsaid and the partner had 
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to sense or guess deeper meanings.* Perhaps this need to watch 
the mouth was the main reason for the fact that Kekkonen be-
came so disproportionately furious, when the correspondent of 
the leading newspaper Helsingin Sanomat suggested in his news 
report that Hungarians were playing the visit down in response 
to Soviet pressure. Hungarians probably did not try anything of 
the kind,43 but Kekkonen was very nervous not to provoke or 
raise any Soviet suspicions towards his dealings in Eastern 
Europe. After the trip, however, only a Finnish left wing social-
ist newspaper (financed by the Soviets) wrote that some of 
Kekkonen’s remarks might fuel anti-Soviet elements in the 
West.44 
According to Finnish notes, Kekkonen and Kádár seem to 
have mainly discussed the past, most of the time the Prague 
Spring. Kádár explained the course of events as he saw them, 
admitting, “as a lawyer” (to another lawyer) that sovereignty 
was violated by the occupation. 
Perhaps even the future was talked about, or at least under-
stood, because Kekkonen used his discussions with Kádár to 
sell the European security conference idea to reluctant and sus-
picious Americans. In the White House in June 1970, he ex-
plained to President Richard Nixon that smaller Eastern Euro-
pean nations (“satellites”, as the American memo read) strongly 
desired such a conference, seeing it as an occasion to express 
and to strengthen the national identity.  
 
History has shown that armed rebellion does not work, as evi-
denced in Hungary. It has also shown that quick economic change 
does not work, as evidenced in Czechoslovakia. The last resort for 
the East Bloc satellites is to get more individual freedom through 
the conference table.45 
 
The only solution left was to find a way somehow acceptable 
also to the Soviet Union. The proposed conference could possi-
                                                 
* The Hungarian report is now available: Feljegyzés Kádár elvtárs és 
Kekkonen között 1969. szeptember 29-én törtent tárgyalásról. MOL, 
KÜM, XIX-J-1-j-Finn-TÜK-1-002242. 37.d. [Ed. note] 
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bly open up a peaceful development, where Eastern European 
national aspirations would become better represented. In this 
sense, it was a kind of risk also to the Soviet Union. 
This was the kind of talk Nixon understood. He invited his 
advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger from the adjoining office to join the 
discussion and repeated to him what the Finnish President had 
said. The Americans now gradually adopted a more positive 
attitude, sensing after all that there was something in it for the 
West also.46 
This was only a first step, but it was an important one.  Dur-
ing the complicated and lengthy preparations a special working 
relationship developed between the Finns and the Hungarians, 
although the latter had – especially in public – to be very care-
ful. Not to raise any Soviet doubts, the Hungarians stressed that 
their special relations in the cultural field derived from com-
mon linguistic ancestry (that is, not from e.g. political consid-
erations).47 On state visits, Hungarians avoided paying respects 
at the graves of the unknown soldier or Marshal Mannerheim, 
knowing how the Rumanians succeeded in provoking the Rus-
sians by acts like this.48 But privately or even semi-officially 
Hungarian leaders spoke so straight that the Finns were aston-
ished, even a bit shocked. Introducing to his colleague Kek-
konen the famous painting on King Árpád’s arrival in the Bu-
dapest parliament house, Pál Losonczi pointed out the van-
quished Slavs, saying that Slavs (and even Germans) had al-
ways tried to suppress Finns and Hungarians, but in vain.49 In 
Helsinki in January 1971, Prime Minister Jenő Fock boasted 
how he told about a power cable to Austria to Prime Minister 
Kosygin only afterwards. The Soviet colleague looked shocked, 
“because I had not asked his permission first.” Fock entertained 
his Finnish hosts by telling a Hungarian joke, according to 
which many socialist countries were like men who wanted to 
relieve themselves in a swimming pool and did so quietly in the 
water. But the Czechs had insisted on doing so from the diving 
board.50 This kind of talk was certainly understood in Finland. 
At the state dinner after the solemn signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act on 1 August 1975, Kekkonen had Kádár placed next to 
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himself. The placement was no accident (to use Stalin’s vocabu-
lary), since the CSCE was a triumph for these two statesmen, 
who now had every reason to hope for a more secure future for 
their countries.51 
 
4 Closure 
The troubles of the mountains are followed by the troubles of 
the plains. Developments after the security conference were far 
from smooth. But Kekkonen and Kádár could use their mutual 
understanding to help each other to better understand what 
was going on in Moscow, also in very sensitive matters, as was 
demonstrated during Kekkonen’s visit to Budapest in Novem-
ber 1976. The Hungarian Ambassador to Helsinki, Rudolf Ró-
nai, seems to have been an important actor in cultivating these 
contacts.52 This structure was inherited by Kekkonen’s succes-
sor, President Mauno Koivisto, for whom discussions with 
Kádár were of great importance especially in the beginning of 
his tenure, because of the Hungarian leader’s close relations 
with new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov.53 
Of course, this is only the roughest outline. More detailed re-
search into the development of these relations should be con-
ducted, before any conclusions about their significance can be 
made, even on the basis of Russian materials. The wish ex-
pressed by Kekkonen in 1964 about a change in the Soviet sys-
tem and sphere of influence was realized in a far deeper way 
than he or Kádár could ever have predicted. It remains to be 
seen, if their inheritance can at all be developed in new Europe 
by new generations. 
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President Kekkonen’s Visits to Hungary in the 1960s: 
Satellite Policy in the Context of Kinship 
 
Mari VARES 
 
A high-ranking Finnish foreign policy official Keijo Korhonen 
wrote in his memoirs about the role-position of Hungary in Fin-
nish foreign policy during the era of Kekkonen. To quote 
Korhonen: 
 
The Russians were first in importance, after them there was no-one 
in importance, even after no-one there was no-one, then there were 
the Hungarians and at the tail of the queue there were East Ger-
mans, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians and Rumanians. 1  
 
My aim is to discuss Finnish foreign policy – conducted by 
President Kekkonen - towards Hungary during the Kádár era, 
in the 1960s. At that time, the relations between Finland and 
Hungary were improved at both the intergovernmental and 
non-governmental (civic society) level. In this article, I will con-
centrate on the image and the structure of these relations: how 
were these relations established and what kind of relations 
were pursued? It can be anticipated that there were two contra-
dictory elements in these relations: first, the heritage of the old 
cultural relations, which were based on the feeling of kinship*, 
                                                          
* Cf. Riikonen, H.K.,”Sustaining Kinship in Wartime: Finnish-Hungarian 
Contacts in the Light of the Yearbook Heimotyö (1937-1944)”. Hungarolo-
gische Beiträge 7, Hrsg. Anssi Halmesvirta. Universität Jyväskylä 1996, 61-
73. [Ed. note] 
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and second, the political reality of Cold War Europe in the 
1960s.  
Expressions of the Finnish policy towards Hungary can be 
found in the context of the meetings between the countries’ 
leadership. Therefore, I will focus on the two visits which 
President Kekkonen paid to Hungary: the private visit in May 
1963 and the state visit in autumn 1969. The first visit was made 
at a time when the Hungarian relations to the West were prob-
lematic after the 1956 uprising. Kekkonen’s visit, although it 
was officially only a detour during the visit to Yugoslavia, was 
the first visit of a Western Head of State since the uprising of 
1956. The state visit of 1969, which was an official state visit and 
a part of a visit to Rumania and Czechoslovakia as well, was, on 
the other hand, made while the European Security Conference 
was being discussed and while the shadow of the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia was creating intense international pressure.  
Especially during the era of Kekkonen the President had an 
unusually strong position in formulating Finnish foreign policy. 
Kekkonen’s Hungarian relations are of special interest because 
as a student politician he was aitosuomalainen, an Ardent Finn, 
respected Finnish-Estonian-Hungarian kinship, and knew 
Hungary and Hungarians personally. Presumably, this mental 
heritage might have influenced his opinions and his policy to-
wards Hungary.2 The presence of power politics was, however, 
a reality. Relations with the Soviet Union were a primary con-
sideration, but, at the same time, the Finnish reputation as a 
western and neutral state was cherished. It is worth discussing 
how or if these two frameworks – the idea of kinship and the 
prevailing political conditions – were linked to each other in 
Kekkonen’s policy. As a working hypothesis it is presumed that 
these two dimensions were united in his policy to make the mu-
tual relations between Finland and Hungary a quite unique 
case in the field of Cold War policy. Further, it is important to 
compare the attitudes of the diplomatic corps to the policy of 
the state leadership as well as the expressions of the press and 
publicity to the official rhetoric3.  
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These two contexts – the tradition of kinship relations and 
the Cold War political conditions – hypothetically affected the 
visits too. In the case of Finnish-Hungarian relations, the visits 
which President Kekkonen paid in the 1960s seemed to be sym-
bolically valuable as acts of relations between two states. There-
fore, the visits – including programmes, symbols and forms of 
state visits4 – are of special value and worth studying in order 
to illuminate the conduct of the Finnish – Hungarian relations.  
 
1 Kádár’s Hungary and the Recognition of Finnish Neutrality 
In the aftermath of 1956, the issue of Hungary was controversial 
in Finland. Official Finnish policy towards Hungary can be de-
fined as cool satellite policy and the attitude of public opinion 
was that of a warming cultural co-operation. As the Finnish le-
gation in Budapest defined it, there were two different dimen-
sions in Finnish-Hungarian relations. First, the correct state 
level relations – as a result of the Finnish official moderate pol-
icy on Kádárism. Secondly, there were the correct relations be-
tween Finns and Hungarians, which were based on the Finnish 
sympathetic attitude towards Hungarians and on the voluntary 
help to the Hungarians who had suffered in the revolution. To 
quote the Finnish legation, there were the concepts of “official 
gratitude” and “official aid”. There was thus a difference be-
tween public opinion and the Finnish official policy. Kekkonen 
was aware of this difference. 5   
In the context of the issue of kinship, Finnish-Hungarian re-
lations seemed to be normalised soon after the revolution. As 
the Finnish Legation in Budapest stated, thanks to the Finnish 
sympathy for Hungarians, the relations between Hungary and 
Finland returned back to “cherishing the idea of kinship” as 
early as 1957. For example, Finn-Magyar Társaság (Finnish-
Hungarian Society) visited Hungary. The chargé d’affaires, T.H. 
Heikkilä, warned, however, that there was no reason for too 
much optimism yet. According to Heikkilä, it was still impor-
tant to consider the conditions in Hungary carefully, even if 
they seemed to be normalised.6 It can be argued that the state-
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ment reflected, surprisingly, both the attitude of Finnish public 
opinion and the official moderate policy towards Kádárism.  
In spite of the quick return to the normal kinship relations, 
the state-level relations between Hungary and Finland re-
mained cool. The relations were correct, but cool or reserved. 
Therefore, the fact that the Finnish Government opposed all 
open protest against the Soviet occupation in 1956 and against 
the Kádár regime, did not imply that the official relations be-
tween Hungary and Finland were good. It was assumed that 
the relations were kept cool in order to preserve Finland’s posi-
tion as an independent country.7 
Obviously, at the time of the first visit, the policy of a cool at-
titude towards satellite countries did not seem to be essential 
any more. The cool relations between Finland and the satellite 
countries were gradually warming up as a result of develop-
ments in international politics. In the case of Hungary, there 
were some new aspects to consider from the Finnish point of 
view. Kekkonen’s visit to Hungary in 1963 was part of a devel-
opment during which Hungary normalised or reconstructed its 
diplomatic links after the events of 1956. The Finnish political 
and diplomatic circles saw signs of liberalisation and de-
stalinisation in Hungary as well as signs of a new orientation in 
the relations between Hungary and the United Nations.8 
The question of Finland’s reputation as a neutral state was 
also an important indicator in Finnish foreign policy. When 
there were perceptible signs of western acceptance of Finnish 
neutrality, the Finnish political leadership was ready to im-
prove the relations with the Eastern Bloc. After the visit to 
Great Britain in 1961 and France in 1962, the tone of the West 
gave official indications that Finland was a neutral state.9 In ad-
dition to this, the cultural and scientific contacts between 
Finland and Hungary had increased little by little in the late 
1950’s and early 1960’s.10  
The visit of 1963 can easily be seen as a turning point in the 
relations between Finland and Hungary. The policy in the af-
termath of the 1956 revolution seemed to change. One can ask if 
the Finnish contradictory attitudes towards Hungary were still 
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apparent and one can also ask if ‘Finnish sympathetic attitudes 
towards Hungarians’ were transformed to ‘the policy of kin-
ship’ and if the ‘moderate attitude of the Finnish political lead-
ership towards Kádár’ was transformed into the ‘Finnish satel-
lite policy towards Hungary’.  
Kekkonen himself considered that his visit had an important 
effect on Finnish-Hungarian relations. He stated a year after the 
first visit that it was the kinship movement that should form the 
basis for Finnish relations towards both kinship nations, Esto-
nia and Hungary. He pointed out in his private speech to the 
representatives of the so-called national sciences in Finland that 
these relations should be based on unofficial civic society circles 
rather than conducted at the state level. As he said: 
 
To the generation to which I belong and whose marvellous and 
good representatives are gathered here, the issue concerning Esto-
nia and Hungary is an emotional subject… Already for a couple of 
years, I have had an idea that better relations to Hungary and Es-
tonia should be established, not necessarily on a formal or official 
basis, because I understood that there would be difficulties with 
that, but merely on informal, cultural and social levels, but pro-
gress in this way should be handled very carefully.11  
 
Accordingly, Kekkonen invited the scholars to create an in-
formal network between Finland and the kinship nations. This 
was a way to establish and reinforce the contacts between 
Finland and Hungary. One can ask if this was a way to 
strengthen kinship relations as such or whether it was a way to 
get Finns involved with Hungarians in spite of the political dif-
ferences. Were these informal contacts aimed to further the offi-
cial political relations? 
The visit which Kekkonen paid to Hungary in May 1963 was 
an unofficial visit - and the aim of the Finnish political leader-
ship was to emphasise this unofficial nature of the visit. The 
tentative attitude of the Finnish political élite towards Hungary 
can be interpreted in Finnish official reports to the press. The 
Finnish News Agency, STT, pointed out that President 
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Kekkonen would only call at or stop at Hungary during his 
way home from Yugoslavia.12  
President Kekkonen then stopped at Hungary on May 12th-
15th 1963, immediately after his visit to Yugoslavia. President 
Dobi and Mrs Dobi acted as hosts for him and Mrs Sylvi 
Kekkonen. The programme consisted of cultural events, sight-
seeing in Budapest and a visit to the countryside and Debrecen. 
Kekkonen also met Finns who lived in Hungary. There was no 
mention of a meeting between Kekkonen and Kádár in the offi-
cial program – a fact that can also be interpreted as a symbol of 
informality.13 
  
2 Reflections on the Visit 
Kekkonen’s visit attracted some attention in the Finnish media: 
in the press there was a slightly critical tone. Before the visit, 
Kekkonen was annoyed about the tone of the newspaper Uusi 
Suomi. According to him they were questioning the judgement 
of the Finnish political leadership – in other words, his judge-
ment. In Uusi-Suomi the question was asked if it was reasonable 
to visit a country in which the prevailing conditions were sus-
pect. Kekkonen brought this matter up with the chief editor, 
Eero Petäjäniemi, who denied that he had criticized Kekkonen 
in this way.14 
After the visit, it was claimed in a Finnish magazine Kuva-
Posti that the state visit to Yugoslavia was successful, but the 
informal extended visit to Hungary aroused more critisism. 
“Was the visit at all necessary at this time?” asked the journalist 
Väinö Länsiluoto.15 The reason for these comments can be 
found in the post-1956 context: the press might well be fearing 
that Finland was being identified with the Eastern bloc.   
Also in Hungarian media comment the visit of the Finnish 
presidential couple aroused some attention. The press seemed 
to have concentrated on the informal nature of the visit. For 
example, the Hungarian magazine Nők Lapja concentrated on 
Mrs Sylvi Kekkonen. The women’s magazine also wrote about 
Kalevala and presented the city of Helsinki in a richly illustrated 
article. In the pictures published in newspapers and magazines, 
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President Kekkonen was photographed in informal situations: 
in Pusta and visiting suburban housing developments.16 In 
other words, in the traditional Hungarian context and in the 
modern one – one can ask if these pictures reflected symboli-
cally new Finnish-Hungarian relations in which the traditional 
context and the modern one were present concomitantly? 
Afterwards, in the political rhetoric certain value was given 
to the visit. The discourse reflected the idea that the visit was to 
be interpreted and expressed as an opening of relations be-
tween Kekkonen’s Finland and Kádár’s Hungary. One year 
later, the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter stated in the 
Hungarian parliament that the relations between Hungary and 
Finland did not reflect only “a romantic ethnographic kinship“, 
but that the relations were at a level of modern progress. Péter 
argued that there were “many useful economic and cultural 
achievements“ between Hungary and Finland. Later, in the 
Finnish Foreign Ministry, Péter’s statement was given as an ex-
ample of the prevailing image of Finnish-Hungarian relations.17 
Kádár himself stated to Finnish Ambassador Palas after 
Kekkonen’s visit that Hungary carefully observed Finnish for-
eign policy. Kádár emphasized the good relations between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. He – like many others – used the 
concept of kinship in a modern sense. Kinship was designed as 
being not only a cliché, but a scientific truth. At the same time 
there was in Kádár’s rhetoric another concept, peaceful co-
operation: the idea of small peaceful nations in the field of in-
ternational politics.18 The Finnish diplomats might have re-
garded this as a sign of peaceful co-existence. Therefore, in the 
1960s, two different aspects were found in Finnish-Hungarian 
relations by the Finns: the two kinship countries wanted peace-
ful co-existence.19 A traditional concept and a modern one were 
thus used in the policy of the relations.  
An interesting detail in terms of the relations between the 
two different political systems was a discussion between Kádár 
and the Finnish Communist Party Chairman Aimo Aaltonen a 
year after Kekkonen’s visit. The discussion was reported to 
Kekkonen by the Finnish State Policy Service. Aaltonen com-
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plained about various difficulties created by Kekkonen’s policy. 
He explained to Kádár that one of the reasons why there could 
not be a communist revolution in Finland was that the Finnish 
Communists were not successful because Kekkonen was taking 
the wind out of the sails of the revolution. Kádár commented 
with a smile: “So God help you!”20 
At the informal level – as Kekkonen wished – there began to 
appear concrete signs as symbols of good relations. A sign of 
the understanding between the two countries was that in 1964 
package tours to Hungary were for the first time organised in 
Finland. This implied – as the Finnish Embassy in Budapest 
stated – the “popularisation of Finnish-Hungarian relations”.21  
Tourism and travel as well as an increasing number of Finnish 
scholarship students in Hungary were undoubtedly ways to 
strengthen and re-establish the contacts between Hungary and 
Finland. Later, as a result of Kekkonen’s state visit to Hungary 
in 1969, the travelling conditions were further simplified, as the 
result of an agreement that compulsory visas between the two 
countries should be discontinued.  
 
3 In a Spirit of ‘Peaceful Co-existence’ – The 1969 State Visit 
If the visit in 1963 was remarkable because it was understood to 
be the opening of a new era of relations between Finland and 
Hungary, the visit of 1969 had also a similar importance. In the 
late 1960s, respect for Soviet interests was still the primary con-
sideration in the relations across the iron curtain. But one new 
element in the foreign policy of Hungary was an increasing 
openness to the West. A key motivation behind such moves 
was the opportunity which the West offered to gain access to 
the latest technologies and to participate in economic oppor-
tunities. The first contacts in this respect were Finland and 
Austria. The visit paid by the Austrian Chancellor Josef 
Klaus in 1967, as well as Kekkonen’s visit, were given huge 
publicity.22 For Kekkonen, the tourney in Eastern Europe of-
fered an opportunity to formulate the Finnish position on 
post-Prague international politics. In 1969 there were signs of 
normalisation in international relations after the events in 
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Prague. This might have encouraged Kekkonen to visit East-
ern Europe. As Kekkonen’s biographer, Juhani Suomi further 
explains, the Finnish state leadership wanted to get ac-
quainted with the situation in Eastern Europe.23 Therefore, 
the situation in 1969 resembled the situation in 1963: stabili-
sation after tension. 
Before the visit, the Finnish Embassy in Budapest assumed 
that the policy of peaceful co-existence had given Finland a cer-
tain position in Hungary’s policy. In the report concerning the 
political events in Hungary it was again estimated that relations 
with the Soviet Union formed the basis of Hungarian policy. 
This basis was, however, not contradictory to the idea of peace-
ful co-existence.  It was stated that “this pleasant side of the so-
cialist bloc is more evident in the case of Hungary than in other 
socialist countries”.24  
In addition to the political conditions, attention was also 
drawn to cultural relations. Culture and science were seen as 
central aspects of these mutual relations. A report which was 
drawn up by the Finnish Embassy in Budapest stated that the 
reason for the good co-operation was that Finland accepted 
Hungarian cultural policy: the policy which was conducted at 
the higher political level.25 
 
4 Expressions of Relations 
The speeches provide an interesting insight into the image and 
to the system of the relations between the two countries. 
Kekkonen’s speeches in Budapest in 1969 reflected both the 
concept of kinship and the concepts of progress: old concepts 
were interlinked to new ones. As Kekkonen expressed it, the 
relations between Hungary and Finland were founded not only 
on historical grounds but also on modern co-operation. For ex-
ample, Kekkonen praised the progress Hungary had made dur-
ing the 1960s: the development in Hungary between the years 
1963-1969 had shown “the high level of Hungarian civilisation 
and culture”. He emphasized both political and cultural under-
standing between the two countries. 
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Further, it was stressed that kinship was a scientific truth, 
not a romantic speculation or a myth. This was undoubtedly a 
way to reinforce the value of the kinship. In this rhetoric, the 
kinship was not, however, the only aspect of brotherhood. 
Kekkonen defined the brotherhood between Finland and Hun-
gary as not only a tradition of the awareness of the kinship but 
also as the willingness to establish mutual cultural and com-
mercial agreements. The concept of a small nation implied this 
brotherhood. The idea of small nations in the field of modern 
politics was thus one of the uniting links between the two coun-
tries. Therefore, the concepts of kinship and brotherhood, pro-
gress and small nation formed the basis of the rhetoric.26  
The kinship aspect – in a more traditional sense – was visible 
also in the informal part of the state visit. Such details were the 
Kalevala-show, which was held in Budapest and a new Hungar-
ian-Finnish Dictionary. According to Kustaa Vilkuna, the Dic-
tionary was a “neat or, in other words, smart and solid expres-
sion of the special status of Finnish-Hungarian relations”. 
Vilkuna had recommended that the dictionary should be pre-
sented to some of the Hungarian high-ups.27   
The discussions between the heads of state can be linked to 
the idea of small nations in the field of international politics. 
Discussions of world politics and mutual interests dealt with 
the typical, actual political issues. Notes of the discussions 
show that an exchange of views concerning NORDEK, Euro-
pean security and commercial and economic co-operation were 
on the agenda.28 The official memorandum which the President 
and the Finnish Foreign Ministry gave on the state visit empha-
sized the correct nature of the relations between Finland and 
Hungary. It is worth noticing that there was an expression of 
“the similarity of opinions on world politics and of the direction 
of the mutual relations between the two states“.29  
 
5 “Muckraking Journalism” – A Dissonance to the Official 
Liturgy 
The Finnish press, however, did not adopt a similarly high tone: 
their discussions were not necessarily in accordance with the 
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official rhetoric. One of the interesting incidents of the latter 
visit was the case of “muckraking journalism“ of which Kek-
konen accused one reporter of the Finnish newspaper, Helsingin 
Sanomat, Lauri Karén: the codes of the official ‘liturgy’ were dis-
turbed by Karén´s critical articles on the president’s visit to 
Hungary.  
The President made his attitude to Karén’s articles clear. 
Kekkonen would not accept critical reporting and accused 
Lauri Karén “of taking a waste bin instead of a pen“ with him 
to Hungary. Kekkonen further complained that “it was clear 
that a journalist who had equipped himself with these kind of 
tools cannot write a truthful description“.  
Karén had written that Hungary had shown only little inter-
est in Kekkonen during his visit. Karén gave an explanation of 
this: the Soviet Union disliked the potentially increasing con-
tacts between Hungary and neutral countries. Karén noticed 
that the typical symbols of a state visit had been lacking in Bu-
dapest: there was no red carpet at the airport and Kádár was 
not there to personally welcome the president. In addition to 
this “lack of symbols at the airport”, there were only a few Fin-
nish or Hungarian flags in the streets of Budapest. He consid-
ered that the atmosphere in Czechoslovakia and Rumania had 
been much warmer towards Kekkonen. Karén had discussed 
this with some British and French representatives, who had 
considered that the reception was rather cool and who had also 
noticed these things.30 Thus maybe his tone of reporting was 
not typically Finnish, but more French or British? Karén per-
sonally stated later in his memoirs that the Hungarians had not 
paid much attention to his writing.31 Nevertheless, the recent 
Hungarian appraisals of Kekkonen’s visit in 1969 have pointed 
out the huge publicity which was given to it in Hungary.32 
 
6 Two Ideas of Brotherhood  
For Hungary, the correct state level relations with Finland were 
important in order to create and develop techno-scientific con-
tacts with the West.33 For Finland, relations with Hungary were 
– in terms of state level politics – an integral part of Finnish pol-
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icy towards the satellite countries. In the case of Hungary, the 
satellite policy was, however, conducted by connecting the idea 
of tradition to the modern Cold War policy. Therefore, the tra-
dition of cultural co-operation and the tradition of cherishing 
the idea of kinship were linked to the Finnish (Satellite) policy 
towards Hungary – at least at the rhetorical level. 
The concept of kinship was undoubtedly a way to establish 
Finnish-Hungarian relations. This myth offered a common dis-
course and it was a way to assure the structure of good rela-
tions. As Kekkonen put it, these relations were meant to be 
primarily unofficial: academic contacts, cultural co-operation 
and increasing tourism. It will be worth extending the analysis 
concerning the role of the unofficial kinship activities in 
Kekkonen’s policy in further studies: what was the role of these 
contacts in the field of international politics?    
Nevertheless, the kinship activities offered a basis not only 
for popular, unofficial contacts between the Finns and Hun-
garians but for the political rhetoric as well. The only limitation 
on the use of the old tradition was, according to Korhonen, that 
the players of the game knew the rules of it. In other words, the 
rhetoric of tradition was to be used in the context of the limita-
tions of the international policy.34  
Accordingly, the efforts of unofficial contacts, which was 
founded on the idea of kinship, could be used as arguments in 
political relations. The visits reflected this policy. There was, 
however, a trend to modernise the concept of kinship in order 
to strengthen its value. First, the kinship was claimed to be a 
scientific truth, and secondly it was stated that it was not the 
only tie between Finland and Hungary.  
In addition, the concepts of a small nation and progress were 
used in the political rhetoric. Similarly, just as with the concept 
of kinship, these arguments referred to the ties between the two 
countries. The role of science, both in terms of the kinship as-
pect and techno-scientific co-operation was essential. In conclu-
sion, there were two ideas of brotherhood to launch: the tradi-
tional one and the modern one. 
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Cultural Policy during the Kádár Era 
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In this article political culture in cultural relations will be exam-
ined through the concept of discursive exercise of power. More 
precisely, the subject of the study is the discursive use of power 
in the cultural policy of Kádár’s Hungary. The cultural policy of 
Kádár’s time was by no means uniform during the era, as there 
were changes that were connected to the general changes of 
society and its politics. What remained the same, however, was 
that the cultural policy was subjected to the general objectives 
of politics, and that its essential task was to legitimize the 
power of the state and the party. As culture, and especially lit-
erature, was seen to have a significant effect on the ideological 
atmosphere in society, it was given an almost exaggerated sig-
nificance during the entire era. As a result, it was kept on a 
short political leash. The ideology defined the room for cultural 
and literary policy.1 
The goal is to examine the conditions of the existence of dis-
course and connect it to the practical field it is produced and 
controlled in: the practice of politics. How, to what extent, and 
on which levels can discourses, in this case especially cultural 
and art-related discourses, be the objects of political actions, and 
what type of correlation can they have in relation to the actions? 
Michel Foucault has studied the relation of politics to discour-
se. He is not interested in codes but incidents: why exactly these 
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events (discursive or others), and what their correlation is to the 
previous and simultaneous events. Thus, he is trying to find the 
set of norms defined by certain eras and certain societies.2 
Discursive use of power is a key concept when one examines 
how cultural and intellectual policies, which in socialist Hun-
gary were personified in the leading cultural politician György 
Aczél, were a part of political culture in general. In that case it 
can be asked how political the culture was, and in what way. 
Culture was openly part of foreign policy, as in all socialist 
countries, and, in practice, it was a matter of what was possible 
and allowed to be said, so that one was able to get for example 
one’s texts published. I will examine the literary life of Kádár’s 
Hungary mainly from this point of view, as it is the most im-
portant field of culture and, at the same time, the object of the 
strongest exercise of power. 
All over Eastern Europe, as well as in Hungary, writers have 
always been assumed to represent the conscience of a nation. 
Writers, poets and other intellectuals have been expected to 
cultivate and maintain the national values even at the risk of 
losing their lives when tyrants have created an unsurmountable 
gap between rulers and subjects. National revolutions have of-
ten been regarded as direct results of the sacrifices made by the 
intellectuals. In brief, literature in particular has often served as 
a substitute for politics in this field, and writers and poets have 
often replaced politicians, who have sometimes been consid-
ered tyrannical and corrupted by foreign states. It can be ar-
gued that one of the Great Narratives of Hungarian literature 
has been the writers’ mission to lead the people with their 
prophesies. Especially the so called folk writers (népi írók) have 
been placed into this vátesz-role. Vátesz means a prophet or an 
inspired writer, who has even clairvoyant powers. It has been 
one of the key concepts of the literary discussion in Hungary 
and an important part of the tradition. The writers themselves 
have accepted this mission as a given model of a good and use-
ful writer. A writer of this kind has tasks also outside the actual 
literary world. Vátesz is also a politically active writer, who 
fights for the citizens. The tradition was started by Sándor Pe-
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tőfi, who has been a model for later generations. The tradition 
has been carried on for example by János Arány, Endre Ady, 
Gyula Illyés and Sándor Csoóri.3 
In Hungary the establishment created a special system with 
which it was able to control the discourse. Culture was an inte-
gral part of this system of control, and the discourse of culture 
itself was closely monitored mainly with the help of the ’system 
of the three T’s’. The name comes from the Hungarian words 
meaning support, toleration and denial (támogatás, tűrés, tiltás). 
The principle was derived from Kádár’s well-known slogan, 
”anyone who is not against us is with us” (1962) and it was offi-
cialized in the ninth party conference of MSZMP in 1966. The 
system was developed by Aczél, who exercised the strongest 
cultural power in Hungary, and it represents a revealing exam-
ple of a system that includes discursive use of power. In this 
article the political culture of cultural policy is exemplified par-
ticularly through Aczél’s role and the system of the three T’s.  
It is also a question of language, or rather of discourse, par-
ticularly of the ideologies and use of power which are con-
cealed in a language. This discourse deals with the constituting 
of ideologies of languages. Discourse can be generally defined 
as an organised and recognisable way to transfer knowledge or 
information to someone else. It also includes the institutional-
ized conventions of conversing. In this sense discourse has two 
dimensions: firstly, what persons say from a certain position 
and, secondly, which kinds of regularities can be pointed out in 
their speech. The focus can, for instance, be on what kind of a 
role public discourse plays in constituting national political cul-
tures.4 Also questions about language use have often led to po-
litical actions; it is, for example, usual to speak about ’politically 
correct’ language use. Does a change in language lead to a 
change, for example, in attitudes? What is between the lan-
guage of control (the language the ruling class uses and that 
helps it to maintain its control of the citizens) and the vernacu-
lar? A language serves as the principal means of expression, 
manipulation and also transformation of power relations and 
political relations. Likewise, the used form of language itself 
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has an effect through defining and concretizing concepts that 
have not perhaps been thoroughly clarified and defined. Lan-
guage can also be used as a means of supervision in the entire 
field of social relations.5 Socialist rhetoric can also be defined as 
a way to shape the consciousness of the people. 
Foucault’s approach has come in for criticism, mainly be-
cause of a significant limitation: it seems to be more applicable 
for research on well-defined institutions (medicine, psychiatry) 
than to finding out how most discourses are limited or what the 
relations between institutions are.6 Foucault uses the term ’dis-
course’ to refer both to literal and social conventions without 
offering any clear indications about where the discourse ends 
and other social life begins.7 On the other hand, Foucault does 
not define his work as a complete philosophical system or gen-
eral theory, but, as he states: 
  
All my books... are little tool boxes... if people want to open them, 
to use this sentence or that idea as a screwdriver or spanner to 
short-circuit, discredit or smash systems of power, including even-
tually those from which my books have emerged... so much the 
better.8 
 
I will use some of Foucault’s concepts and thoughts in this 
spirit, as well as some of the useful questions he generated, in 
order to clarify the political culture of cultural policy in Kádár’s 
Hungary. Discourse, for example, is not a group of signs and 
texts for Foucault, but ”practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak”.9 During his genealogical era Fou-
cault was interested especially in what conditions, limits and 
institutionalizes discursive formations.10 One example of this 
use of power linked to discourse is the concept of ’the policy of 
truth’ that Foucault uses. It means the power of the prevailing 
knowledge, that is to say, the policy which is practised through 
and with the help of the concept of truth. The concept of truth 
means the discourses that prevail, for example, in the field of 
science.11  
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Thus the truth cannot be found, but every society needs to 
produce truth and create its own interpretation of it.12 As to the 
policy of truth, it is also a case of power status and ruling posi-
tions, as well as the practices that ensure the validity of each 
policy of truth. In the end, in practice, it is also a case of how to 
strive to raise subjects who agree with certain policies. The in-
stitutions and discourses specialized in producing truth and 
information are vital for the preservation of the power struc-
tures, as relying on the produced truth guarantees that the use 
of power continues. Information manifesting itself as the truth 
is the object of continuous political disputes and social struggle. 
Every society has its own truth regimes, its general policies of 
truth.13 So, what are the grounds for language change and the 
models of using language in practice in a social organisation? 
What types of norms of speaking exist in certain social net-
works and communities? Which persons and institutions are 
the most influential when the structure of Foucault’s factors is 
being defined? What are the effects of the structure and the ide-
ologies supporting it? 
In Kádár’s Hungary the production of truth was mainly en-
trusted to the intellectuals, especially to the writers. The estab-
lishment regarded them as more suitable than the scientists to 
pass the truth to the people in a way that would produce the 
best subjects from the viewpoint of the preservation of power. 
On the other hand, the intellectuals themselves were the objects 
of the conditioning: consolidation applied to them the same 
way as to the ’ordinary’ people, although at the same time they 
were the tools of consolidation. Another significant fact is that 
in Kádár’s Hungary the intellectuals had a transmitting role: 
their task was to transform the values of the establishment to 
the people with the help of language and discourse.  
 
1 György Aczél – ‘Main Censor’ 
In the following I will discuss the general rules of the cultural 
system of Kádár’s system, especially Aczél’s way of using 
power inside the cultural system; in other words, I will ask the 
question Foucault generated: ”how does power work?”14 This 
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way it is possible to see concretely what sort of power produces 
what and how. One can also ask which individuals, groups or 
classes have access to a particular type of discourse. How have 
the relations between discourse, speakers and the audience 
been institutionalized? How is the battle for the control of dis-
course between classes, nations, linguistic, cultural and ethnic 
communities conducted?15 Or who has the permission to define 
the limits of the desired discourse?  
Cultural power belonged, without a doubt, to Aczél during 
the whole of the Kádár era. In practice, he was the second in 
charge in the administration although his official position var-
ied. He, for example, never worked as the Minister of Culture, 
but as deputy minister. This exemplifies the opaque power con-
tained in Kádár’s system: the power and its topmost holders 
concealed themselves in a complex and ever-changing system, 
whose inner hierarchy and order relations were extremely diffi-
cult to outline. For artists and intellectuals the relationship with 
the regime practically equalled their (often personal) relation-
ships with Aczél during the whole era. He was a member of the 
central committee from the beginning of the Kádár era to the 
end (1956–1989), a member of the Politburo 1970–88, assistant 
Minister of Culture 1957–67 and the cultural secretary of the 
Central Committee 1967–74 and 1981–85. After the Second 
World War Aczél got entangled into the show trial of László 
Rajk, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in 1949. He was 
released in 1954 owing to the amnesty following Stalin’s death. 
At first he did not want to return to politics because in his opin-
ion the country was inevitably being forced to choose between 
Stalinism and Fascism. In addition, the 1956 revolution nour-
ished his nearly paranoid fear of Fascism (he was Jewish), so 
after the suppression of the revolution he joined Kádár’s col-
laborationist administration supporting the communist dicta-
torship, which he saw as the only possibility for resisting the 
Fascist-type restoration.16 
Kádár’s administration immediately started to create a new 
cultural policy that was meant clearly to stand out from the 
previous cultural policy led by József Révai in Rákosi’s time. 
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The leading figure of the new cultural policy was, at first, István 
Szirmai, who was the chief of the Agitation and Propaganda 
Section of the Central Committee 1957–59. Over the years till 
the end of the 1960s the main threat to the ideology was the so 
called revisionist thinking, and the official approach to the 
problem was represented by Szirmai and the agit-prop section. 
Aczél, however, quickly took control of cultural life and soon 
gained the position of second-in-command in the country’s 
administration. He was practically the absolute authority in 
cultural and art-related matters all through the era from the 
mid-sixties. Cultural policy was an extremely important field, 
because the intellectuals were quite a dangerous group in the 
sense that they had a key role in shaping public opinion. Aczél, 
in particular, was responsible for the way the Party treated the 
most important intellectuals who shaped opinions. The founda-
tions of the new literary policy were laid between the years 
1957–1962: it was the time of literary reform, and the bounda-
ries of the later consensus were drawn. The main question of 
the reform was whether to eliminate the intellectuals who con-
tinued to rebel or whether to try to compromise with them. The 
writers were an especially important group in this matter. From 
the Foucaultian viewpoint, therefore, the problem was what 
type of power relation could be achieved between the writers 
and the regime, so that the consolidation would develop opti-
mally. Aczél had a considerable influence on the main policies, 
which stated that there would be an attempt to calm down the 
intellectuals who had played a significant role in the revolution 
and to get them to accept a compromise instead of terrorizing 
and silencing them.17 
The entire administration of cultural policy was personified 
in Aczél, and literary life, in particular, was under his personal 
control. Although his dominance was the same as Révai’s in the 
1950s, Aczél’s approach was more pragmatic than dogmatic. He 
had close personal contact especially with the writers, which 
was sometimes considered by the party officials to be a danger-
ous practice. They were afraid that subjective relations would 
RAIJA OIKARI 
 140 
interfere with the objective solving of aesthetic and ideological 
problems.18 
 
2 The Discursive Use of Power Contained in the System of the 
Three T’s 
Aczél’s cultural policy was based on various principles. First, 
he supported the heterogeneity of cultural life (although not 
pluralism), and secondly, his opinion was that disputes over 
style could not be solved from the viewpoint of power.19 My 
other Foucaultian question handles the limits and forms of the 
sayable (that which is possible to say). What is possible to be 
talked about? What is the constituted domain of discourse? 
What type of discourse refers to this or that area of reality (in 
other words: what is regarded as an object of narrative process-
ing, that is to say, an object of literal formulation)? What did 
Aczél’s “heterogeneity”, therefore, mean in terms of cultural 
activities?  
In order to guarantee heterogeneity, Aczél created a catego-
rizing system that enabled more specific defining of what was 
”non-hostile” and ”clearly hostile” literature, and, in addition, 
possibly a kind of ”concept of politically neutral literature”. 
From the late 1950s onwards, Aczél drafted this regulation and 
censorship system, the so-called ’system of the three T’s’ that 
dominated the cultural and literary policy throughout the 
Kádár era.20 
The first official comment on literature was Aczél’s report 
“About the state of our literature” (Az irodalmunk helyzetéről). 
The date of publication of the report (6 August 1957) has been 
called the birthday of the system of the three T’s. The report 
consisted solely of broad definitions of policy, as the country 
was still in a state of transition. It was announced that writers 
were expected to represent their political commitment only 
through their literary works. Otherwise, it was important that 
the writers clearly expressed their political views on important 
political matters, such as on the émigré Hungarian writers.21 
The most important section of the report, however, was the 
early formulation of the three T’s:  
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In the first place, the Party and the government promotes socialist-
realist art. However, it also supports other progressive, realist 
trends. Furthermore, publicity with due criticism, is granted to 
such non-realist trends too which are not in contradiction with the 
People’s Democracy. Finally, we reject all attempts to undermine 
the social or public order of the People’s Democracy.22* 
 
In September of the same year the strategy of the central 
committee of MSZMP was published – so far literary life had 
been practically stagnant. At that time a proper strategy for lit-
erary policy did not yet exist, and this document reflects a type 
of transition period in the birth of Kádárian literary policy. An-
other early sign of a new approach was the Party pamphlet 
“Guidelines of cultural policy” (Művelődéspolitikai irányelvei), 
which was published in August 1958. It abandoned the old 
rhetoric of the arts having a spontaneous need for socialist 
unity and guiding of the Party by stating that when building a 
socialist cultural life, the Party did not only allow, but actively 
promoted, diversity. This decision emphasizes that ‘realistic’ 
cannot be a genre, as “it is not possible to solve questions of 
style by orders/by fiat” (stílusvitákat nem lehet hatalmi szóval 
eldönteni). Additionally, it was stated that the category of toler-
ated books included works that were not realistic, but that 
nonetheless were humanistic, which did not threat the social 
order and were not disruptive. According to the decision, the 
Party gave these books a chance of being published, but re-
served itself a right to “discuss them”. The books that were con-
sidered to be disruptive were not tolerated: in other words, they 
                                                          
* “A párt és a kormány elsősorban a szocialista-realista alkotások létrejöt-
tet támogatja, de segítséget ad minden más haladó, realista irányzatnak, 
s a bírálat jogát fenntartva nyilvánosságot biztosít olyan nem realista 
irányazatoknak is, amelyek nem állnak szemben ellenségesen a népi 
demokráciával. Ugyanakkor elutasít minden olyan törekvést, amely a 
népi demokrácia állami és társadalmi rendjét akarja aláásni.”  
 
 
    
RAIJA OIKARI 
 142 
were banned.23 The principles of the system of the three T’s 
were already outlined, although not yet perfected. The publish-
ing of the system did not, in fact, take place until 1959.24 
A view that was meant to be final was published in Decem-
ber 1958, even though a proper unanimity was not reached. The 
decision was meant to be a step towards literary consolidation 
and pacification of literary life. Literary policy was, however, 
still rather disorganised at the time, and the government made 
several decisions, which were often self-contradictory to some 
degree. Consolidation in the literary and cultural life meant 
essentially its de-politicization. The regime also wanted to em-
phasize that it had learned from the mistakes of the earlier cul-
tural policy (led by Révai) and that the government did not fa-
vour any group in particular, but that the foundation of cultural 
life should be as broad as possible. This has been criticized by 
saying that whereas the cultural policy of Révai’s time suffered 
from schematism*, Kádárian cultural life was grey, soporific 
and mediocre.25 On the other hand, it was ideologically more 
colourful and politically and ideologically more free. In addi-
tion, the artistic production was of better quality than during 
Rákosi’s time, because now, for example, strict adherence to the 
doctrine of Socialist Realism was not demanded.  
The new viewpoint to literature and cultural life gained 
broader validity after the Party Congress in 1962. That congress 
is famous because of the slogan “anyone who is not against us, 
is with us”. The outcome of the intensive debates over philoso-
phy, literature, history, religion, etc. is crystallized in the decla-
ration of the 9th Congress: 
 
We shall give our support to socialist and other humanistic crea-
tive works that speak to broad masses, we shall accommodate en-
deavours that are politically and ideologically inimical, but we 
                                                          
* Schematism refers to a superficial, photographic realism in arts with 
stereotyped black and white characters soaked in shallow sentimental-
ism. It was a consequence of the slavish adaptation of the dogma of the 
socialist realism. See Lóránt Czigány, The Oxford History of Hungarian 
Literature. Oxford University Press 1984, 442. [Ed. note]  
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shall debar from our cultural life all manifestations that are politi-
cally inimical, antihumanistic or offend public morals. 26* 
 
This is the official formulation of the three T’s and, at the 
same time, the culmination of the political neutralisation and 
consolidation of the intelligentsia, which got its doctrinal form 
through the system of the three T’s. This system was thereby 
the way in which party policy was converted into practice.27 
The system of the three T’s was, above all, meant for catego-
rizing rather carefully what was possible to say (the sayable) and 
what was not. The categories were not defined by any finalized 
rules or regulations: they were slackened and tightened de-
pending on the prevailing political situation. Sándor Révész, 
who wrote the Aczél monograph, refers to this wavering of the 
rules when he states that the cultural policy of the three T’s also 
contained an unsolved dilemma. It was a part of the basis of the 
system that the establishment did not by any means tolerate 
even the “tolerated” works without commenting on them. In-
stead, it pointed out their shortcomings, thereby attempting to 
prevent the hidden dangers (against the Socialist System) to-
gether with Marxist critique. In addition, as there were no exact, 
permanent and normative borderlines, the tolerated could 
change into the prohibited at any time (and vice versa). For ex-
ample, one of the primary duties of an editor was to sense and 
conform to those changes. In case he did not pay enough atten-
tion, the “competent officials” of the Ministry of Culture or the 
Central Office of the Party, or at the highest level Aczél himself, 
could intervene.28 It was not, therefore, possible to know in ad-
vance when tolerance would appear in the eyes of the Party 
leaders as an error in the publishing policy. Both the writers 
and the officials may have tried to test the boundaries, but the 
                                                          
* “Támogatásban részesítjük a nagy tömegekhez szóló szocialista és 
egyéb humanista alkotásokat, helyt adunk a politikailag, eszmeileg 
nem ellenséges törekvéseknek, viszont kirekesztjük kulturális életünk-
ből a politikailag ellenséges, antihumanista vagy közerkölcsöt sértő 
megnyilatkozásokat.”A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt IX. kongress-
zusa. Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó 1966, 128. 
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only one who really knew what was allowed at a certain time 
was Aczél. In practice, Aczél often decided personally which 
literary works were to be published and how. The works could 
also be distributed only in certain circles, semi-officially, with-
out allowing them to be published in the usual manner.29 Defin-
ing the sayable was thus an ongoing process, and over the years 
the line between the first two T’s became more and more indis-
tinct and even the third category gradually decreased in signifi-
cance. What remained constant, however, was a kind of con-
tract between the writers and the government: the writers were 
not allowed to question the ideological basis of the system (in 
other words, the one-party system and Hungary’s relations 
with the Soviet Union), but as compensation, they were able to 
freely express their personal discontent or problems.30 
In order to be ranked in the category of the “second T” (tol-
erated), the book had to meet some certain requirements. First 
of all, the work was not allowed to contain any, even implicit, 
political critique of the regime. Secondly, in order to ensure po-
litical neutrality, it was important that the book did not create 
any kind of feeling of a “negative atmosphere” in society, not to 
contain any mention of decadence gnawing at the social fabric. 
Even the section of society that did not politically support the 
regime was expected to feel reasonably comfortable under the 
given circumstances. The goal was that the feeling of comfort 
would in the end culminate in a “general feeling of well-being”. 
Aczél felt that while trying to estimate the impact of a non-
conformist book or poem on its potential intellectual audience, 
he was assumed to be on safe ground as long as he remained in 
the field of ”realistic” literature. According to Aczél, realistic 
literature was written in a transparent way and it described 
social situations that conformed to the prevailing political in-
terpretation (social class differences, poverty, etc.). Thus, the 
world of modern art was not familiar to him. When he had to 
act within that world, Aczél tried attentively to estimate how 
the so-called “negative atmosphere” present in avant-garde 
works or the artistic representation directed against the feeling 
of comfort and security would affect the general atmosphere. 
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He tended to ban the works on the grounds that they were 
“alienated” and that “their attitude towards life was not posi-
tive”. An example of a problematic writer was Miklós Mészöly, 
who broke the traditions of Hungarian literature consistently 
enough to arouse suspicion in the party critics right from the 
start, not only on ideological but also on formal grounds – par-
ticularly on the latter. Additionally, Mészöly was an ambiguous 
writer. All this was problematic from the Marxist viewpoint, 
and it shut Mészöly out of the prevailing Hungarian literary 
discourse for a long time, although he was allowed to publish.31 
As examples of the variable rules one could mention the 
(temporary) cooling of the atmosphere and the changing cate-
gorizations of the writer Tibor Déry. In the beginning of the 
1970s the opposition stood up against a “new economic mecha-
nism” that had been launched in the field of economic policy. 
Cultural policy was also harnessed to suppress the opposition, 
and a sort of leftist counterattack against the “forces of the petit 
bourgeois” was agreed upon. Ideological control tightened not 
only in domestic policy but also in cultural and literary policy. 
At the same time also the set of rules concerning light reading, 
detective and adventure stories was tightened, as the leaders of 
the field of cultural policy thought it was too slack.32 
The writer Tibor Déry, on the other hand, is a good example 
not only of the indistinct boundaries of the three T’s, but also 
how essential the naming of ‘1956’ was. Déry was released from 
prison in 1960, and for several years he was not allowed to pub-
lish at all. In 1963 he was issued a passport. At the time he 
barely fitted the category of tolerated writers, and although 
during the same year he published his first book since 1945, his 
request to be permitted to travel to Sweden was refused. How-
ever, Déry was allowed to travel to Austria later that year. 
There he behaved so “gracefully” in a press conference that Ac-
zél himself often referred to it afterwards. The next year, how-
ever, Déry’s 70th birthday was celebrated only by a few official 
bulletins, and the magazine Kortárs was not allowed to publish 
an article which was intended to praise the writer. In any event, 
already in 1971 Déry was among the most sponsored writers. 
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Among other things, he had a villa in the hills of Buda and a 
western car – an example of Aczél’s benefit system. In the end 
of the 1970s Déry held a press conference about the film 
Szerelem in the Cannes Film Festival. This film, based on Déry’s 
script, was a big international success. In the press conference 
Déry stated that what had happened in Hungary in 1956 was a 
suppressed revolution. This caused problems not only to him-
self but also to Aczél, who had strongly supported the film. 
However, even after this Déry was able to publish his books on 
a regular basis.33 
The actual naming of the events of 1956 was a significant 
milestone between the sayable and non-sayable. It was important 
to call the year 1956 a counter-revolution, not a revolution, even 
though it was not until 1972 that Kádár officially stated that “a 
national tragedy has occurred, which is scientifically defined as 
a counter-revolution”.34 Also, Heino Nyyssönen mentions “the 
most significant official authorities on ‘1956’ in Kádár’s Hun-
gary, who guarded the ‘right’ interpretation“.35 Therefore, it can 
be said that by that time Hungary already had the persons or 
circles who had the authority to define the meanings to the 
Hungarian people and at the same time to interpret their his-
tory. This matter contains other questions such as the bounda-
ries and forms of the memory and in what way the events of the 
year 1956 were allowed to be remembered.* Nyyssönen writes 
about the politics of memory during the Kádárian regime. He 
states that the year 1956 was a taboo in Socialist Hungary. One 
of the strategies of remembering was the anniversaries. For ex-
ample, the officials tried to confuse people’s memories concern-
ing October 23 to 30. Instead of people remembering the events 
of the year 1956, the officials put emphasize on November 7th, 
the day of the Russian Revolution. The aim was to get the pub-
lic to forget ‘1956’ through prohibition and censorship.36 In ad-
dition, Nyyssönen claims that the revival of the year 1956 was 
an essential part of the change in the political system at the end 
                                                          
* See also Nyyssönen’s article in this volume. [Ed. note] 
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of the 1980s. He refers to the epoch-making event in 1989 when 
Imre Pozsgay commented on the naming of 1956 as a counter-
revolution: “It could be considered that it is not true.”37 
 
3 Silence as a Weapon 
If we follow Foucault’s line of thoughts on how the conditions 
for the existence of discourse can be examined, it is interesting 
to focus on those writers who chose to be silent. Foucault says: 
 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised 
up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allow-
ances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can 
be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, 
a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it re-
inforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart it.38 
 
Foucault understands power as a relationship. According to 
an analysis by Martin Kusch he sees that our identities as indi-
viduals cannot be separated from the power relations, in which 
we live and function and that people become subjects through 
these power relations.39 What is essential in Foucault’s concep-
tion of power is that he sees power as an internal relationship, 
in which relationships shape the participants. He also empha-
sizes that the possibility of resistance is always included in 
power. He presents this idea in a pointed way by claiming that 
there are no power relations if there is no possibility of resis-
tance. Even though the relations can be unequal, power can 
only be exercised up to the point when those lacking power 
have the chance to, for instance, commit suicide, flee or kill the 
former.40 According to Foucault there are resistance points eve-
rywhere in the power network and, moreover, quantitatively, 
they can only exist in this strategic field of power relations. 
Thus, each form of resistance is a unique case. There are various 
forms of resistance such as possible, necessary and unlikely 
resistance, or spontaneous, wild, guided or violent resistance, 
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etc. Also the possibilities for resistance vary from the wider to 
the extremely limited.41 
In the case of Hungary the writers have exercised several 
forms of resistance. In 1956 they fought at the barricades in its 
concrete sense and lost the battle. After that there was a change 
in the power relations which resulted in a change in the forms 
of resistance, too. After the events of 1956 there were writers in 
Hungary who had no other option but silence: they were either 
imprisoned or silenced in other ways. Nearly every productive 
writer was an active member in political resistance. They were 
amongst the finest and most widely read writers, such as Tibor 
Déry, Gyula Illyés, Gyula Háy, László Németh, Péter Veres, 
István Örkény, Zoltán Zelk. Only few of the completely non-
political writers such as Sándor Weöres, Géza Ottilik, János Pil-
inszky or Miklós Szentkuthy did not participate. In 1957 writers 
were even on strike: on 3rd December 1957 the Writers’ Union 
decided that “the Hungarian writers will in all circumstances 
serve the Hungarian people, and we will not allow our works 
to be abused by any government or party.”42 Many of those 
writers who had a choice boycotted the government’s new pub-
lishing activities by simply refusing to publish. These silent 
writers could not be persuaded to publish even politically com-
pletely neutral poetry. Of those mentioned above, Déry, Háy, 
and Zalk were silent, for they were imprisoned. Aczél was 
given the executive power to decide the attitude towards the 
political resistance. For example, whether the previous active 
literary elite is to be replaced by Party followers and fiction-
producing Party propagandists.43 
What took Aczél to the highest stage of decision making was 
the courageous choice he made concerning the matter. He de-
cided to reintegrate the rebelling writers in the official literary 
life of the regime, at any price. To replace the intellectuals who 
were either rebelling or regarded as unreliable with more flexi-
ble ones was not an unusual solution. One can refer to the 
elimination of the blossoming and internationally acknowl-
edged art avant-garde of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, or the 
activities of the Husák regime in Czechoslovakia after 1968. In 
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Hungary, however, it was thought that if the rebelling intellec-
tuals were replaced by Party followers, the regime might easily 
turn the majority of the intelligentsia against them for a long 
period of time, thus jeopardizing the consolidation. After the 
uprising the essential problem for the Party was how to break 
the silence of the writers and in this way get them in an implicit 
way to acknowledge legitimacy of the regime. This was at-
tempted by no longer emphasizing the dogma of socialist real-
ism as the criterion for publishing.44 
The form of resistance chosen by some of the writers could 
be called the “policy of silence”. László Németh wrote in his 
diary: “If there are words or a word, the writing of which is 
prohibited, let’s not write them. The act of not writing can 
speak for itself, a white blank or a column in the censored 
newspapers of the First World War. There is no need to write 
things, but we must write in such a way that the white blanks 
are there.”45 The rules on what could be said (the sayable) al-
ready existed even though the system of the three T’s was not 
yet officially formulated. However, as it is essential to differen-
tiate between the verbs “reminding” and “making to forget”46 it 
is also essential to distinguish “forcing” from “restricting”. On 
one hand the writers were not allowed to say what they 
wanted, on the other hand they had to say something: to be 
more specific, to say such things the regime had defined as say-
able. By refusing to speak the writers were to some extent able 
to change the relationship between the power and opposing 
strategies. With strategies Foucault refers to the means of using 
power effectively or preserving it.47 
Because the writers chose the policy of silence as their strat-
egy, Aczél needed to find a strategy with which to break this 
silence in order to preserve the power with his own system. 
Aczél performed the task in an exemplary manner: he did not 
use coercion, but chose seduction which in practice manifested 
itself as personal relationships and was in fact a kind of dinner 
table exercise of power. For Aczél had a number of tricks and 
manipulative devices which he used when trying to bring the 
key intellectuals closer to the regime. Aczél’s method can be 
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summarized in two terms: the policy of favours and informali-
zation, the latter meaning personal contacts.48 
It needs to be noticed that power includes the possibility of 
consent, which can be assessed to be particularly essential in the 
case of seductive power, even though Foucault places it, as with 
violence, in principle outside power, but still as one of the pos-
sible features of a power relationship. Aczél focused namely on 
certain key figures in the literary life, whom he assessed to have 
the power to influence others’ opinions as widely as possible. 
This way he strove to gain a kind of network of trustees among 
intellectuals, especially the writers. So, Aczél’s exercise of 
power is exactly what Foucault talks about when he states that 
the mechanisms of power are, in fact, points in which power 
reaches individuals: power is exercised rather within a social 
community than from outside one.49 
 
4 The Economy of the Culture as a Control System 
On a more concrete level controlling the discourse and activities 
of the intelligentsia were essentially about controlling and ma-
noeuvring the publishing business, where both the number of 
titles and editions were increasing. Between 1960 and 1985 the 
volume of printed books and the titles of pamphlets more or 
less doubled reaching the total of 10,000, while the total volume 
increased from 53 books per thousand citizens both in 1955 and 
in 1960 to 98 books per thousand citizens by the year 1984. The 
result was that in 1970 Hungary rose to the same level as 
France, Belgium and Bulgaria. Ten years later Hungary was the 
only socialist country to reach the top third level of book pub-
lishing, together with West Germany, Finland and the Nether-
lands. Even more significant than the quantitative measures 
was the diminishing role of propaganda, while the work of ear-
lier unknown and banned foreign writers were now more 
available and at reasonable prices.50 
However, censorship remained an essential part of the edito-
rial work in the publishing business. There was no office of cen-
sor, but the guiding principles were commonly known and the 
publishers fulfilled an agreement of a kind of self-censorship. In 
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exchange, the Hungarian Government offered financial security 
to these “cultural workers”. This benefit system was organised 
in state supported and controlled organisations, such as the 
Writers’ Union, or foundations, such as the Literature Fund, 
and offered security to the writers who followed the Party pol-
icy. The punitive measures consisted of loss of benefits for a 
certain period of time.51 
In addition, a characteristic feature in the literary life in 
Kádár’s era was the rehabilitation of popular genres and writers 
lacking any theoretical or political meaning. One of the writers 
was György Moldova, who at first gained an enormous reader-
ship by daring to choose to write about themes such as Judaism 
and Communism, which were earlier regarded as taboos. Later 
Moldova confused his admirers by choosing to write sensa-
tional disclosures on various social problems. Also the French 
Foreign Legion adventure stories by Jenő Rejtő, which were 
written before the war under the pseudonym P. Howard, were 
again allowed in book stores in the early sixties.52 
Rejtő can be regarded as a good example of the actual system 
of censorship, which had a strong effect on which works were 
published and which were not. In 1954 the Kiadói Főigazgatóság 
(KF), was founded in order to centralise the administration of 
publishers. The main agenda was to ascertain that the cultural-
political goals remained intact. In reality, it was KF, which exe-
cuted Aczél’s literary policies. The system of the three T’s mani-
fested itself in a so-called iv-ár -method, according to which a 
price was set for books on the basis of the number of pages they 
consisted of. However, the value of a page was tied to its con-
tent. This price was based on certain price sheets: the cheapest 
(0.70 Ft/page) pages were the “Who is who” literature of Hun-
garian, Soviet and other contemporary People’s Democracies. 
Next on the list came classical works from the countries already 
mentioned. Even more valuable was the so-called foreign con-
temporary literature, and the most expensive literature was 
foreign classical and older literature in general, as well as such 
literature which was regarded as “light”, such as entertainment, 
detective and crime stories, etc. This system functioned 
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throughout Kádár’s era. Thus, it was far from easy to get Rejtő’s 
detective stories published, or at least it required a large 
amount of money. On the other hand, socialist Hungary was 
suffering from shortage of paper, and money could be earned 
with the help of the popular detective stories. Overall, this is a 
good example of the complex censorship system functioning in 
Hungary, even though it was never said out loud that such a 
system existed.53 
 
5 The Failure of Aczél’s Power Strategy 
Aczél’s calming, neutralizing and integrating role lasted until 
1968, when along with the Czechoslovakian crisis a new and 
self-confident generation of writers appeared. Their strategy 
was to found their own organisations as an opposing forum for 
the official, politically controlled structures of literary life and 
beyond. At the same time, they took the first step towards po-
litical pluralism by polarizing the field, which so far had been 
under bureaucratic control. Aczél had no means of coping with 
the situation, and no routine solutions were available. Thus, his 
methods did not succeed when he tried to apply them to this 
new generation of writers.54 
In his article Subject and Power (1982) Foucault defines 
power as a ratio of two operators, that is of a to b. This ratio can 
also be applied to Aczél and the writers. After 1956 there was, 
on the basis of a compromise, a balance of some kind in the re-
lationship. Both parties had accepted the same rules for their 
actions. The question was clearly about the relationship, for 
Aczél could not operate only through the orders given from 
above, but he needed the writers’ approval. In this way power 
became productive, in a concrete sense, which Foucault, too, 
stresses in his analyses of power. 
At the end of the 1960s there was a change in the relationship 
between the writers and the regime, and Aczél’s seductive 
power no longer attracted the young writers. On the other 
hand, it can be mentioned that once more they chose a more 
active form of resistance by forming nests in the field of power. 
In addition, they had none of the deep-seated fear of their liter-
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ary creativity being jeopardized. Rather than unofficial and per-
sonal, they wanted their contacts with the regime to be objec-
tive and institutional. The new generation of artists wanted to 
rank the artists with a hierarchy based purely on artistic merits. 
They did not want official acknowledgement as the price of 
having to serve the regime’s purposes. They had no intention of 
legitimizing the power by socializing with Aczél at his ‘dinner 
table’ and thereby consolidating the regime. In a Foucaultian 
sense the resistance of the young writers was opposition to 
those effects of power which were connected with knowledge, 
competence and qualification, a battle against the privileges of 
knowledge. Furthermore, it was opposition to the secrecy and 
mystification. Foucault also states that it is the forms of resis-
tance which function as some kind of catalysts, which bring the 
power relations to light, point out their positions and applica-
bility and the methods used.55 This change that occurred in the 
power relations resulted in Aczél no longer being regarded as a 
successful stabilizer in the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s writers 
were in a growing number turning their backs on the compro-
mise that had been in operation since the end of the 1950s. The 
writers wanted to treat themes and points of view that had been 
banned. This led to a new era when, in the beginning of the 
1980s, the officials felt obliged to take action against someone or 
something almost every year, even though the boundaries de-
fining what could be discussed in public were fading and the 
taboo concepts were shrinking.56 
At the turn of the decade political opposition emerged again 
and the means by which the political neutralization had been 
exercised turned out to be ineffective. The chances of Kádár 
holding on to his power were at the same time being ques-
tioned. Intellectuals’ movement, similar to the ones in Czecho-
slovakia and Poland, collected names for various petitions, pub-
lished samizdat magazines, founded underground publishing 
houses, organised “counter” universities in private homes and 
started the national movements. Soon it grew to a general po-
litical opposition, the objectives of which were to improve civil 
rights, to create an economic policy based on a market economy 
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and political pluralism. The aspirations of the Democratic Op-
position were making progress at a similar pace with the 
movement of the young writers and the two became more and 
more intertwined. These movements were the vanguard of the 
alternative movement, and eventually that of the emerging po-
litical parties.57 
In the 1980s Aczél realized that the only way that Kádárism 
could resist the pressures for normalization was for it to be-
come less oppressive. Neutralization was no longer sufficient, 
nor were Aczél’s methods calming the rebellious intelligentsia. 
Their isolation, the last effort to keep them under control, was 
less and less successful. The Kádárian system went through a 
crisis during the 1980s, with the result that the policy for han-
dling the intelligentsia lost its meaning and function. In addi-
tion, Aczél lost his position formally, and he was replaced in the 
middle of the 1980s. Thus, the situation changed during the 
1980s and it can be argued that it was a form of post-modern 
change, which resulted in a culture and society which was more 
pluralistic and more difficult, if not impossible, to control to-
tally.58 However, the question was mostly about changes in the 
power relations. Foucault says that the idea is not to get rid of 
the power but to cause shifts within it.59 Tuija Pulkkinen, for her 
part, points out that Foucaultian thinking does not attempt to 
suppress power but to cause transitions in what is caused by 
the power.60 The intelligentsia did not submit to Aczél’s power, 
which resulted in a conflict between the regime and the intelli-
gentsia. There were other conditions at this time, too, which 
made it impossible to use violence.  
1980s was the time of transition in Hungary. Bill Lomax 
(1998) claims that the Hungarian intellectuals during the 1980s 
were reminiscent of the intellectuals of Victorian England in the 
sense that they were both elitist. Even though the Hungarian 
intellectuals had not been that elitist as their Victorian prede-
cessors they were still aware of their superiority. John Stuart 
Mill, regarded his fellow lights as “persons qualified to govern 
men’s minds”. According to Mill, society would develop to-
wards perfection in the event that “the most virtuous and best 
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instructed of the nation would acquire ascendancy over the 
opinions and feelings of the rest”. This illustrates the traditional 
role of the writer as a prophet. On the other hand, Hungarian 
dissident intellectuals combined in a similar manner a bohe-
mian lifestyle, freethinking and scorn for authorities with self-
assured feelings of intellectual superiority, chauvinistic atti-
tudes towards women and patronizing attitudes towards the 
poor and the less educated. Rather like Mill, the Hungarian in-
tellectual dissidents believed that it were the task of the edu-
cated class to civilize a nation. However, they did not have a 
genuine interest in the other classes’ problems, such as those of 
the workers and peasants. This attitude derived from their own 
history, the Revolution of 1956 in particular. When naming the 
year 1956 as a revolution, instead of a counter-revolution, the 
dissident intellectuals supported the reformist communists 
more than the workers or street fighters.61 
Only few of the members of the opposition were brave 
enough to challenge the dominant position of the elitist cultural 
ideology, and although a radical plebeian group did exist, it 
remained small, isolated and marginal. Eventually, the moder-
ate main body of the opposition realized the significance of 
workers’ councils in the events of 1956 and even regretted not 
taking more interest in them. After 1989 the interpretation of 
the year 1956 resurfaced to polarize the people with the intellec-
tuals, on the one hand, who mainly identified with the martyr-
reformist communists and their programme, and with former 
proletarian leaders and street fighters, on the other hand, who 
favoured mostly populist and right-wing radicalism. The situa-
tion remained stable even after the change of regime in the 
sense that the intellectuals remained above the people.62 This 
also explains the fact why it was so important for the regime to 
gain the support of the intellectuals. Perhaps this partly ex-
plains why Aczél lost his grip on the intellectuals in the 1980s. 
Both of the generations of intellectuals, the one after 1956 and 
the one following that, were, nevertheless, able to cause 
changes in the power and the power relations in Hungarian 
society in their own ways.  
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6 Conclusion 
The political culture of Kádárian – or Aczélian - cultural policy 
consisted of a strong exercise of power. However, the way in 
which the power was executed differed from the earlier 
Rákósian cultural policy. In a Foucaultian sense it was tempt-
ing, even seductive. Foucault writes about power relations, in 
which both the possibility of violence and acceptance is in-
cluded. In addition, he mentions the chance of violence as a 
power mechanism of a kind, but he does not see the exercise of 
power itself as being either violence or acceptance. The question 
is about the total structure of the functions directed at the pos-
sible activities. 
Nevertheless, as we discuss the exercise of power it is not ei-
ther one of the above, but rather for the nature of power to be 
encouraging, alluring, seductive and complicating as well as 
facilitating. In its extreme form power prohibits. However, Fou-
cault always sees power as productive: it constitutes new 
knowledge and new areas of human existence. Violence, in con-
trast, forces, bends, crushes, destroys and closes doors for pos-
sibilities. According to Foucault, when faced with a policy of 
violence the only possible form of resistance is passivity, which 
the ruling power can only try to minimize.63 
Thus, the antithesis of violence can only be passivity. It was 
also chosen by the Hungarian writers after the suppression of 
the rebellion in 1956 but soon broken by Aczél with his seduc-
tive dinner table method. Aczél counted on these individually 
tailored privileges as being sufficient to retain the intelligent-
sia’s support for the consolidation of the regime. In a wider 
sense this practice refers to the technique which helped the 
Kádárian regime to stay in power. The consolidation of Kádár’s 
power and its consequences have often been called a compro-
mise. A compromise can be defined as a contract between two 
active parties, even though the power relations were unequal 
and benefits were only offered to one of the parties. However, 
in this case only one of the participants, the Party, was active. It 
offered the writers, the passive participants, the benefits which 
only the party could impose. The benefits did not result from 
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the prevailing conditions but they were granted because the 
Party had the power to grant them.  In the literary sphere Aczél 
attempted to charm most of the important figures and made it 
seem as if the privileges were granted as a result of the writers’ 
high literary merits. Nevertheless, he also implied that in addi-
tion to these merits the writers had to express their loyalty to-
wards the regime in an explicit way to gain any privileges.64 
As was already mentioned, this method was successful only 
with the generation active during 1956 and immediately after-
wards. The following generation was immune to Aczél’s seduc-
tive machinery and even to power itself. For instance, Péter Es-
terházy has declined the role of a literary prophet, or vátesz. He 
says that politics belongs to politicians, not writers. This way, 
by not accepting power, he at the same time gains a wider sense 
of freedom of speech. On the other hand, a proportion of the 
writers still take the prophesy of political influencing as their 
responsibility. Most visible also in today’s political field have 
been Sándor Csoóri and György Konrád and one should not 
forget that the first president of the Republic of Hungary was in 
fact a writer and translator, Árpád Göncz.65 
In the atmosphere of the three T’s the traditional role of 
Hungarian literature as public resistance, an awareness of the 
nation and as a substitute for parliament receded. As a general 
rule it can be said, however, that literary works were not forced 
into a position of illegal publishing and so the possibility to 
publish books legally caused some demoralizing self-censor-
ship amongst Hungarian writers. The aim was to get the writers 
and other artists to say only such things that supported the re-
gime, its values and objectives. This way the cultural policy was 
to support the Party policies. Culture was a means of propa-
ganda and literature, in particular, manifested the propagandist 
and instrumental idea of it held by the new political elite. Thus, 
Hungarian literary discourse was a subject to a substantial exe-
cution of power. 
At the core of the power relations there is “the stubbornness 
of will” and “unconditionality of freedom” constantly nourish-
ing them.66 And however unequal the power relation, there is 
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always a chance for resistance, Foucault claims.67 When examin-
ing the relationship between the cultural regime, particularly 
Aczél, and the intellectuals in a Foucaultian manner in Hungary 
during the Kádár era, it is easy to say that it is fruitful to regard 
power as a relationship. It can also be perceived that both the 
parties of the relationship had an effect on how that relation-
ship functioned: in a Foucaultian sense intellectuals, too, had 
freedom to influence their own positions and the field of dis-
course in which they functioned. Exercise of power was clearly 
discursive, for the limitations and the attempts of restriction 
were focused namely on what was allowed to be said. Thus, the 
question was about discursive relationships which always cre-
ate boundaries for discourse.68 
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History in the first Parliament: 
The Politics of Memory in Hungary 1990-1994 
 
Heino NYYSSÖNEN 
 
 
In the transition to democracy Hungary could be remembered not 
only for its early political reforms but also as a country in which 
the leading party itself started to investigate its recent history at an 
early stage. In 1989 several symbolic political actions also took 
place such as a new interpretation of 1956, the reburial of Prime 
Minister Imre Nagy, and the declaration of the republic on Octo-
ber 23rd, i.e. precisely on the anniversary of the 1956 revolution. 
In this paper we will take a step ahead and examine how the 
new Hungarian Parliament conducted debates on historical mat-
ters in the 1990s. The idea of this approach is based on the view 
that professional historians and scholars are ultimately one group 
of several who interpret and reinterpret the past. This is because 
the media or politicians deal with history and interpret and rein-
terpret the past in their comments and speeches. Dieter Langewi-
esche has noted that all six presidents of the Federal Republic of 
Germany commented on and interpreted the German past in 
speeches made to the public. Furthermore, as Bo Stråth has ar-
gued, myth and memory are history but in a process of constant 
transformation, so that the distinction between history and mem-
ory as opposites can no longer be maintained.1 
However, we have to bear in mind that the debates in Hungary 
were not unique in the 1990s, and the situation could be seen as an 
example of a broader discussion after the collapse of communism. 
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Moral and political problems can be found, for example, in dealing 
with the past in general, purges or the restriction of ‘men of the 
past’ from participating in contemporary political life. In this sense 
there are also many other examples from other countries such as 
The Truth Commission in the Republic of South Africa, Chile in 
the 1990s or the long-standing discussion of Vergangenheits-
bewältigung in Germany. In those debates during, and particularly 
after a political change, the past, the meaning of it and how the 
past is dealt with in general are discussed.  
In the context of the Hungarian situation it is argued here that 
the debates in Parliament were not only an interlude at the turn of 
the decade or just the consequences of the limited discussion and 
the taboos of the communist era. Instead, they are connected to 
Hungarian political culture which, in the view of the present au-
thor, is strongly bound up with earlier orientations of historical 
argumentation. Secondly, they dealt with difficult political ques-
tions of morality, justice and identity; and therefore they were in-
timitately connected to the very nature of nationalism as well. 
The main argument here is that at an identity level the past has 
been more political than the future – an argument frequently over-
looked in the future-oriented transition literature. Quite a large 
consensus existed about the future, i.e. system change in general: 
therefore dealing with the past in Hungary has been more prob-
lematic.  
We may argue that not only the leading communist party, 
HSWP, and its reformers engaged in politicking with history: since 
1988, new parties also started to discover and rediscover their his-
torical roots and rituals in order to dissociate from and identify 
with particular pasts in their argumentation. The political use of 
history did not end in 1990; critical studying of history and histori-
cal identity, thus, emerged at the turn of the decade. Defining ‘we‘ 
and searching for historical roots for ‘us‘ politicized history as 
well. 
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1 Change and the politics of memory 
Particularly during transition periods the past belongs to the 
whole process of the change. The change itself consists of several 
alterations on separate levels – not all could be changed at the 
same time. Although the first free elections took place in 1990 and 
the whole parliamentary structure was soon completed, even as 
late as in 1999 a minister might still argue about “completing the 
system change”. Only in the summer of 2001 did the Prime Minis-
ter use the slogan that “the future has begun”.2 
Hence, studies of mentality would suggest that changes in men-
tality occur slower than symbolic, economic or political altera-
tions.3 Not only is ‘the new’ born from ‘the old’, but at the same 
time ‘the old’ remains a part of ‘the new’. In politics the change 
has also to be fashioned from rhetorical constructions of identities 
and differences. History in the Parliament is a significant part of 
this process. We cannot get rid of the past, but more problematic is 
the question of what should be done with it. 
However, history itself is a broad concept and encompasses 
many agents. Frank Füredi differentiates between History and his-
tory, the former also including the future-oriented broad narrative, 
while the latter refers to critical historical thinking.4 The debate is 
not solely carried out amongst historians, but also occurs in public 
discussion and the media as part of ‘history culture’ (Geschichtskul-
tur). 5 According to Wolfgang Hardtwig, this concept refers to un-
defined but various means of keeping the past in the present.* We 
may also refer this phenomenon to the politics of memory (Erin-
nerungspolitik); hence maintaining and representing the past in the 
present needs political activity as well. 
For these and other reasons I will use a concept which could be 
labelled ‘history politics’ (Geschichtspolitik) in this study. This con-
                                                 
* “Geschichtskultur – das ist eine Sammelbezeichnung für höchst unter-
schiedliche, sich ergänzende oder überlagernde, jedenfalls direkt oder in-
direkt aufeinander bezogene Formen der Präsentation von Vergangenheit 
in einer Gegenwart. Sie ist nichts Statisches, sondern permanent im Wan-
del…”. Hardtwig, Wolfgang, Geschichtskultur und Wissenschaft. 
München, DTV 1990, 8-9. 
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cept deals with ‘history as politics’ (Geschichte als Politikum) and 
was first used by Edgar Wolfrum. According to Wolfrum, in ’his-
tory politics’ the past is used to achieve mobilized, politicized or 
legitimised effects on the public (Öffentlichkeit).6 These effects 
could be found, for example, in discussions surrounding identity, 
nation, rituals, memorial and festival days, etc. There the political 
use of history does not only refer to a certain ‘misuse‘, but also 
arguments such as ‘revealing the truth at last‘ which need political 
– though not necessarily party political – activity. 
When we discuss the connection between the past and politics, 
it is evident that it is not only related to historians and politicians, 
but to all human beings. The struggle for supremacy and the dura-
tion of domination remain struggles over history.7 Thus, on the 
one hand, the question in Hungary was about getting ‘rid’ of the 
past, but at the same time, and more important, it was about the 
political values of the new republic. Hence, we have come to his-
tory as an ongoing political debate of the past, and also to the 
judgement of that past, which always takes place in the present 
context. In Aristotelian rhetoric, a particular kind of forensic rheto-
ric deals with the past. There are two arts of forensic rhetoric: de-
fending and accusing, which both also utilise arguments such as 
justice, injustice, honesty and disgrace. Aristotle was concerned 
particularly with courts, but parliaments are very typical examples 
as well.8 
As a whole, this paper focuses on the first Hungarian Parlia-
ment and its discussions in the 1990s. During those years there 
were several debates concerning actual political issues and inter-
pretations, in addition to which the Parliament was responsible for 
the creation of several laws which both directly and indirectly im-
pacted on the ways of dealing with the past. Thirdly, the Members 
of Parliament, as well as the President of the Republic, maintained 
several commemorative rituals, such as laying wreaths, or repre-
senting the country through the practice of these public rituals. 
 
 
 
THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN HUNGARY 1990-1994 
 167
2 The Hungarian Parliament 1990-1994 
The Hungarian Parliament has been one of the most stable in East 
Central Europe: five out of the six parties elected in 1990 still held 
seats in the Parliament in 2001, and only one new party had 
emerged in the elections of 1998. In 1990 only 14 members out of 
386 had been re-elected from the previous Parliament. However, 
conversely, there was also a longer continuity with the past: five 
MPs, mainly from the populist Smallholder‘s Party, FKGP, had 
already been MPs immediately after the Second World War.  
A typical MP in 1990 was a man born in 1944, which was also 
the average age of members of the largest party, the centre-right 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF. In three of the parties the 
average age was higher, which here is connected to personal ex-
perience as well: in the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP (1938), in 
the Christian Democratic People‘s Party, KDNP (1935), and the 
Smallholders were the oldest (1932) on average. On the other 
hand, the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ typically repre-
sented the ‘beat-generation‘ (1948). The League of Young Democ-
rats, FIDESZ, had an age limit of 35 in their membership guide-
lines; therefore an ideal FIDESZ MP was born round 1962. Hence, 
from the four Visegrad countries Hungary was the only one with-
out premature elections in the 1990s. At first the centre-right Gov-
ernment of József Antall (MDF) – led by Péter Boross from De-
cember 1993 – held its positions until the elections of 1994. At that 
time the socialist party, MSZP, won an absolute majority of the 
seats. 
The educational level of the Parliament in 1990 was the highest 
it had ever been, since 90% of its members had university level 
degrees. There were 100 teachers, 77 lawyers, 47 economists, but 
only three workers, as was pointed out by the newspaper Magyar 
Hírlap on 2nd May. There was a significant group of humanists and, 
in particular, 27 historians. The new Government might even be 
called the ‘Historian’s Government‘. 
In the parliamentary calendar, Szabadon választott (The Freely 
Chosen), the new members were given a chance to introduce 
themselves in 1990. There, for example, political activity in 1956 
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was openly considered a merit, especially in the Smallholders‘ 
Party, in which almost a third (29,5%) had had something to do 
with the 1956 revolutionaries. Moreover, the tradition of 1956 had 
played a significant role in the life of the new President, the author 
Árpád Göncz, of SZDSZ. Furthermore, two ministers in the new 
Government, the new Prime Minister, the historian József Antall 
and the Minister of Defence, the historian Lajos Für, had been di-
rectly involved in the events of 1956. Directly involved was also 
the Prime Minister of 1994-1998, Gyula Horn (MSZP), who had 
been on the other side of the front at the end of 1956. 
In 1990-1994 the Government identified itself more to the right 
and the Opposition more to the centre and to the left. However, 
one peculiar, but not insignificant, case was based already on dis-
tributing the seats in the Parliament. In 1990, the seats were dis-
tributed as in Britain – the Government on the right and the Oppo-
sition on the left side of the Parliament – however, in 1994, the 
winners did not want the right side. FIDESZ agreed to be “the far-
thest right“ but criticized the fact that the decision was not made 
according to historical tradition, but rather on ideological grounds. 
Thus, a historical left-right axis was not evident: it had to be iden-
tified and maintained by the parties themselves.9 
 
3 The Significance of the 1956 Revolution and Fight for Freedom 
The opening ceremony of the newly-elected Parliament took place 
on 2nd May, 1990. The moment was historic and the presence of the 
past obvious. The occasion was honoured by the presence of the 
1945 Speaker of the Parliament, Béla Varga, and by Otto von 
Habsburg, a descendant of the last king of Hungary. In the first 
session, the new Parliament connected the present to the past and 
enacted a law which dealt with the symbolic meaning of 1956. In 
the first paragraph, its memory was enacted into law, and the sec-
ond paragraph declared 23rd October a national holiday. The new 
speaker of the Parliament, György Szabad (MDF), an historian by 
profession, declared 1956 to be the most important connection to 
the historical past, and the most important basis for the creation of 
the future in Hungary.  
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This freely elected Parliament regards as its urgent task to codify the 
historical significance of the October Revolution of 1956 and its 
struggle for freedom. This illustrious chapter of modern Hungarian 
history can only be compared to the 1848-1849 Revolution and War of 
Independence. The Revolution of 1956 lay the foundation for the 
hope that it is possible to achieve a democratic social order, and that 
no sacrifice for our country‘s independence is made in vain. Al-
though the ensuing suppression reinstated the old power structure, it 
could not eradicate the spirit of 1956 from people’s minds. 
The new Parliament assumes the responsibility to preserve the 
memory of the Revolution and the ensuing struggle for freedom. 
The Parliament underscores its determination to do everything in 
its power to secure multiparty democracy, human rights, and na-
tional independence by proclaiming in its first session the following 
law: 
(1) The memory of the 1956 Revolution and its struggle for freedom is 
herewith codified. 
(2) October 23, the day of the outbreak of the Revolution of 1956 and 
the beginning of the fight for freedom, and also the day of the 
proclamation of the Hungarian Republic in 1989, shall henceforth 
be a national holiday. 
 
We may argue that the first Hungarian Parliament began its work 
with studying the past and already “preserving the memory“. The 
first paragraph concentrated on several matters: it codified an 
event into law and defined it as an historical event. The act, almost 
unique in a democracy, becomes more understandable from the 
point of view of ‘history culture’. When we focus on the Hungar-
ian penal code, we are able to locate several examples of such laws 
from the communist era and before. As mentioned in the text 
above, 1848-1849 was enacted into law on its 100th anniversary in 
1948, although this is merely one example among many. Since 
1848 several anniversaries and, in particular, the commemoration 
of certain deaths were codified in law. Besides Hungarian national 
heroes such as Deák, Széchenyi or Horthy, Francis Joseph (1916) 
and Josef Stalin (1953) were also designated for commemoration. 
The memory of Stalin was de-canonised, however, as late as 1989, 
by the reform communist Government as a part of the democrati-
zation process.10 
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Moreover, in July 1990 the new Parliament requested that the 
Soviet Union condemn the intervention of 1956. The request was 
directed to the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, and this was 
also a parliamentary document that dealt with history. According 
to the Parliament the…  
 
… military intervention in 1956 was merely a contemptible act against 
the country‘s sovereignty and a serious crime against the Hungarian 
people… Parliament requests that, in a re-evaluation similar to that of 
the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Supreme Council of the 
Soviet Socialist Union should deem illegal and condemn the 1956 
military intervention by the Soviet Union.11 
 
This step, according to the statement, would strengthen the Soviet 
Union‘s commitment to having respect for the sovereignty and 
independence of the Hungarian Republic, would contribute to the 
creation of amicable relations between their respective peoples, 
and would be a sign of encouragement to the Central and Eastern 
European people with regard to the hastening of the process to-
wards the change to a democratic system. 
Already, on the following day, Gennadi Gerassimov com-
mented that the intervention was unpardonable and agreed with 
the request. The final answer was delayed until after the 1991 coup 
in the Soviet Union and took place in December, when Prime Min-
ister Antall signed several bilateral treaties in Moscow and Kiev. 
During that visit, Mihail Gorbachev declared that thirty-five years 
earlier the Soviet Union had intervened in the domestic affairs of 
Hungary.12 
On the first anniversary of the republic – and thus on the 34th 
anniversary of the uprising – the Parliament held an extraordinary 
session at which relatives of the 1956 martyrs and heroes of the 
revolution were present. On that occasion President Árpád Göncz 
and Prime Minister József Antall made speeches on the signifi-
cance of 1956. Both pointed out historical analogies with 1848 and, 
in particular, Antall stressed the significance of 1956 as an essen-
tial part of Hungarian national mythology.  
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Finally, the name and memory of Imre Nagy, who had been 
executed in 1958, was prominent in several discussions. At the end 
of June 1990, the MPs discussed the possibility of withdrawing 
from the Warsaw Pact. At that time the Parliament renewed 
Nagy‘s declaration from 1956 in which he affirmed that Hungary 
had already left the Pact.  Furthermore, in June, a general amnesty 
was also declared – symbolically the name of Imre Nagy was 
added in that law.13 
 
4 National Symbols, Holidays and Memorials 
The old kings‘s crown and its connection to politics has been a 
matter of debate many times in Hungarian history. In 1990, the 
Parliament eventually selected as the national emblem the coat of 
arms with a crown which had been used before 1946, i.e. also dur-
ing the Horthy era. However, an alternative was suggested by the 
Opposition: to choose the so-called Kossuth emblem – the same 
emblem but without a crown – which, according to its supporters, 
was a more democratic political symbol. 
In June of 1990, Medián published a poll conducted the previous 
November about the issue. According to the poll, 49% preferred 
“the crown“, 34% the Kossuth emblem, and 15% the current coat 
of arms with a star. Among the younger citizens, more educated 
people, the residents of Budapest, protestants and atheists, the 
Kossuth emblem was more popular, while older people, catholics, 
less educated and people from the “countryside“, i.e. outside Bu-
dapest, preferred “the crown“. 
In the Parliament, “the crown party“ had a majority over “the 
Kossuth party“, although in the first vote, held on June 19th, the 
crown did not receive the necessary constitutional majority of two 
thirds. Miklós Szabó, a historian and an MP of the Free Democrats, 
opposed the idea and contended that the crown alternative might 
be interpreted abroad as reflecting a yearning for the pre-45 pe-
riod; on the other hand the Kossuth emblem would represent the 
democratic efforts of 1918, 1946 and 1956. However, the Govern-
ment once again suggested “the crown“ on July 3rd. The opponents 
made a counter-proposition that in certain sites and on certain oc-
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casions the Kossuth emblem could be used, while “the crown“ 
would be used on more solemn occasions. Prime Minister Antall, 
also a historian, replied that there are many republics which have 
a crown in their coats of arms. The crown alternative was eventu-
ally selected with the bare two thirds majority required by the 
constitution. The present coat of arms is designated in the constitu-
tion, as was its predecessor as well.14 
The discussion about the national holidays of the new republic 
took place in March 1991. A total of three alternatives were sug-
gested and the Parliament was forced to decide which of the three 
national holidays would be promoted to state holiday. In the de-
bate, Government circles tended to support Saint Stephen’s Day, 
i.e. the memorial day of the first king, which was commemorated 
for the first time in 1989 since the 1940s. The supporters argued 
that this day best expressed the ideas of the Hungarian ‘state’ and 
‘constitution’. Christian Democrats added that the day was also a 
Christian day. Representatives of free and young democrats pre-
ferred March 15th (the 1848 Revolution), based on the considera-
tion that the day represented the unity and ideas of democracy. 
In the final vote, the winner, August 20th, was backed more in 
the ranks of the Government and March 15th by the Opposition. 
Hence, on the basis of the vote, August 20th became the state holi-
day of Hungary (állami ünnep), but the two others also maintained 
a certain position: they were defined as national holidays (nemzeti 
ünnep). In the law, October 23rd was defined with two meanings as 
“the day of the beginning of the 1956 Revolution and the fight for 
freedom, and as the day on which the Hungarian Republic was 
declared in 1989".15 
Although a national holiday refers in other countries to a king 
or the royal family, in Hungary the most important day of the 
state refers to medieval history, and to the first king to whom the 
Hungarian Kingdom is connected. In addition to this, August 20th 
also had actual political significance in 1991, because it connected 
Hungary also to the conservative traditions which were used prior 
to 1945. This helped to strengthen prejudices of the Opposition 
regarding the basic ideals of the new republic. 
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Moreover, a few debates concerning memorials took place in 
the Parliament. These could be divided into three categories: 1) 
unveiled statues, 2) removed statues, and 3) memorials which 
were debated but not built. Initially, in the autumn of 1990, the 
Foreign Minister, a historian, Géza Jeszenszky (MDF), opposed the 
idea of re-establishing the statue of Trianon. The basic problem 
could be connected to nationalism and revisionism, in other words 
whether the statue – the four points of the compass, i.e. the four 
areas lost in the Treaty of Trianon – would give to rise to the old 
ideas of the Hungarian revisionist policy between World War I 
and II. The debate continued later in the 1990s as well, because the 
only Soviet liberation memorial left in Budapest since 1989 had 
been built precisely on the same spot. 
Secondly, since 1991 The Reconciliation Statue Foundation 
(Megbékélés Emlékmű Alapítvány) had planned a memorial to the 
memory of both sides of combatants of 1956. The original idea was 
to build another memorial for the martyrs, which would be located 
beside the existing statue of the victims on Republic Square. In Oc-
tober of 1991, some art historians rejected the idea. With the signa-
ture of the leader of the Budapest Gallery, himself a Member of 
Parliament in the leading Government party MDF, they expressed 
their doubts about the existing consensus and the function of the 
memorial. 
The plan of the joint-monument did not materialize, and the 
memorial which had been erected in 1960 was abolished in Sep-
tember 1992. In November, the memorial issue reached the Par-
liament floor, when the chairman of the radicalized 56-veteran 
organisation TIB, Tibor Zimányi (MDF), condemned the idea. Ac-
cording to Zimányi, nowhere in the world was it possible for the 
fallen of both sides to be included in the same memorial. The case 
of Spain was not an appropriate example for him, because the 
country had not fallen under foreign rule. Alajos Dornbach 
(SZDSZ) responded that a black and white division between kill-
ers and revolutionaries was impossible, because both sides had 
innocent victims and bystanders. Finally, more than 400 memori-
als were unveiled after 1989 to commemorate 1956.16 
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Outside the Parliament the anniversaries were used for political 
demonstrations as well. On the third anniversary of the new Re-
public, on October 23rd 1992, an incident occurred when groups of 
neo-Nazis gathered on the Kossuth Square. When President Göncz 
tried to make his speech, they whistled and shouted at him. On 
26th, the issue was discussed for three hours in Parliament, and it 
was debated whether the Government or the Opposition had been 
responsible, and especially why the police had not prevented the 
action of the skinheads. On the basis of this incident, several 
members of the MDF created an initiative to prohibit Fascist and 
Bolshevik symbols. Since then, the hammer and sickle, red star, 
SS-badge and swastika have also led to proceedings in court. 
 
5 Justitia Plan and Reckoning with the Past 
The Czechoslovakian example of banning former communist func-
tionaries in 1991 is the most well-known case in East Central 
Europe. However, although collective guilt was never accepted in 
Hungary, emotional elements were not lacking in the discussion. 
The debate polarized parties, and there were proposals which 
were not completely considered and prepared at all. 
Already at the end of August 1990, a detailed Justitia plan was 
made public. In the space of eleven paragraphs, the plan put forth 
a broader settlement with the past, expressed a desire to identify 
responsible parties, and wanted to take legal measures against the 
leaders of the old system. Representatives of the MDF had given 
the plan to the Prime Minister in June, and it was made public in 
August, although the proper debate began only a year later.17 The 
whole debate culminated in the word igazságtétel, ‘making justice’. 
Igazság means both ‘truth’ and ‘justice’, and thus, two meanings 
were entangled in one word. The ‘truth’ from 1956 also meant ‘jus-
tice’ for 1956, and it became an issue in the hot-tempered political 
debate on how to deal with the past. 
As an interlude in March 1991, the Attorney General, Kálmán 
Györgyi, answered one interpretation, which concerned volley 
fires (sortüzek), i.e. firing into a crowd of demonstrators, which had 
occurred in 1956. There was no possibility of punishing the perpe-
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trators as war criminals because Hungarian law from 1945 dealt 
only with the Second World War. However, he saw the opportu-
nity to change a law on the conditions of international commit-
ments so that crimes committed during the communist era would 
have no statute of limitations. 
In the summer the Justitia plan once again became part of the 
political agenda of the MDF. It is essential to note that it dealt with 
quite an extensive political reckoning with the past. According to 
the plan, it was time, for example, to speed up the system change, 
as well as to revitalize and change the spirit of Hungarian radio 
and television. The plan was to be carried out regardless of 
whether or not it was supported by the majority.18  
At the end of October, the Parliament discussed the issue of 
homicide, treason and disloyalty between 1944 and 1990. In one of 
the most intense debates of the new democracy the MP Ágnes G. 
Nagyné Maczó (MDF), for example, stated that until then the 
Government had failed in its responsibilities and that those peo-
ple, “who have destroyed Hungarian culture“, should be brought 
to justice. Another MP argued that this question was outside party 
interests, i.e. above parties. The third opinion concerned the fu-
ture: guilty and not guilty should not be equal in the future. On 
the other hand, socialist MP Iván Vitányi stated that they would 
awaken a spirit of reprisal, and that moral judgement belongs to 
society, not to Parliament. The leader of the Young Democrats ar-
gued that this judgement must be based only on the law, and not 
on emotions. 
Finally, the law was accepted in Parliament on November 4th, 
i.e. it was timed precisely for the anniversary of the second Soviet 
invasion in 1956. The proposal dealt with homicide and treason 
committed between December 1944 and May 1990. The Parliament 
accepted it by a vote of 197 for, 50 against and 74 abstaining. An 
open vote was requested, because the bill was not compatible with 
Hungary‘s international agreements. The vast majority of the 
Government parties voted for, and from the opposition FIDESZ 
and MSZP (one absent) voted against. The majority of SZDSZ 
were absent, four of them voting for and two against. 
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After the vote, President Árpád Göncz made the decision to 
turn to the Constitutional Court to clarify the content of the law. 
Another 1956 veteran and MP, Imre Mécs (SZDSZ), considered the 
bill harmful from every point, and threatened to refer it to the 
Constitutional Court. In addition, close relatives of the deceased 
made a statement that they did not accept the Government‘s pro-
posal. They had created an alternative: instead of court proceed-
ings the real criminals should be named in public, with the full 
extent of their actions made known. In November the Chairman of 
the Human Rights Committee in Hungary stated that the criminals 
of the dictatorship should be punished only within the framework 
of the rule of law. Moreover, an ex-56 veteran and MP, Miklós 
Vásárhelyi (SZDSZ), condemned the law, while another ex-
veteran, János Dénes (ex-MDF), even demanded hangings.  
Finally, the Constitutional Court made its decision in March 
1992, finding all paragraphs of the law to be against the Constitu-
tion. They decided that the paragraphs were not clearly defined, 
and a law must already be enacted before a crime is committed. 
When President Göncz commented on the decision, he reminded 
everyone of two principles: every nation has the right to know its 
past, and legal responsibility does not mean that the state should 
not re-open events of the last decades, i.e. the question also deals 
with people‘s sense of justice. From the ranks of the Opposition it 
was argued that the rule of law had won, and that the democratic 
state structure was functioning. A representative of the governing 
party argued that in the European value structure and Judeo-
Christian culture, crime and punishment could not be separated.19 
In April, Attorney General Györgyi opposed the idea of a new 
bill, noting that retroactive punishment would be against the law. 
However, in September it was reported that the Government was 
preparing a new bill which was based on the bill VII/1945, con-
cerning war crimes. The model was taken from present-day 
Czechoslovakia, in which legal proceedings were to be modelled 
on the basis of the law enacted in 1950. According to the newspa-
per, lawyers had advised Prime Minister Antall two years previ-
ously that it would be extremely difficult to get convictions. Both 
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the Hungarian Martial Court in Budapest, and the local Martial 
Court at Györ, had refused to prosecute in the case of volley fire 
which had taken place in Mosonmagyaróvár in 1956. They argued 
that prosecuting would mean the death of the rule of law, because 
in Hungarian law manslaughter has a statute of limitation of fif-
teen years, which had run out in 1971. 
In the Parliament there were several proposals. A few MPs 
asked for an investigation of 1956 on the basis of war crimes. Be-
cause the law still existed, the Attorney General ordered the inves-
tigation. Politically, the debate took place in the Parliament around 
the 36th anniversary of 1956, when skinheads had whistled the 
President down and prevented his speech. The Government, how-
ever, did not unambiguously defend the President. On the con-
trary, the Minister of the Interior, Péter Boross, rather understood 
the situation by claiming that “perhaps a Socialist Hungarian Nur-
emberg is not a bad formulation“. Finally, socialists opposed the 
bill; Free Democrats and FIDESZ abstained from voting on the 
Government version. 
In March of 1993, President Arpád Göncz, having been asked 
to, solicited the viewpoint of the Constitutional Court before he 
would sign the bill. The Court made its statement at the end of 
June, and again declared the bill unconstitutional. In October, it 
became apparent that the Geneva Convention of 1949, which pro-
tects the victims of war, defined international armed conflicts and 
forbade actions that were not international armed conflicts from 
being prosecuted. According to the Constitutional Court, the first 
paragraph of the bill was unconstitutional; however, the second 
was not.  
Despite its complicated sentences, the message was clear: 
crimes committed in 1956 were not considered war crimes, but 
crimes against humanity. On October 22nd the President signed the 
bill.20 Finally, constitutional solutions had won and strengthened 
the idea of rule of law in Hungary. However, the processes them-
selves have been as difficult to carry out as the law itself, and sev-
eral cases were still open at the turn of the millennium. 
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6 Screening Law 
Screening has become a pivotal tool in clarifying the past in sev-
eral post-communist countries. In Hungary, the law “for control-
ling persons chosen to particular important positions “was enacted 
in March 1994, and it came into force on July 1st 1994. According to 
the law, the persons should be screened in order to enhance the 
democratic functioning of the state. After incriminating evidence 
has been established the person should either resign or his/her 
name was to be published. However, from the point of ‘history 
politics’, the law not only deals with official and secret members of 
the former counter-intelligence (III-III). It can cover more distant 
past as well, because it also concerns persons in the armed forces 
(i.e. people who collaborated with Soviet forces right after the up-
rising) as well as members of the Fascist Arrow Cross Party before 
1945. 
According to critics, the timing of the law prior to the May 1994 
elections suggested that its motivation was to damage the Gov-
ernment‘s major political rival, the Hungarian Socialist Party, 
which was leading in the polls. The discussion itself had already 
begun in the autumn of 1990, when the free democrats proposed 
their own version of the law. At that time their proposition was, 
however, rejected by the Government parties.21 
In the next phase of the discussion, the Minister of the Interior, 
Péter Boross (MDF), referred to a forthcoming law and a commis-
sion, which should consist of the Prime Minister, President, Par-
liament Chairman and the Chairman of the Constitutional Court. 
This commission would investigate whether a person had been a 
member of the III-III, the armed forces between 1956 and 1957, the 
ÁVH, or whether there were aggravating circumstances in the 
cases before. The Minister speculated that the results would be 
secret, or would only be published after consultation with the per-
son; in June, the III-III archives were declared state secrets.22 
Thus, quite soon, it had become apparent that the question was 
not only about the former members of the old ruling MSZMP or 
counterintelligence, but it was a far deeper problem in which the 
past could also be used to compromise someone in the present. 
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Party membership, i.e. collective guilt did not become a criterion 
for processes or discrimination but, on the other hand, there were 
some ideas about ousting persons. The Minister of Justice, István 
Balsai (MDF), argued that the Government should further restrict 
those who had belonged to organisations like the ÁVH or work-
ers‘ guard from public action. According to another allegation, any 
person who had participated in the reprisals could not lead the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs. 
In February of 1993, the newest version of the bill – known also 
as the “little brother” of the retrospective igazságtétel – outlined 
several categories of co-operation: a secret informer, documents 
provided and signed by hand, an informer, and belonging to the 
armed forces between 1956 and 1957. On the basis of the draft, the 
law would touch a large number of people: Members of Parlia-
ment, those nominated for office, those who would take an oath, 
the Government, political secretaries, judges, lawyers, ambassa-
dors and the President and Vice-President of the National Bank. 
The discussion in Parliament finally began in October of 1993. 
The bill was referred to as a ‘fluoroscopy‘ and also had the nick-
name pufajkás law, named after pufajkás, who was a man who had 
aided the Soviet army after November 4, 1956. According to the 
new law, the files of the security services would not be made 
available to the public until July 1st 2030, i.e. 30 years after the 
screening or lustration process (átvilagítás) would have ended. The 
Government parties voted for, whereas among the Free Democ-
rats, only one supported the bill and the others abstained. Ten so-
cialists voted against it, and the remaining two votes came from 
SZDSZ and independents. 
Although the law ordered lustration, the issue has been contro-
versial ever since. The Hungarian Parliament could not deal with 
the question as quickly as the Czechs did, and, compared to the 
proposition of the Free Democrats in 1990, aroused suspicions that 
also the Government had something to hide. Secondly, the law 
went far back into the past, and, thus, for example forgot economic 
commitments – in fact an adult of 1944 would be over 70 years old 
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when lustrated for the first time. In its broadest version the proc-
ess itself is quite cumbersome to carry out.23 
 
7 Hungary Between Two World Wars 
In the first Parliament not only was the state socialist past dealt 
with but, as our examples demonstrate, the whole of Hungarian 
history was in principle used as a political argument. During the 
post-1945 era Hungary between the World Wars had become a 
certain “anti-period“, but since 1990 many analogies to this era 
have also started to come to the fore. Already in September 1990 
the largest Opposition party, SZDSZ was worried about the ideals 
of the new republic. The party took out page-long political adver-
tisements in both Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság, in which it 
evaluated the first hundred days of the Government. They argued 
that the Government was building less and less continuity with 
the years 1956 and 1947, rather it clung to the ‘great deadlock’ of 
Horthy’s Hungary.* 
Earlier in June, Prime Minister Antall had commemorated Tri-
anon, and expressed concern about the fate of minorities in 
neighbouring countries. His words that he wished in his soul to be 
the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians became famous, be-
cause they also meant Hungarians living outside the present Hun-
garian state. At the time –  on the 70th anniversary – the Speaker of 
the Parliament, György Szabad, had also asked Parliament to 
commemorate Trianon, and the faction of the Young Democrats, 
FIDESZ, left the room in protest. The Foreign Minister Géza 
Jeszensky, however, clearly torpedoed the idea to rebuild the old 
                                                 
* “Fears have risen about the undisguised nostalgia which the parties of the 
governing coalition feed in the direction of Hungary prior to 1945. The 
spirit of the coalition recalls [idéz] the Hungary between the two World 
Wars. The governing parties decreasingly admit the continuity with 1956 
and 1945–47, and increasingly refer to our historical deadlock of Horthy’s 
Hungary. It alarms the people who do not want the system change to 
bring back the vanished world of upper classes  [úri világ] and who want 
to move towards the democratic Europe of the turn of the millennium” 
Magyar Hírlap & Népszabadság 3 September 1990 (Transl. HN). 
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memorial statue of Trianon which had existed in Budapest be-
tween the wars.24 
Until 1944 the country had been ruled by Admiral Miklós Hor-
thy, who was then exiled to Salazar‘s Portugal, where he died in 
1957. Little by little, the Horthy-question also began to actualize in 
post-communist Hungary. In February 1991, Népszabadság had 
posed the question “Horthy to be Buried in Hungarian Soil?“ Ac-
cording to President Árpád Göncz, Horthy had the right to ‘rest‘ in 
his motherland, but if he were to be buried officially, it would also 
be an acknowledgment of his policy. In October, the Minister of 
Justice István Balsai (MDF) denied juridical rehabilitation, but con-
sidered it obvious that political rehabilitation was only a matter of 
time. According to Balsai, it was unlikely that Horthy‘s tomb in 
Estorial would continue to be acceptable to Hungarian public 
opinion. The end result would be the same regardless of whether 
it was carried out by the Government or any other organ. 
In November, socialists made an interpellation regarding 
whether the Government was planning to rehabilitate and rebury 
Admiral Horthy. The reburial had political precedents and expec-
tations, because in Hungarian history there have been several re-
burials. These reburials, more or less, have had political conse-
quences and have been used by different political forces. Imre 
Nagy‘s reburial in summer 1989 was one of the most important 
events of the year. According to the MSZP’s interpretation, a de-
mocratic human being could not oppose Horthy‘s reburial, but 
there was speculation about the role of the state. When Prime Min-
ister Antall answered the question, he stressed that because Hor-
thy had not been sentenced, he would not be rehabilitated or re-
buried by the state either. Thus, at that time Antall rejected Hor-
thy‘s reburial as a state event.25  
However, it seemed at first that the reburial would be organ-
ised by the family in accordance with ecumenical ceremonies, as 
opposed to being organised by the state.26 When Horthy was fi-
nally reburied in Kenderes in September 1993, the President and 
seven Government Ministers participated in the occasion. As in 
the case of Imre Nagy‘s reburial in 1989, the struggle over what 
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was private, official or public domain became actual. No particular 
sense of rhetoric was needed to define the prejudices of “repeti-
tion“ or of “cyclical time“, particularly in the polarized political 
situation which characterised Hungary at that time. For example, 
the MP Tamás Bauer (SZDSZ) argued that if there were a private 
funeral, the state should not issue a medal, the national television 
would not broadcast it, and ministers should not reveal before-
hand whether or not they are planning to attend. Finally, the day 
before the reburial, the liberal-minded intelligentsia held a sym-
bolic demonstration, “The Final Goodbye to the Horthy System“, 
where they bade farewell to the Horthy era.27  
According to foreign comments, the funeral itself became a po-
litical event. Critical comments were issued from Slovakia, France 
and from Bucharest. The Slovak Vice-Prime Minister, Roman 
Kovác, for example, noted that six ministers who attend a public 
function cease to be “private persons“. In the Government, the 
Horthy-criticism seemed to fall upon deaf ears. Antall, for exam-
ple, had noted that they did not expect Western or international 
history writing to want to place Miklós Horthy in his correct 
place.28 
Although Horthy‘s reburial did not lead to the rehabilitation of 
his policy, certain and sometimes propagandist fears existed in the 
neighbouring countries. In a situation in which three neighbouring 
countries had split, analogies to the past, particularly to the 1930s 
were presented and specially in countries with Hungarian minori-
ties. In 1938 and 1940 Horthy‘s Hungary had received territories 
back with Hitler‘s assistance. Thus, it was no wonder that Hun-
gary’s role in the Second World War and its consequences were 
debated in the Parliament as well. 
 
8 Compensation 
Compensation and privatisation became issues when history and 
historical past were discussed in the Parliament. In January 1991, 
local peasants occupied their former land, which began a wave of 
occupations lasting for several weeks. Swift compensation, already 
in “the air“, quickly became a current matter, and the first consti-
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tutional version of the compensation law was accepted in June 
1991.  
In the discussion the Free Democrats first supported some more 
compensation for the general public, socialists supported only par-
tial compensation and FIDESZ generally opposed the idea. The 
Government backed the idea of returning estates to their former 
owners and of recreating the domestic private ownership in the 
first place. Already before the general elections of 1990 the Small-
holders‘ Party promised that it would restore private ownership, 
particularly in agriculture to the level of 1947, if the party partici-
pated in the Government. 
The proposal restricted compensation to former owners who 
had lost their property after June 8th 1949. Hence, a certain limit 
was defined; however, at the same time it left earlier injustices 
without compensation. This politically unfortunate bill seemed to 
leave most Jews and their descendants out of the question and 
created speculations and expectations of anti-Semitism. For exam-
ple, in Autumn 1990 newspapers debated whether the slogan 
hordót a zsidónak (let‘s give compensation to Jews as well) was anti-
Semitic or not.  
It is important to bear in mind that the year 1949 was ousted 
from the bill in the parliamentary debate. It was done by the Gov-
ernment party. At the same time, they accepted a principle that in 
the future a forthcoming law of compensation would be based on 
the limit of 1939. Later, in 1992, two other laws were enacted 
which broadened the temporal basis of compensation: now the 
limit was set between May 1st 1939 and June 1949, and between 
March 11st 1939 and October 23rd 1989. However, when we study 
political cleavages in the first Parliament, it is essential to know 
that in June 1991 the Parliament rejected the Opposition‘s proposal 
that would have extended the time-limit until 1939. Moreover, 
another law was accepted without a broad consensus in July 1991; 
the Parliament returned estates, building-sites and cemeteries, but 
neither land nor rented houses to churches. 29 
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9 Conclusion 
This paper studied how the Hungarian Parliament dealt with his-
tory between 1990 and 1994. History was not only debated as “his-
tory” with a small “h“, but also as “History” with a capital “H“, 
i.e. referring to identities. The past appeared even more political 
than the future: political identities and the new image of the ‘na-
tion‘ were constructed at the same time through the attempt to 
thoroughly research and document the problematic past. Not only 
were different concepts and views of history confronted, MPs also 
formed opinions on historical issues, and also the new Parliament 
has become a certain lieux de mémoire for national commemoration. 
For several historians, the era was ‘historic‘ and historians 
found a new political mission in defining political platforms for 
parties. Analogies from the past were used, and in connection with 
all three national holidays, political commemorations took place 
which gave space for political speeches as well. The first Prime 
Minister József Antall even defined his party and tried to keep its 
three wings together with historical terms. 
However, it became apparent how difficult it was to found a 
new historical ‘basis’ for the future. At first, models and influences 
were taken from 1956, but little by little, other, and even inconven-
ient, images of the past emerged. These historical cleavages, and 
particularly the mistrust and expectations of “the other“, i.e. po-
litical opponents, moved and influenced people. 
The most controversial discussion dealt, in its broadest sense, 
with retrospective igazságtétel. Although there were other difficult 
issues as well, this question might drastically have polarized the 
political atmosphere. Neither the Truth Commission nor the idea 
of collective guilt emerged; however, there were four ways of 
dealing with the past since 1988: compensation, rehabilitation, naming 
and punishment. Punishment was the severest of these and its 
commemorative influence was restrictive and juridical. Naming 
the perpetrators could also restrict, although in the Hungarian 
case of 1991 it was more liberal for the perpetrators, because in-
stead of punishment moral judgement was preferred. The charac-
ter of the retrospective proposal was evidently very political, in 
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that its purpose was to settle old injustices, and particularly to 
reach those who had participated in the political repression after 
November 4th 1956.  
On the whole, the discussion of punishment evidently cleansed 
the atmosphere in the long run; however, it also essentially polar-
ized and widened the gulf between the Government and the Op-
position as well as between the Government’s supporters and 
those who support the Opposition. In particular, polarization and 
radicalization came to the fore after the decision in the Constitu-
tional Court in March 1992. 
Although the debates were partly labour pains of the new de-
mocracy, they have the potential of revealing something more 
about the Hungarian political cultures and their commitments to 
the past as well. However, the Hungarian debate is not unique in 
the world after 1989. According to Welsh, “the weight of the past“ 
is particularly significant in the “transitional countries“.30 Particu-
larly in those societies dealing with the recent past, the political 
question is broader and more complicated than mere historical 
writing. There are also obvious consequences, such as whether the 
policy of reconciliation will work, and if so, how soon it might 
work. 
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Continuities and Discontinuities in Kádár's Hungary:  
Everyday Life in a Socialist Town 
 
Sándor HORVÁTH 
 
 
The image of socialist cities generally influenced the image of 
industrial cities in Hungary in the socialist period. Stalintown 
(Sztálinváros) represented the typical image of a ‘real existing’ 
socialist city in Hungary. It did not meet the utopian ideas of an 
ideal socialist city, but its building stock as well as its spatial 
structure reflected the architectural developments of 40 years of 
a centralised and planned economy. As an industrial and ‘so-
cialist’ city Stalintown became a symbol of ‘socialist life’ in the 
fifties.* The image of Stalintown in the propaganda shows a 
town in which technology and nature no longer negate each 
other, where urban setting and countryside no longer confront 
each other as aliens, where factory and home are not separated 
by long distances which devour time and energy. In this 
healthy complex of work and residential area, the worker was 
promised to have space enough to develop his personality, and 
unlimited possibilities to follow his bent in a cultivated exis-
tence bound up with nature. Stalintown accordingly was con-
structed in the 1950s as a model community in Hungary in or-
der to represent the ‘communist dream’. 
                                                          
* Also the Finnish radio broadcasted reports on the building and life in 
Stalintown in 1952. See Dömötör to Budapest 29 Nov. 1952. MOL, 
KÜM, Finn-TÜK-XIX-J-1-k-21/a, 01155/5. 18.d. [Ed. note] 
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At the beginning of the rapid industrialisation in Hungary, 
during the period of the first Five Year plan (1950-1955), a party 
and a government decision ordained the building of a metal-
lurgy works closely attached to a new town, nearby an old vil-
lage (Dunapentele) on the left bank of the Danube. The pre-
paratory work commenced in the spring of 1950 and on 2nd May 
the construction of the ironworks and the town began. The con-
structions attracted labour force from all parts of the country, 
and from very different social classes. At the end of 1950 the 
population of the village even reached 4200, while the number of 
people working on the building sites was 7100. In spring 1953 the 
population of Stalintown had already reached 25,000.1 In 1960 it 
exceeded 30,000, in 1970 44,000. 
The vitality of the town was represented by the age structure 
of its inhabitants: Stalintown was an industrial city of the ‘youth’ 
and, as the propaganda suggested, the town was built according 
to the wishes of the people who live in it, bedded in green parks 
and lawns, threaded by shopping streets, modern houses with 
central heating, laundries. Its houses were gay with colour, com-
fortable within and worthy of their inhabitants, built in a simple 
style of architecture, devoid of fussy decorations. The images of 
heroic founders and ‘classless society’ were also common pic-
tures to show the ‘socialist lifestyle’ of workers in a ‘socialist 
town’.2 
In memoirs and police reports there is another ‘story’ told 
about this ‘socialist city’: Stalintown was a town of ‘juvenile de-
linquency’, and there were more pubs and prostitutes to be 
found than in the whole county.3 The cultural conflict involved 
in urban adjustment can be shown by the story of the most 
known pub of Stalintown, called Késdobáló (To the Knife-Thrower). 
The story of this pub represented the most important conflict 
between ‘urban’ and ‘villager’ lifestyles, which had a very sig-
nificant role in the official language. The pub was opened at the 
foundation of the town in 1950. The pub-goers were mainly 
semi-skilled workers and bricklayers. As the occupational struc-
ture changed in the town many articles were published in the 
local press about scandals in the pub. The pub started to became 
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the symbol of ‘non-urban’ and ‘non-socialist’ life and its custom-
ers were described as “criminals” and “villagers”. At the end of 
1954 the municipal authorities closed the pub to urge the spread 
of ‘a socialist lifestyle’ through the “town of socialist workers”. 
Pubs had a special importance in the public sphere of Stalintown. 
The immigrants created in them a distinctive social institution of 
their own that symbolised not only a rejection of some of the 
cornerstones of official lifestyle but also an acceptance of alterna-
tive public modes of sociability and solidarity.4 
One of the persistent myths about the socialist cities has been 
the notion that most people accepted the opposite mythology of 
the town centered around acquisitive individualism, gold rush 
and chaos of socialist cities. The conventional discourse about an 
undifferentiated ‘culture of socialist cities’ suggested that almost 
everyone shared the same set of values. A look at the pubs, fam-
ily trials or youth cultures of socialist cities calls into question 
this myth of cultural consensus. The myth of solidarity was one 
of the first myths which appeared in the mythology of Stalin-
town, and the myth of the heroic founders and solidarity be-
longed to the identity of the towns’ inhabitants. The culture of 
Stalintown pubs was an alternative but not a countercultural 
phenomenon. The official discourse suggested the pub-culture 
was a countercultural phenomenon because of the official efforts, 
which tried to stigmatize every non-planned and non-official 
phenomena. These efforts generated a public debate about the 
pubs. In this debate pubs and their customers were represented 
as ‘non-urban’ and ‘non-socialist’ phenomena.  
For many members of the ‘upper classes’ and the members of 
local authorities of Stalintown, pub-going and public celebration 
represented the image of many forms of working-class recrea-
tion. However, many of them similarly viewed workers who 
drank on the common as affronts to modesty and conven-
tionality. The notion of public was a more limited one which did 
not encompass many forms of public celebration, like pub-going. 
The city center and the main street had a special importance in 
socialist cities: the main street in Stalintown thus had the func-
tion to represent a place in a socialist city where people parade 
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primarily on 1st May, and this street was designed to have addi-
tional functions attached to sociability. The main street of Stalin-
town, according to the ideal of the time, got the name of Stalin 
(after 1961 it got a new name: Ironworks Street). Stalin Street had 
to be the busiest street in the town, filled with active people and 
traffic, and it had to represent the public life of ‘socialist people’. 
The planners of Stalintown designed little flats to raise the level 
of collectivity in the town. However, the inhabitants of the town 
did not want to meet each other on broad streets but in little 
pubs. 
The local authorities thus perceived this form of working-
class recreation as a challenge to the dominant culture, to family 
and factory, to socialism and property. They responded to this 
assumed challenge with a variety of campaigns aimed at chang-
ing or restricting pub-culture through disputes in the local 
newspaper, police steps, and administrative proceedings. The 
Stalintown Police had been implementing a policy of con-
straining pub-culture after 1954, introducing a classification 
system for pubs on the basis of social class. The police recog-
nized acceptable and unacceptable pubs, according to their cus-
tomers. The first and second class pubs in the downtown area 
could be tolerated because of their affluent customers, but the 
third or fourth-class ones were associated with semi-skilled 
workers and bricklayers, so the police directed their activities 
primarily against these “underclass institutions”. The main idea 
was that the town center must be cleared. In the first years the 
police did not regard pubs and drinking as a primary target for 
police action. As the occupational structure of the town 
changed and a new myth of its founders had to be constructed 
the arrests occurring in pubs rose quite dramatically. It is also 
clear that the arrests in pubs depended not only on this policy 
but also on the manpower levels of the police and official ex-
pectations. The criminal rate in Stalintown was the highest in 
Hungary in the fifties, not because of the high immigration rate 
of criminals, but due to the distinct control of the socialist 
towns and the special attitudes of policemen towards the ar-
rests of semi-skilled workers taking part in pub scandals.5 
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According to the ideas of city planners the spatial structure of 
Stalintown had to be clear and transparent in order to control the 
everyday activities of people living there. Working class youth 
created an alternative subculture, which expressed the rejection 
of the dominant culture for contemporaries. The discourse in the 
local newspaper concerning this phenomenon shows the typical 
social conflicts between the local authorities and working class 
boys represented in the image of the town. This particular kind 
of delinquency of working class boys, or “hooliganism”, in Sta-
lintown was the product of a public discourse, which rejected the 
consumption of western goods to demonstrate that a socialist 
society could function better than a capitalist one. The ideological 
concept of equality determined the new form of youth delin-
quency: the consumption of western music and dance (such as 
jazz, beat and rock-’n-roll), western or extravagant clothes (blue 
jackets, black shirts, and coloured shoes), the use of slang words 
and expressions.6 
Stories about this form of “hooliganism” (jampecek) were fre-
quently published in the local newspaper as part of a campaign 
for raising the general level of urban culture. The working class 
youth wearing extravagant clothes and dancing rock-´n-roll 
was described in these articles as gangsters or bamboozled boys 
following the remnants of the old way of life. The struggle 
against hooliganism meant the struggle against any sort of in-
dividualism, and its main function was also to demonstrate that 
a socialist community could be more fair than a capitalist one. 
The interclass conflicts were frequently represented in the 
language of the local authorities of Stalintown by the different 
lifestyle of rural people coming to the town. Stalintown, as other 
socialist towns, was growing at a rapid rate and much of the 
growth was directly attributable to a massive rural immigration. 
The people with rural background were characterized by the of-
ficial discourse leading disordered, untidy lives, almost totally 
devoid of the local community. Instead, their social relations 
were characterized by spontaneity and capriciousness and that is 
why they were often placed at the margin of society. Their life-
style was often characterized by stories about their raising ani-
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mals in bathrooms, scandals in pubs, immorality of country girls, 
who came alone to work at the factory, etc. This discourse led 
them to participate in the local society only in limited and highly 
selective ways. 
The process of adjusting to urban life was represented as a 
constant struggle of people to maintain the integrity of family 
and personal life in a strange new setting. Many of the migrants, 
however, expressed pride in their own origins. On the other 
hand, a man from a rural background who moved to Stalintown 
into semi-skilled factory labour could feel that he was lucky to 
have such a good job; a man from an urban middle class back-
ground who moved into the intermediate ranks of industry 
could feel blocked, but the one who became an engineer could 
feel satisfied. This experience was not universal, but it was com-
mon. In the first years of the town many peasants worked to earn 
money for specific purposes back in their own communities, for 
example, for the purchase of agricultural equipment, and thus 
were more interested in money than in working conditions. Oth-
ers, who migrated only to work in Stalintown, decided to stay 
near to the factory because they did not have other options, but it 
did not mean that they lost their connections to their own com-
munities. Many of the migrants tended to enter the unofficial 
tertiary sector of urban economy, working as vendors on the 
black market, domestic servants employed by affluent families 
(such as engineers, physicians, heads of factory), and in various 
“services”. The cultural conflict involved in urban adjustment 
had a significant role in the discourse, but its main function was 
to demonstrate the official attempt which tended to represent in 
Stalintown a classless society and to level urban – rural differ-
ences. It is doubtful if there have ever been totally harmonious 
communities, peasant or otherwise, whose members always got 
along perfectly together. Although the image of Hungarian vil-
lages has suffered in the past from overly romanticised interpre-
tations, the image of the villagers of socialist towns had the func-
tion in the official discourse to represent the disorders of local 
society.7 
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The barracks in Stalintown were basic shelters for the majority 
of the rural population till 1965. At the beginning of the fifties 
they relentlessly met the eye of anyone who walked the town’s 
central streets, but having built the central area the barracks were 
relocated nearby the factory, which was far away from the town. 
After 1954 the blight of these barrack-slums could be more easily 
ignored, because the local officials tended to cleanse the inner 
town area. Slum sensationalism, however, became an especially 
popular subject in the local press at the end of the fifties because 
of the transformation of public policy-making, which seemed 
now to be much more on the side of raising the living standards 
than at the beginning of the rapid industrialisation in Hungary. 
In Stalintown the barrack-slums became the subject of a new 
type of popular reform journalism.  
Newspaper discourse on barrack-slums and judicial pro-
ceedings against people living there highlight the transformation 
of images and stereotypes of barracks. This discourse was a 
dramatic essence of the story of Stalintown, because the brick-
layers who built the houses usually lived in barracks for many 
years whilst the flats went usually to the engineers and the 
skilled workers. However, it was the petty crime and violence of 
the barrack-slums, which filled the first pages of Stalintown’s 
more sensational newspaper. The inhabitants of the slums were 
identified as deviants in order to uphold the legitimacy of the 
centralised flat allocation system. The main economic function of 
the slums in Stalintown was that the ‘dirty work’ was done. The 
existence of slums in the discourse generated by the local news-
paper and officials, however, helped to guarantee the status of 
those who were not living in such poor conditions, but in 
planned flats. Social mobility was a particularly important goal 
of the state socialist system, and people needed to know exactly 
where they stood. The discourse about the barrack-slums in Sta-
lintown also encouraged all those living in planned flats to feel 
fortunate for being spared the poverty, which officially did not 
exist in socialism. From one point of view, however, the barrack-
slums could even be optimistically viewed as an integrative ele-
ment – a sort of staging area in which the rural immigrant was 
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initiated into the mysteries of the life of the first socialist town, 
where he could learn new forms of solidarity, acquired new so-
cial skills, but this view was not highly represented in the local 
press. In the history-writing the barrack-slums of socialist towns 
served as “dark stories” of the socialist period to substantiate the 
opponent political point of view.8 
The official discourse and the image of families living in Sta-
lintown were particularly influenced by ‘the myth of the declin-
ing family’. This image was evidenced by the high rate of divorce 
and abortion, and had the function to foster the idea that in ur-
ban, industrial societies, the family is no longer the unit of eco-
nomic production. However, oral history interviews and private 
letters of villagers living in Stalintown show that the people con-
cerned maintained close kinship ties and even kept many of their 
former practices in the town.9 The official image of families in 
Stalintown and the urban paradigm of family life of socialist cit-
ies worked for the macro-level characteristics of the city. How-
ever, it did not hold true at the neighbourhood and family level, 
which were more integrated and personal. The villagers in Sta-
lintown regularly visited their relatives in the countryside; the 
first generation of immigrants tended to settle in urban areas 
where they already had kin. The immigration into Stalintown 
was a kin-related migration similarly to other industrial cities.  
The emancipation of women, however, was a principal issue 
of socialist propaganda: the typical working class families were 
sexually segregated in Stalintown. Husbands and wives had se-
parate family roles; the husband was the breadwinner as a result 
of the high rate of unemployment or low wages of women. 
Working class husbands spent their free time with other male 
companions, women with other women, and most of social life 
took place among relatives, neighbours and workplace friends. 
In spite of the fact that the divorce rate of Stalintown was one of 
the highest in the country, the marriage rate was also extremely 
high. One reason for the high rate of married people was that 
only married couples could obtain a flat. 
Socialist towns are myths. They are constructions of the 
imagination. This is not to say, for example, that Stalintown, 
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Nova Huta, Eisenhüttenstadt, Dimitrovgrad or Magnitogorsk 
did not exist. Nor is it to dispute the extraordinary living con-
ditions that characterized the everyday life of people living in 
new socialist towns. I do not mean that socialist towns were not 
real. Socialist towns were, after all, a universal feature of Eastern 
bloc countries and from a microhistorical perspective they can 
represent the main issues of the social history of these countries 
in the post-war period (such as urbanization, migration, gender 
roles, culture of consumption, making of the working class and 
especially the social limits of state control). Their reality, how-
ever, lay in the constructions of official and unofficial conviction, 
and in the belief of public knowledge, rather than in the material 
conditions of everyday living. To discuss socialist towns is to 
deal with discourse, and the concepts they communicated, rather 
than the state ordinances or social geography of the new towns 
built in post-war socialist countries. The struggles over pubs, be-
haviour of the youth, immigrants with rural background and 
barrack-slums in Stalintown helped the growth and develop-
ment of interclass conflicts. These conflicts fostered the definition 
of ‘socialist’ modes of behaviour, socialist towns and the 
boundaries of the various social groups. These tendencies deter-
mined the myths of Stalintown and generally influenced the my-
thology and imagination of socialist cities in Hungary. 
Many historical analyses tend to view the Stalinist period as 
the ‘ideal-type’ for examining state-socialism, and the post-
Stalinist period as an ‘ideal-type’ for examining the so-called so-
cial process of ‘destalinisation’. This phenomenon can lead to an 
ahistorical analysis. For example, there are many historical ana-
lyses which argue that at the end of the fifties economic policies 
turned decidedly more pro-consumption in Hungary. If we de-
scribe post-Stalinist regimes in terms of a ‘social contract’, the 
state ensured rising living standards in exchange for popular 
political calm, for the so-called Kádárist social compromise. This 
kind of description can work for the macro-level characteristics 
of Kádár’s Hungary. However, it did not hold true at the level of 
everyday life, which can be characterized by considerably more 
continuous social phenomena than discontinuous ones. 
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Agriculture and the New Economic Mechanism 
 
Zsuzsanna VARGA 
 
 
When I was invited to the conference, held in September 2000 in 
Budapest, I was asked to give an introduction on the effects of 
the New Economic Mechanism on agriculture. In my lecture I 
asked the question another way around: what influence did 
agriculture (and within it the agricultural co-operatives) have 
on the process of economic reform. 
If we take together the package of measures introduced on 1 
January 1968 with agricultural reform measures then they do 
not neatly fit together. In 1965 the concept by which the whole 
economic system was to be redesigned was being devised, 
while the debates around agriculture were already dealing with 
practical and side issues. For example, the abolition of machine 
tractor stations or the cancellation of agricultural co-operative 
debt. In 1966 when the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
(HSWP) Central Committee accepted the initial principles of the 
economic reform, producer prices were increased in agricul-
ture. In 1967, as the planners prepared for the economic reform, 
two important pieces of agricultural legislation came into force, 
while interest representation organs were created for the mem-
bers of the co-operatives. 
Therefore, the changes in agriculture, and especially as they 
affected agricultural co-operatives, occurred from 1966 on-
wards, two years before those that replaced plan instructions in 
the economy as a whole. 
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How is this discrepancy to be explained? The most common 
explanation is that agriculture was nothing more than the labo-
ratory for the reform. However, this begs the question of 
whether this was simply a question of unintended outcomes, or 
whether it was the result of planned attempts by the state? 
What other factors need to be taken into account? For example, 
we might consider the impact of the agricultural co-operatives 
themselves, what came from below, and what the effect was of 
interaction between the planners and economic actors.  
This study is based on the results of archival research and 
oral history and attempts to explain how agricultural reform 
and economic reform were connected. In the following parts of 
my paper I would like to concentrate on three principal issues: 
1) The major problems of collectivized Hungarian agriculture 
during the first half of the 1960s. 
2) The peculiarities of agricultural reform during the decade. 
3) The effects of the New Economic Mechanism on the agricul-
tural co-operatives.  
 
1 The major problems of collectivized Hungarian agriculture 
during the first half of the 1960s 
The problems of collectivized agriculture largely result in the 
fact that the state’s opportunity for representing its interest was 
greater than that of the co-operatives, that is the collective deci-
sion-making process of the individual co-operative members. 
Indeed, as a result of the state’s dominance certain process be-
gan which were against the interests of the party-state itself. 
What were the major problems? 
Just as from year to year the co-operatives sold a higher per-
centage of their produce (mainly to the state) the volume of 
their production hardly increased at all.1 
The second contradiction showed itself in the fact that while 
the co-operatives were able every year to fulfil their obligations 
to the state, their operating budgets were insufficient for their 
needs. Behind this was that pricing policy in fact drained the 
resources of the co-operatives, while the use of their revenue 
occurred in a way largely prescribed by the state. The so-called 
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‘remainder principle’ meant that any income of the collective 
farm was firstly spent on repaying its obligations to the state. 
The impact of these factors was that the co-operatives never 
had sufficient funds for investment and for this reason could 
only buy machinery on credit or with state subsidies, and there-
fore they became indebted. Dependence on the state translated 
into state control, even though the state did not formally own 
the co-operatives.2 
The pricing system and distribution of income also pre-
vented the co-operatives from giving a decent income to the 
membership. As a result of the insecure and inadequate income 
provided by the common farming within the co-operatives 
large numbers left them. Not even the three-year ban on leaving 
after joining could prevent this because the new industrializa-
tion drive launched in 1959 created demand for workers. This 
movement was largely made up of the most employable of the 
young, and particularly the men. Those leaving did not only 
represent a problem for the co-operatives but so did those who 
stayed because many hardly ever worked or worked poorly in 
the common farming element of the co-operative.3 
By autumn 1961 it had become clear that the problems, to-
gether with the restrictions on investment directed at the agri-
cultural sector, prevented the state from fulfilling their aim of 
“more production, more produce”. This was serious as the 
Kádár regime’s living standards policy was only visible 
through the provision of foodstuffs, because most people still 
spent most of their money on food. 
At that time the HSWP sought two kinds of solutions to the 
problem. 
The first was that in 1961–1962 the party leadership launched 
a reform programme, planned to end in 1963.4 It had three 
planks: 
1) The reform of the agricultural pricing, taxation and financial 
system 
2) The examination of agricultural management 
3) The introduction of a new co-operative law 
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On the other hand, until the end of the reform, efforts had to 
be made to do something about stabilizing the situation of the 
co-operatives. A large number of examples arrived from the 
socialist countries, simply because in the first half of the 1960s 
there were reactions to the problems that appeared in the agri-
cultural sector in both the Soviet Union and in other Eastern 
and Central European countries.5 As a result, they reorganized 
the party and state direction of agriculture. Under the influence 
of these reorganisations the channels of influence were open to 
the central authorities in the fields of production and purchase, 
while both agricultural co-operatives and state farms came un-
der unified direction.  
The Hungarian leadership did not choose to go down this 
road, but instead from 1960-1961 chose their own strategy for 
dealing with problems. This rested on the recognition that the 
production responsibilities of the co-operatives, alongside the 
constraints imposed by investment, could only be fulfilled if 
they secured or expanded the interest of the individual member 
in both collective production and production on the household 
plot.6 
The improvement of the work ethic of the membership could 
only be secured through giving them supplementary sources of 
income. The possibilities for securing such extra income were 
definitely constrained. At the same time the 1959 Law No. 7 
that regulated the co-operatives laid down the basic institutions 
for binding the membership financially to the co-operative 
through the basic institution of the ‘remainder principle’ – the 
‘work unit’ system.7 
It was in the resourcefulness of the peasants that the solution 
was found that ensured the realization of the interests of the 
membership came before the interests of the state. They used 
forms of remuneration (like share cropping and periodic bo-
nuses) that allowed for the realization of this. At this time there 
were very many semi-legal solutions which had one simple 
constraints. The local initiatives of the co-operatives could only 
to a very defined extent mitigate the larger negative forces that 
affected the co-operatives (the income, however it was distrib-
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uted, was always too low). This is so even without speaking 
about how the effect of state intervention on the agricultural co-
operative really constrained the interest realization of each unit. 
 
2 The peculiarities of agricultural reform during the decade 
These experiences were built into the reform measures in agri-
culture that were implemented in the first third of the 1960s, 
and these were connected to the two means of dealing with the 
problems that are referred to above. The realization of the re-
form measures was frustrated at the turn of 1963 and 1964 be-
cause of macro- and micro-economic problems.8 At the same 
time numerous large questions of principle had already been 
decided by the reform attempts in 1963, and therefore in large 
part the 1966–1967 reform package was built on the 1963 reform 
package. 
The next part of this study concentrates on comparing and 
contrasting the 1963 reform plans and the specifically agricul-
tural parts of the 1968 New Economic Mechanism.  
As a result of the initiatives that were introduced from below 
and the financial problems of the co-operatives the question of 
the realization of interest came to the fore. The new model for 
the financing and income distribution of the co-operatives had 
already been formed in 1963. The financial infrastructure for 
independent enterprise production had to be created. In 1963 
political considerations had interfered in its implementations, 
mainly in the maintenance of low consumer prices. The ques-
tion of consumer prices, far more than ideological considera-
tions, was a crucially important crisis because it made the low 
level of agricultural prices necessary, so that grocery prices 
could be kept low, and thus wages kept down. 
By the middle of the 1960s it was widely accepted that solu-
tions to the problems of giving adequate incentives could not be 
solved either at the level of the membership or that of the co-
operative, unless the price system was restructured. 
The Politburo on 6 July 1965 decided to raise agricultural 
prices by 9% in 1966, and a further 10% in 1967–70.9 The in-
crease in prices was not, however, sufficient to allow the co-
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operatives to wipe out their debt. For this reason, as part of the 
same decision, the state wrote off 60% of total co-operative 
debt. Alongside this, short-term loans were converted to long-
term loans.10 
The co-operative model introduced in 1966 together with the 
price and financial measures taken did not, however, go much 
further than the 1963 reform plan, except in the respect that the 
authority for making decisions about investment and finance 
remained with state bodies. The major constraint, therefore, on 
the enterprise based production was that of state investment 
policy. 
The creation of independent co-operative production was 
not only necessary in order for a larger proportion of earned 
income to remain with the farms, but also for the co-operative 
to decide itself what it did with its income. Already in 1963 it 
was recognised that the agricultural co-operatives had to have 
responsibility themselves. At that time the greatest weight was 
placed on the amortisation fund. In the middle of the 1960s the 
criticisms of the system of distribution co-operative income be-
came stronger.11 
The Law No. 3 of 1967 on agricultural co-operatives set up 
the new financial system. Within its scope fell the creation of 
the amortisation fund, as well as the share fund.12 The impor-
tance of the latter lay in the fact that the sums paid to the mem-
bers for their work were counted as an expense of the co-
operative, and that its payment took precedence over the needs 
of the state and the supplementation of economic means. In this 
way the system was reformed. 
The shift to independent enterprise production did not only 
require the securing of an appropriate financial background, 
but whole spheres of decision-making authority were trans-
ferred from the state to the co-operatives. The major changes 
only took place with the financial measures in the middle of the 
1960s. In contrast to the previous situation, the role of the state 
to intervene in the affairs of the agricultural co-operatives was 
restricted, and this increased the independence of the co-
operatives from both the central and local organs of govern-
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ment, and particularly the bureaucracies in the district councils 
which had frequently directly intervened. It is, however, neces-
sary to point out that the ability of central organs to intervene 
still remained strong.  
In order to validate these changes there had to be amend-
ments to the law as well. In the three reform packages designed 
in 1963 the envisaged end result was a plan for a new agricul-
tural co-operative law.13 During the drafting of the law the ma-
jor effort was to attempt to eliminate the asynchronous relation 
between the de jure and de facto elements of co-operative life. 
They did this so that the practice of co-operatives was incorpo-
rated into the law, allowing for the legalization of various in-
formal initiatives at the level of work organisation and remu-
neration.14 
The 1963 plan defined the agricultural producer co-operative 
through two basic principles in just the same way as Law No. 3 
of 1967. On the one hand, it stated that the co-operative was an 
agricultural plant that was a productive enterprise based on 
independent accounting. On the other hand, it talked about the 
co-operatives’ organisation and economic independence. Agri-
cultural co-operative independence was legally protected in 
two ways. On the one hand, it stated that the owners of the co-
operative were the members: in other words that they were re-
sponsible for their own affairs. On the other hand, the law 
stated that to some extent the co-operative came under state 
direction, but that its directing role was not the same as direct 
control over co-operative members and property. It emphasized 
that state bodies could not make a decision that affected pro-
duction, farming and the distribution of income.15 
The novelty of the 1967 package was the proclamation of le-
gal equality for agricultural co-operatives. Behind this was one 
very important political decision. Previously official ideology 
had regarded only direct state ownership as the highest form of 
socialist property. Every other form of property figured as the 
indirectly socialist form of property like co-operative property. 
With the law co-operatives were recognized as a directly social-
ist form of property, and a major ideological revision occurred. 
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It is important to draw attention to the fact that this political 
decision, taking into account the great differences between so-
cialist countries, was not without its problems. It is only neces-
sary here to mention that in the Soviet Union many kolkhozes 
turned themselves into sovkhozes, drawing attention to the 
higher nature of their form of property.  
 
3 The effects of the New Economic Mechanism on the agricul-
tural co-operatives 
The New Economic Mechanism, introduced on 1 January 1968, 
cleared away many ideological, judicial, constitutional and fi-
nancial obstacles in the path of agricultural development. In 
this changing political and economic atmosphere it was the ag-
ricultural co-operatives that adjusted themselves to the new 
possibilities most rapidly and most successfully. While produce 
in the entire agricultural sector increased by 5.5% a year, the 
growth of the agricultural co-operatives was 9.4% after the re-
form.16  
What were the factors which promoted this dynamic 
growth? In the last third of the 1960s the quantity of agricul-
tural investment increased, which had not only state farms but 
also agricultural co-operatives receiving their share. The end of 
the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s affirmed the tendency 
that the major part of the investment did not serve as a com-
pensation for the implements anymore that had fallen short as a 
result of collectivization, but was used for real development 
instead. This period also brought forth a decisive change in the 
structure of investments. The centre of interest was shifted from 
building investment to machinery investment.17 
Beside large-scale mechanisation, the extension of the utiliza-
tion of chemical agents and artificial fertilisers as well as the 
appearance of ‘closed production systems’ was carried out in 
this period. Due to the reform the process of technological re-
generation grew stronger. Traditional large-scale production 
was gradually replaced by industrial-type production systems 
using engines of high capacity that had mechanized the entire 
process of production as well as efficient chemical agents in 
AGRICULTURE AND THE NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM 
 209
great quantities.18 An important preliminary condition for the 
reception and the adaption of the above mentioned had been 
the rise of an adequate staff of managers and experts within the 
co-operatives by the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to a wide-
ranging agricultural secondary and university education.  
The spread of ‘closed production systems’ in Hungary in the 
second half of the 1960s commenced with the produce of 
chicken-meat and eggs and then continued with the field grow-
ing of plants in the 1970s. The new system was applied most 
successfully in the domain of maize-cultivation, employing or-
ganisational and technical experience from the United States 
among others and partially making use of their imported ma-
chine systems. By the middle of the 1970s about half of the 
quantity of maize was cultivated within the scope of the new 
system.  
The first results of the efforts to boost the technical and intel-
lectual background of agricultural production were making 
themselves felt in a short time. The abrupt increase in the aver-
age yield of both wheat and maize formed the basis – through 
the increase of cattle stock and meat produce – of the tripling of 
Hungarian agrarian exports between 1965 and 1975.19 This 
growth is of great importance considering that the country had 
been in need of bread-grain and meat imports up to the middle 
of the 1960s. 
Underlying this running-in of the co-operatives’ produce we 
find the particular division of labour between the household 
plots and the communal part of the co-operatives. While large-
scale production operated very well in the field growing of 
plants, household plots succeeded significantly in labour-
intensive growing (e.g. horticulture and viticulture). 25% of the 
total returns of plant cultivation and stock-farming of the agri-
cultural co-operatives were produced by household plots. This 
level of production could be achieved in spite of the fact that 
they were in possession of a mere 12% of the entire area of the 
co-operatives and had a rather scanty stock of implements, 
since the instruments of production they needed were largely 
missing from the market or were extremely expensive. The de-
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gree of co-operation between collective and household farming 
was different in virtually every single co-operative. Many co-
operatives undertook the production, purchase and distribution 
of the main implements needed by the household plots (seed-
corn, breeding animal, artificial fertiliser, plant protectives, 
fodder). It was more accepted to sell produce excess through 
the co-operatives.20 
Household small-scale produce, thus, had had an important 
role in stabilizing large-scale production success. In fact, we 
may add, it had become a significant factor of the gross national 
product and Hungary’s export capacity. There had been an-
other important aspect of the collaboration between collective 
and household farming. The communal part of the co-operative 
ensured but a small income to the members; the household 
farming in turn provided an opportunity for industrious mem-
bers to grow richer and rise socially. Countryside families were 
willing to make enormous efforts to obtain durable consumer 
goods, build family houses of personal property, and, last but 
not least, to provide school education for their children. The 
greatest change in the way of country life in the history of the 
twentieth century in Hungary took place.21 The immense 
change in the consumption and the standard of living of coun-
tryside families made this era the golden age of ”consumer’s 
socialism”. 
Beside the household produce, the widening range of co-
operatives’ supplementary establishments played a significant 
part in the rapid increase of co-operative and membership earn-
ings. The restrictions of the Soviet kolkhoz-model limited the 
activity of agricultural co-operatives to plant cultivation and 
stock-farming and restrained other temporary activity; albeit 
this had had a long tradition in Hungary in the organisations of 
both the old latifundium and the peasant farming. Following the 
reform of the Mechanism, the non-agricultural, subsidiary ac-
tivity (so called ancillary enterprises) – including activity in 
industry, building industry, transport and trade – grew consid-
erably wider, in fact, tripled in the period between 1968 and 
1975. The net receipts of the co-operatives outside the base ac-
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tivities grew from 9.2 billion a year in 1968 to 22.4 billion a year 
in 1971 (271%), building industry activity increased from 3.2 
billion to 6 billion (182%), the net receipts coming from trade 
grew from 2 to 7.4 billion (350%).22 These ancillary enterprises 
developed particularly vigorously in the co-operatives which 
had significant drawbacks in agricultural produce, since they 
retrieved the earnings the base activities would not cover, and, 
on the other hand, ensured continuous employment, and, thus, 
a guaranteed income, for the members.  
The positive effects of the agricultural reform could be per-
ceived in the entire society through improving food-supply or 
through the appearance of goods regarded until then as scarce 
material. A significant outcome of the period between 1966 and 
1972 had been a rapid and balanced increase in consumption, as 
well as the improvement of commercial balance. Both the popu-
lation and the state, thus, had become beneficiaries of the run-
ning-in of agricultural co-operatives. Despite all this, an anti-co-
operative campaign started to develop in the beginning of the 
1970s. Who were the leaders of this fight and why did they bat-
tle against agricultural co-operatives?  
In search of the reasons we must first consider that there had 
been opponents of the economic reform of 1968 from the very 
beginning. One of the opponent groups was represented by the 
big industrial enterprises. In the course of a development of 
nearly a quarter of a century the priority of industrialization 
had led to heavy industry (metallurgy, steel metallurgy and 
machine industry) obtaining the greatest part of investment. In 
addition to this a strong lobby had emerged, even supported by 
the idea that in the building of socialism, the prominent part 
should be taken by the working class (which, by the way, had 
never come about). All this had ensured them privileges not 
only in the obtaining of resources but in each and every ques-
tion of political supremacy. Their representatives took the key 
positions in the Party, the trade unions and the state institu-
tions.23  After 1968, they had to realize to their great astonish-
ment that co-operatives could make more capital out of the 
adaptable scope enabled by the reform than giant factories. 
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They had also been disturbed by the agricultural lobby that had 
gained strength in the meantime and had started to formulate 
its interests with a growing explicitness. The lobby criticized the 
extremely high retail price of agricultural machinery and indus-
trial raw material and the growing gap between prices of agri-
cultural and industrial products.24  
This conflict itself, however, would not have been sufficient 
for an assault on agricultural co-operatives. The decisive factor 
had been the fact that international opinion on the reform had 
changed. The stifling of the reform process in Czechoslovakia 
by force of arms did not only mean that Hungary had been left 
alone with the reform but also that the Hungarian develop-
ments had attracted the close attention of the other socialist 
countries with special regard to the conservative leadership of 
the Soviet Union led by Brezhnev. They were afraid that the 
New Economic Mechanism would result in undesirable conse-
quences for politics, power and ideology. The “follow-wind” 
from Moscow showed favour towards all with an aversion to 
the New Economic Mechanism from the beginning. Factory 
managers, heads of trusts, the general staff of the Central Coun-
cil of the Hungarian Trade Unions, as well as loyal, but non-
expert party members from central and county economic 
boards formed the opposition of the reform, led by Béla Biszku, 
Zoltán Komócsin and Sándor Gáspár. They were disturbed by 
the fact that through the dynamic growth of household farming 
and ancillary enterprises, the income of large-scale industry 
workers had gradually been overtaken by the income of co-
operative members. Moreover, the heavy industry lobby in-
sisted that the sudden development of co-operative farming, 
and, as a result, the income of peasants, could not have taken 
place in a “legal” manner.25 
Since opposition could not be overtly aired in public, the 
covert attack on the reform was launched with a reference to 
the protection of the interests of large-scale industry workers. 
The decisions of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Central 
Committee made in their session on 14–15 November 1972 
meant practically a suppression of the reform process.26 Within 
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the next two years, the politicians involved closely with the re-
form (Rezső Nyers, Lajos Fehér, Jenő Fock) were dismissed.  
The main line of attack had been the sector of agricultural co-
operatives and the measures taken ranged from ideological de-
bate, economic regulators and executive measures to legal and 
criminal proceedings.27 Despite the fact that the reform of 1968 
had acknowledged state and co-operative property as equal, the 
debate whether co-operative property – including household 
plots and ancillary enterprises – had to be considered directly 
socialist property, started afresh in the press in the beginning of 
the 1970s. There had been comparable discussions regarding 
the interests involved.  The hierarchy of interests, a pivotal for-
mula of the socialist system, had declared that interests hierar-
chized downwards from the top to the bottom. ‘People’s econ-
omy’ ranked first, an enterprise or a certain group second, the 
individual last. This had also been a hierarchy of assertion, 
which means that the interests of the socialist economy and so-
ciety represented by the Party had always had the upper hand 
of the group interests of co-operatives or the interest of their 
members.  
The agricultural co-operatives could see their situation grow-
ing worse not only in the field of ideology but also in the do-
main of economic regulators. Their assessed taxes had been 
increased, the taxes on household parts had been steepened 
retroactively, which was a case without parallel. The subsidiza-
tion of their investments had been reduced. The collective 
farms' non-agricultural activity had been limited by executive 
means. First, steps had only served for preventing expansion, 
later they were also used to restrict industrial activity outside of 
the state sector. A number of restrictive measures were taken 
from the beginning of the 1970s. From 1 January 1971 on, the 
progressive taxation for all activities in the co-operatives had 
been increased. Rates and taxes applying to state officials had 
been extended to co-operative employees as well. First in Bu-
dapest and its environs within a radius of 60 kilometres and 
later in the surroundings of other towns as well, they prohib-
ited outworker-activity for the machine-, chemical-, and light 
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industry of the co-operatives. Thirty-eight different scopes of 
activities had been deemed completely forbidden for agricul-
tural co-operatives.28 
Conservative anti-reform forces were not content with a 
mere acceleration of the regulation system. Legal and criminal 
procedures had been launched against many co-operative-
leaders overstating a common activity which, however, did not 
suit the opinion of the opposition to the reform. They picked 
out a few people involved in these activities with the intention 
of setting an example and intimidating the others. The people 
prosecuted were exactly the ones who made the greatest effort 
to meet the expectations of the New Economic Mechanism, hen-
ce, those striving for greater efficiency, more profit in farming 
and the assertion of the spirit of a market economy. These show 
trials particularly affected the most ambitious people, who had 
risen above their fellow leaders through their creativity and 
their spirit of enterprise. This process was the farthest-reaching 
wave of political retribution in Hungary since the massive re-
taliation that came to an end in the beginning of the 1960s. Le-
gal and criminal proceedings against co-operative-leaders made 
it clear that unlawful show trials still belonged to the set of in-
struments applied by the so-called “soft dictatorship”.   
The negative consequences of the restrictions and interven-
tions concerning co-operatives came out in a short time. The 
spectacular fall-off in household produce, the forcing back of 
the supplementary activities provided by the agricultural co-
operatives had the most unfavourable effects on food-supply. 
Since the self-legitimation of the Kádár-regime had largely de-
pended on accomplishing the policy of living standards, from 
the middle of the 1970s, they started to revoke the measures 
that had had disadvantageous effects on the development of 
both producing capacity and the basis of production. 
 
4 Summary 
Two years before the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism, from 1966 on, the managements of agricultural co-
operatives launched the switch-over from central directives to 
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economic regulators. By doing so, they had built up a system 
based upon the idea that economical regulators might substi-
tute for central directives, moreover, in the event they could 
add to the producer’s interests, they might help the implemen-
tation of central objectives even more effectively.  
The most recent archival research affirmed that experience 
gathered in the agricultural sector as well as material on the 
reform completed by 1963, had had a stimulating effect on the 
entire process of economic reform.  
In the course of general reformist endeavours, deliberate ef-
forts were made to make use of models of work organisations, 
remuneration, decision-making in state-owned companies that 
had worked very well in the co-operative sector. We must add, 
however, that there still remained a discrepancy between reali-
zation and its adoption. Furthermore, since the traditional con-
flict of different ideologies and interests could not have been 
settled in the beginning of the mechanism reform, the asyn-
chronism between official conception, legal regulation and 
practice still remained, albeit in a much milder shape. More-
over, conservative anti-reform forces started a counter-attack in 
1972–1973, causing serious damage in the national economy.  
The ‘attack’ on agricultural co-operatives illustrated clearly 
that their fate had continued to depend largely on the political 
climate. Underlying all this was the fact that the New Economic 
Mechanism had been based on the notion that politics and ide-
ology were separable. The cancellation of the reform process 
had resulted exactly from the revelation that the changes 
started in the economy would inevitably affect the remaining 
domains of society. The process that had resulted in agricul-
tural co-operatives becoming independent was deemed particu-
larly perilous. Dogmatic forces of the political structure were 
afraid that co-operatives’ growing independence would result 
in unfavourable political and ideological processes. In the first 
half of the 1970s, however, they managed to drive the genie 
back into the bottle.               
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Planning in Finland – 
The Beginnings of a Market Economy in Hungary 
 
Erkki PIHKALA 
 
 
Although Finland has never been regarded as a planned econ-
omy in the Soviet style, it is useful to examine what kind of ele-
ments of planning there were in the Finnish economy and how 
extensive they were in the post-war years and especially in the 
era of President Kekkonen (1956-1981). This is interesting as 
many post-war Western European economies, impressed by the 
achievements of the socialist planned economies were applying 
the idea of a planned economy, as did, for example France by 
its indicative planning system with four year plans. 
The Hungarian experiments with a market economy from 
1968 onwards using the scheme of the New Economic Mecha-
nism (NEM)*, although an exception in the socialist countries 
as a real experiment, offers at the same time an interesting 
counterpart to the Finnish attempts to apply planning or rather 
the systematic development of the national economy as advo-
cated by President Urho Kekkonen himself. 
After the Second World War in many Western European 
countries, as in the United Kingdom and France, the socialisa-
tion or rather nationalisation of certain major branches of pro-
duction and services (coal and steel, traffic and communica-
tions, insurance, etc.) was common, partly for ideological rea-
                                                          
* Cf. Varga’s article. [Ed. note] 
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sons and partly in the name of reconstruction. In Finland there 
were also similar demands and a committee was set up in 1945 
to plan it. However, the enthusiasm was over by 1948 and, as a 
matter of fact, no branch of the economy or company was even-
tually nationalised. This was partly because of the continuing 
strict regulation of the economy. Rationing lasted in some form 
until the mid-1950s, and the price controls in some form until 
the 1980s. Foreign trade was liberalised only from 1958 on as a 
reflection of the Finnish membership of the GATT since 1950. 
This was followed by the Finnish association in the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1961.1 On the other hand, there was 
little that could be called “national economic planning” in the 
original meaning of planning applied in the socialist countries. 
An important turning point in the Finnish post-war econ-
omy came with the expiration in 1955 of the fixed-term Emer-
gency Powers Act used by the government to control the econ-
omy, including prices and wages, since May 1941. This was one 
of the causes leading to the three week General Strike organised 
by the Labour Unions, which started on March 1st , the very day 
President Urho Kekkonen started his first period of office. 
 
1 Germs of the ideas of national planning 
It has been claimed that the idea of the Soviet-style economic 
planning was adopted by Lenin from the German war economy 
during the First World War. The structure of the German war 
economy was, no doubt, a practical response to the problems of 
allocation caused by a total war. The same is true for the regula-
tive solutions adopted during the Second World War in 
Finland, as in the other European belligerent countries, and 
regulation presupposes planning in advance. But the ideas of a 
planned or rather a systematically developed national economy 
had in Finland also other origins, which are worth mentioning. 
 
1.1 Before the Second World War 
The ideas can be traced back to the influence of the ideas of the 
German Younger Historical School through the Verein für 
Sozialpolitik and its Finnish counterpart Yhteiskuntataloudellinen 
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yhdistys (Social-Economic Society) in the 1910s. The German 
Younger Historical School criticized the English liberal school 
of economics and emphasized societal planning and social poli-
cies aimed at removing social evils by publicly announced ob-
jectives. Urban circumstances were considered problematic and 
rural depopulation was thus to be prevented by improving liv-
ing conditions in the countryside. 
On the basis of these tendencies the first full professor in 
economics and chief editor of the influential Yhteiskuntata-
loudellinen Aikakauskirja (Social-Economic Journal), J.V. Vennola, 
wrote in 1916 a programme on how to develop the Finnish na-
tional economy. Vennola was later, in 1919-1920 and 1921-1922, 
the prime minister and several times a minister in the govern-
ment. In his programme Vennola moved further away from 
economic liberalism represented by the English school, which 
had caused many economic and social ills. An ideal for Vennola 
was an “autonomic state” based on its own resources. This 
meant reduced dependency on imported grain, land reform 
and improving the credit conditions for agriculture, which was 
employing 70-80 per cent of the population and development of 
forestry. The need for energy was to be solved by building wa-
ter power stations. The local ores had to be refined as much as 
possible. The main emphasis was to be laid on the development 
of the wood, paper and chemical industries and the flour mills. 
One way to achieve this was customs policies and the improv-
ing of the seafaring and good relations with Russia and the 
Russian markets. A permanent economic central organisation 
was to co-ordinate the economic policy of the society by annual 
plans. This advisory body to be established, was supposed to 
include the representatives of the most important branches of 
the economy and the economic organisations.2 The thoughts of 
Vennola found support in practice in 1928 as the Taloudellinen 
suunnitteluneuvosto (Council for Economic Planning) was estab-
lished. In 1929 it outlined the principles of economic policies to 
be followed during the recession of the 1930s. 
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1.2 The post Second World War stage 
The positive experiences of the rather extensive state-run in-
dustrialisation in the interwar period were seen among other 
things reinforcing the defence capabilities of the country. In the 
Finnish war economy the influence of the Sotatalousesikunta 
(Staff of War Economy) had until 1944 grown crucial in the allo-
cation of resources.3 After the war it was in practice replaced by 
SOTEVA (Delegation for War Reparations Industries) which 
had the power to regulate the allocation of resources. The very 
regulative role of the state was also obvious in the post-war sys-
tematic settlement of the Karelian evacuees and the veterans.4 
After the war the left-wing parties, especially the People’s 
Democrats (Communists) wanted to change the government’s 
powers to regulate the war economy in the direction of a 
planned economy. The right-wing parties advocated deregula-
tion and especially the dismantling of the “hated” rationing 
system in order to promote a return to the “free market” sys-
tem. Formally there was no national planning as such, but the 
regulative system of the Kansanhuoltoministeriö (Ministry of 
Supply) working in keen co-operation with SOTEVA in the dis-
tribution of import licenses and especially in the distribution of 
foreign currency by the Bank of Finland meant economic plan-
ning in practice, since the plans for the future had to be set in 
an order of priority. The positive political climate for state-run 
industrialisation found support not only from the develop-
ments in the new socialist countries in Europe, but also from 
the United Kingdom, France and Italy.5 
In 1951 the Taloudellinen suunnitteluneuvosto (Council for Eco-
nomic Planning) was founded, but in practice its mission was 
reduced to preparing the stabilisation programme of the year 
1951 and the Basic Programme for Economic Policies of 1954. 
 
1.3 Urho Kekkonen’s  vision 
While the end of the war reparations to the Soviet Union 
loomed, a discussion was started, as to whether this should be 
achieved by a reduction in taxation or as a public investment 
programme advocating industrialisation. Urho Kekkonen, who 
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acted at that time as the prime minister, was for a rapid indus-
trialisation by “radical means”, as expressed by a leading 
economist (Bruno Suviranta) of the time. 6 In his book Onko 
maallamme malttia vaurastua ? (Does Our Country Have the Pa-
tience to Get Affluent?) in 1952 Kekkonen emphasized the role 
of forced saving in order to finance the investments needed to 
industrialise, in particular, Northern Finland.7 The Soviet 
model of industrialisation since 1928 and the industrialisation 
programme of Poland (e.g. Nova Huta) were presented in this 
connection as positive examples.8 Kekkonen demonstrated that 
in 1938 the role of the state had grown bigger in total invest-
ments than in 1950.9 Since agriculture was an economic burden, 
the settlement of people had to be stopped and agriculture had 
to deliver a workforce for industry.10 The industrialisation of 
Northern Finland was seen as possible only by state invest-
ments in the heavy industries and in order to produce the elec-
tric energy needed. This was achieved by harnessing the river 
Kemijoki from 1953 onwards as the works on Oulujoki river 
were finished. 
 
2 Efforts towards systematic planning in Finland 
The period around the General Strike of 1956 was not a time for 
planned economic growth. The Economic Council (Talousneu-
vosto) of 1957 ended up with nothing, but in 1959 the govern-
ment set a committee to work out a production programme for 
the next few years. The committee proposed the establishment 
of a corporative Economic Council consisting of the representa-
tives of the state and the government and the different main 
interest groups. In 1962 the new Economic Council was thus 
established and in 1966 its functions were enacted by law. In 
1967 the Economic Council made its proposition on the devel-
opment of an Incomes Policies. In this manner it was following 
the tendencies of development in the OECD countries.11 The 
efforts to develop the national economy systemically were also 
reflected in different branches of the economy. 
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2.1 Agriculture 
In agriculture the systematic planning was closely connected to 
the Incomes Policies adopted after 1966. It aimed at securing 
the income level of individual farmers and this was connected 
with the objectives to cut the agricultural production in order to 
reduce heavily subsidized exports.12 
 
2.2 Forestry 
The increased use of raw wood due to the systematic expansion 
of the forest industries was reflected during the first years of 
the 1960s in that the annual drain exceeded the estimated an-
nual increment of the growing stock in forests. Thus, in 1962-
1975 four major long-term programmes (TEHO, MERA I, II and 
III) were set up in order to increase the future growing stock of 
timber. The result was heavily increased artificial regeneration, 
seedling-stand improvements, forest fertilisation, drainage of 
swamps and construction of forest roads by subsidies (from 20 
to 70 per cent of the costs) and long term cheap loans (20-25 
years) granted by the state. The MERA III programme was 
partly (16 per cent) financed by the World Bank.13 The annual 
increment of the growing stock went up from 57 million cubic 
meters at the end of the 1960s to 75 million cubic meters twenty 
year later and the increment was expected to be around 90 mil-
lion m3 in 2040. The popularity of big forest improvement pro-
grammes faded after the MERA III programme: this was partly 
for ecological reasons and also simply because the work was 
completed. The long term annual drain also remained at the 
same level from 1955 to 1995 mainly due to increased imports 
of timber from the Soviet Union.  Thus the Metsä 2000 (Forest 
2000) programme of 1983 did thus not find the necessary sup-
port.14 Before that the Metsätalouskomitea (Forestry Economy 
Committee) of 1981 had outlined the abandonment of the cen-
tralised forestry policies and advocated private initiatives in-
stead of the tight control of the authorities in the treatment of 
the forests. The new line was criticized by the older economists, 
claiming that there are too many individual forest owners who 
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were not able and/or who would not use their forests effec-
tively and thus would be in a need of expert control.15 
  
2.3 Manufacturing 
As industrialisation with a strong capital formation necessi-
tated by it was accepted as a national goal, the Industrialisation 
Committee of 1951 presented the means for an investment pro-
gramme emphasising the role of the traditional forest indus-
tries and the metal industries expanded by the war reparation 
deliveries.16 The investment programme for the expansion of 
the capacity of the forest industry was partly financed by the 
World Bank (IBRD) until 1962 and partly by the export deposits 
paid after the 1957 devaluation by the forest industries into the 
Bank of Finland. 
The industrialisation of North Finland advocated by Urho 
Kekkonen was mainly worked out by allocating resources from 
annual state budgets for founding state-owned companies to 
use the resources in North Finland. They also got loans from 
the Bank of Finland. In this way the state owned companies 
Kemijoki Oy (electricity), Kemijärvi Oy (pulp), Otanmäki Oy (min-
ing), Rautaruukki Oy (1960, steel), were founded and the plants 
of the former ones (Veitsiluoto Oy, (timber, pulp and paper), 
Typpi Oy (fertilizers) and Outokumpu Oy (non-iron metals) were 
expanded. Since 1957 the most important counterbalancing 
power to Kekkonen was the President of the Bank of Finland 
(Klaus Waris), who demanded that these projects should be 
commercially profitable.17 The starting of oil refinement by 
Neste Oy in 1957 was important for the development of imports 
from the Soviet Union. The last scheme of state-led industriali-
sation was the establishment of Valco Oy in 1977 to produce 
television tubes in cooperation with the Japanese Hitachi. It, 
however, was a disaster since neither the engineers nor the 
workers were able to master the production process. After that 
the state cautiously began to sell its firms to private companies, 
starting with the small ones. 
ERKKI PIHKALA 
226 
On the other hand, the state had traditionally had a domi-
nant role in some branches of production, since only the state 
had the capital and could take the risks needed. The following 
table (1) shows the percentage of workers employed in the state 
dominated enterprises in 1938/1949 in proportion to all workers 
in the respective branch of industry: 
 
Table 1.  
Branch of production 1938 1949 
Mining                                 91 95 
Metallurgy                        2 8 
Engineering shops                15 23 
Chemical industry                  9 16 
Wood working                       6 10 
Paper mills                           13 15 
Electricity 10 17 
Printing 6 6 
In total 6 11 
Source: Kekkonen, Urho: Onko maallamme varaa vaurastua?, 95  
 
This supports the Gerschenkron thesis on the role of the state in 
the economic growth of late industrialised countries. In addi-
tion to the role of the Finnish state as a public owner of the key 
industries, the municipalities traditionally controlled the pro-
duction and distribution of electricity, gas and water and the 
largest traffic companies in the cities according to a law dating 
from 1895. In addition to this the telephone business, some re-
tailing and banking were traditionally co-operative in their 
character (table 2). All this decreased the needs in post-war 
Finland to nationalise these activities. Also the education and 
health services were from early on dominated by public owner-
ship supported by the state and municipalities. 
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Table 2. The distribution of gross domestic production (GDP) by form of 
business and branches of production in 1956 and 1975. 
Form of business, in per cent  
 
Branch of production        
1956 1975 
 Pri Bus Cop Pub Pri Bus Cop Pub
Agriculture                         96 1 1 1 98 0 1 1 
Forestry 52 30 3 15 53 29 3 14 
Manufacturing                    6 75 6 12 4 75 5 16 
Electricity, water, etc. 0 37 1 52 0 34 0 66 
Building                              34 28 2 35 39 35 4 21 
Traffic and communicat.   16 41 1 41 13 34 4 48 
Trade and commerce         22 55 21 1 20 56 23 1 
Banking, insurance             – 61 20 19 – 55 25 20 
Ownership of dwellings    78 16 1 5 74 19 1 6 
Public administration        – – – 100 – – – 100
Education and heath          8 0 11 81 5 0 7 88 
Other services                     22 20 38 20 17 18 32 33 
Total production  30 39 8 23 21 41 8 30 
(Pri = Private ownership, Bus = Private companies, Cop = Co-operatives, 
Pub = Public companies and public enterprises). Source: Suomen talous-
historia 2, 517. 
 
2.4 Development of the traffic network 
The development of the traffic network is in principle ideal for 
planning purposes. In the 1950s and in the 1960s the construc-
tion of the traffic network was in Finland, however, dependent 
on the annual unemployment situation and the subjective 
wishes of the different ministers to get new roads in their con-
stituencies. Kekkonen was very successful in this respect. In 
1952 a “North Finland Billion” was allocated for the road con-
struction. Between 1955-1960 all the roads proposed specifically 
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by Kekkonen himself were build by prisoner workers. They 
were popularly called “Kekkonen´s roads”.18 
In 1955 the Road Committee of 1952 issued a ten-year plan 
for the development of highways, but the plan was not realized 
for financial reasons. The Committee had proposed partly for-
eign financing, but only in 1964-1971 Finland could get three 
big (15 year and 5½-6 per cent) loans from the World Bank for 
highway construction. A main condition for the loans was a 
systematic plan for the use of the money, which presupposed a 
feasibility study on the traffic conditions in Finland to be made 
by foreign experts. The study was conducted by a Dutch engi-
neering firm, NEDECON, and the conclusions drawn were 
about the same as those by the Finnish traffic authorities.19 
Thus, thanks to the demands set by the World Bank, the traffic 
planning in Finland came to approach the practices already 
usual in the advanced market economies. A parliamentary traf-
fic committee issued its plan for highways in 1975 with heavy 
impact in turnpikes. The plan run, however, into difficulties 
due to the energy crises and it did not became actual again un-
til the mid-1980s.20 
The State Railways traditionally controlled the rail traffic. 
The losses and the development of the branch were financed by 
the annual state budgets. Air traffic was in the hands of the 
state company, (Aero Oy) Finnair Oy. 
  
2.5 The state budgets 
The years 1948-1966 were in Finland characterised by different 
kinds of short term coalition governments, which lasted less 
than one year on average. The Peoples` Democrats (Communist 
Party) was permanently left in opposition. But in the years 
1966-1982 the Popular Front Governments or governments 
formed by the Agrarian Party, Social Democrats and Peoples` 
Democrats were typical. The political change in 1966 was also 
reflected in economic planning. 
Since 1966 the Economic Department of the Ministry of Fi-
nance started to make 4-year plans for budget planning. Thus 
for the years 1966-1969 a basic budget was prepared. It was, 
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however, more like a summary on the expected expenditures of 
different branches of the state economy than a total plan for the 
state economy. 
The first Medium Term Economic Plans (KTS) were pre-
pared by separate ministries for the years 1968-1972, as in-
structed by the Ministry of Finance in 1967. They were sup-
posed to consist of a plan of action and calculations on incomes 
and expenditures. The plans for 1968-1972 were considerably 
late, and so the KTS-plans for the years 1969-1973 expired. Since 
1973 the changes caused by the oil crises, instability of curren-
cies and inflation invalidated the requisites for planning. 
The net saving of the government economy was considerable 
from the 1950s to the 1980s although there were difficult cash 
deficit crises during recessions (1958, 1967, 1976). Thus, in prac-
tice the financial planning of the government economy did not 
succeed. From the point of view of Keynesian theory the 
budget policy was reinforcing the economic cycles and not 
smoothing them off.21 This was due to the fact that separate 
ministries were eager to present large-scale development 
schemes from their field of operations in the common optimism 
of building a welfare society. These plans did also find support 
in the Parliament as the resources to realise them seemed to be 
there. In order to master the parliamentary race for new societal 
schemes the use of parliamentary committees to outline the de-
velopment was strengthened. This tended to emphasize corpo-
ratism in making political decisions. 
The Finnish ambitions for long-term public budgets reflected 
the developments in the other Nordic countries, aiming at cre-
ating welfare states according to the ideas of the Social Demo-
cratic parties, especially by long term planning of the public 
expenditures. These efforts were spiced with demands for 
“economic democracy” in the private sector by increasing the 
worker’s participation. The centralised planning system of the 
public economy, however, failed due to the political limits to it, 
the cyclical reasons since 1975 and problems of total co-
ordination.22 
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2.6 The local level 
The needs for a planned economic development on the local 
level were reflected by the creation of voluntary regional plan-
ning organs. The first organs were started in the 1940s and at 
the beginning of the 1960s the whole land was covered. The 
1960s and the beginning of the 1970s was the golden age of re-
gional planning, with promising perspectives for the develop-
ment of industries, especially manufacturing, but also tourism, 
the traffic network, educational facilities up to university level, 
etc. Most of these plans, aimed at lobbying the state authorities 
and politicians to allocate money from the state budget to the 
region in question, did not result in anything. The money to 
implement them was just not there especially after the mid-
1970s with the energy crises. 
 
3 The Hungarian aims for markets23 
The main economic policies in immediate post-war Hungary 
included the stabilisation of the currency, changes in the nature 
of rural land-holdings and the beginning of nationalisation. The 
era of balanced economic development represented by the 
three-year plan (1947-1949) aimed at bringing the economy up 
to pre-war levels came to an end with the five-year plan of 
1950-1954. Its Soviet (Stalinist) model of industrialisation, based 
mainly on heavy industries in a small country lacking the raw 
materials (ores and fuels) needed, was one of the causes of the 
uprising in 1956. The critics of the Soviet model of industrialisa-
tion with extensive centralisation, emphasis on extensive 
growth, rigidities in the planning mechanism, incentive prob-
lems and the continuing problem of poor productivity and in-
adequate adoption of technical advances forced the Communist 
Party to adopt the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1966 
with effect from 1968 in order to promote efficiency. 
It is true that already in the 1950s some efforts had been 
made to effect a liberalisation of the Stalinist bureaucratic and 
administrative framework of economic planning. In 1953, after 
the death of Stalin, the guidance and control on enterprises, 
previously exercised by ministerial industrial boards, was 
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turned over to newly organised trusts operated to maximise 
profits, with the component enterprises defraying the expenses. 
In 1957, for example, individual enterprises were relieved of the 
obligation to submit monthly and quarterly plans for the ap-
proval of higher authorities. In 1964 industry was made to pay 
capital charges to the state on fixed and circulating capital in 
their possession. Ideologically these interests in fact were justi-
fied because capital is nothing else than materialised labour, 
and as such should be rationally distributed. 
 
3.1 The New Economic Mechanism 
The introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) sub-
stantially reduced central government intervention in the econ-
omy at the enterprise level. NEM was the only somewhat suc-
cessful economic policy reform introduced on the basis of re-
form initiatives widely discussed at that time in the Socialist 
countries. In the Soviet Union the ministerial system of plan-
ning was back again in autumn 1965 replacing the sovnarkhoz 
(regional) system. Economic efficiency was debated under the 
title of “libermanism”, which in 1967 eventually led in the So-
viet Union to the so called Kosygin reform emphasising the role 
of profits and capital charges in allocation. In Czechoslovakia 
the more wide economic reforms ended with the intervention 
of the Soviet troops in 1968. 
The objective of NEM was to combine the central direction of 
relatively few key variables with local responsibility for the re-
maining decisions. The NEM thus made the enterprises inde-
pendent economic units with the right to determine the struc-
ture of their production and sales. Instead of the previous de-
tailed and intricate plans, only broad guidelines were provided 
for enterprises to follow. Enterprises were thus given latitude 
in determining their own production mix on the basis of their 
preferences with respect to quality, styling and pricing. The en-
terprises also got the right to establish direct contacts with for-
eign firms, conclude contracts and engage in independent for-
eign trade activities. To facilitate this shift, price flexibility was 
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introduced so that some domestic prices could respond to 
changes in foreign currency prices. This implied a genuine eco-
nomic (as opposed to accounting) function for the exchange 
rate in a socialist planned economy. 
A modified market economy was thus permitted in which 
enterprises could react to consumer preferences on the basis of 
their resources. The central planning authorities, however, 
were able to exercise control over enterprise production 
through the use of economic levers designed to induce co-
operation by making it more profitable to produce certain 
items. Profits were to be used as an indicator of success, and 
above all, the utilisation of profits by the enterprise to finance 
decentralized investment. The administrative control was to be 
replaced by “economic regulators”. 
 
3.2 The ideological and regulatory constraints of the NEM 
But as all major macroeconomic decisions concerning economic 
development, investment and consumption remained in the 
hands of the state, enterprises and individuals soon discovered 
that indirect regulation (implemented by the planners, the 
banking system and state agencies) and especially severe price 
and wages controls, exercised by the state provided severe con-
straints on the functions of the markets. This was also rather 
easy, since Hungary had in 1970 only 812 industrial enterprises 
with an average of seven plants each. There were no intermedi-
ate-level industrial authorities, which meant that planners 
could talk to enterprises rather easily (in a kind of oligopolist 
industrial structure). The enterprises, on the other hand, tended 
to expand their investments unnecessarily and had little incen-
tive to develop effective exports or substitutes for imports. 
Since there were no corresponding political reforms, the 
NEM came into conflict with ideological and political issues, 
with Soviet influence and vested domestic interests, and was 
thus watered down. Job security and the income distribution 
system, which did not distinguish between the competent and 
incompetent enterprises and/or workers, continued to inhibit 
the increase in labour productivity. This was combined with 
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limited tolerance of unemployment and inflation and problems 
in the mobility of the labor force. 
Unfortunately abrupt changes in world oil prices since 1973 
turned the terms of trade with both the Western and the CMEA 
countries severely against Hungary. The reflections of the rise 
of oil prices, as a consequence, made it necessary to connect ex-
ternal and internal prices on a permanent basis. In practice this 
led, combined with Soviet political pressure, to the reversal of 
the NEM, which until then had produced a good economic per-
formance for Hungary. Domestic prices became less meaning-
ful as indirect taxes and subsidies were introduced and the con-
trol over enterprise financial behaviour was strengthened. Eco-
nomic performance was declined and foreign debt was accu-
mulated, which entailed measures to control the trade imbal-
ance and emphasising the equilibrium in the domestic econ-
omy. From 1980 to 1982, in the years of the second oil crisis and 
of a recession in the western economies, the rate of economic 
growth averaged only one percent. 
 
3.3 Reversions of the 1980s 
In the early 1980s the role of prices as regulators in the system 
was again increased. In order to make it possible for the enter-
prises to compare the domestic and foreign prices, the multiple 
exchange rates were abandoned in 1982. Economic reforms in-
troduced in 1984 and 1985 were aimed at increasing the effi-
ciency of state enterprises and effectively combining market 
and plan mechanisms in a manner consistent with central pri-
orities. A compulsory reserve fund, introduced in 1968, was 
eliminated. The reserve fund had been a prescribed percentage 
on after-tax profit and as a result the disposable enterprise in-
come was reduced. From now on the reserves held were based 
on the decisions of individual enterprise managers. The state 
enterprises could now also issue bonds to be sold to the general 
public. Since 1985 the director and management staffs of small 
and medium-sized state enterprise were selected by the work-
ers, who were also given the right to recall them. Earlier they 
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had been chosen by the Communist Party and/or by the appro-
priate industrial ministry. 
In large state enterprises enterprise councils composed of the 
elected representatives were introduced. The enterprise council 
was responsible for the election of the managing director, it ap-
proved the company’s annual budgets, strategic plans and 
other major resource allocations, mergers and acquisitions and 
financial statements etc. The state was, however, able to exer-
cise some control over an enterprise through the appropriate 
branch within the Ministry of Industry. The reforms made since 
1988, however, are a different story.  
The rules to form a co-operative were quite liberal and they 
were in widespread use in agriculture. Production quotas were, 
however, to be fulfilled, but private plots of land were permit-
ted. The private production of food was thus quite extensive. 
Hungary thus attempted to develop a market-socialist sys-
tem, to some extent following the ideas of Oscar Lange on mar-
ket socialism. This gave it some lead to the other socialist coun-
tries in reforming the system further as the socialist economic 
system collapsed in 1989-1991. 
 
4 Conclusions 
In the immediate post-war years the challenge of socialism was 
taken up also in the capitalist countries, mainly as an ideology. 
These ideas were thus initiated as nationalisation or by devel-
oping strong state-owned enterprises as a kind of substitute for 
nationalization. On the other hand, the support of state owned 
enterprises can be traced back to the ideas of nationalism or 
even national-socialism, in which the development of national 
heavy industries had an important practical role already in the 
1920s. 
These influences are seen in the ideas of President Urho 
Kekkonen regarding the means of the developing of the Finnish 
economy at the beginning of the 1950s. The founding of state-
owned large enterprises was started in Finland already in the 
1920s and was continued until the 1970s. At first this policy 
was supported by the idea of a strong national state. After the 
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Second World War the founding of state enterprises was sup-
ported mainly by the leftist parties as a means of reinforcing 
the role of state in the economy and/or as a means of regional 
policy. During the 1970s the enterprises became to such an ex-
tent knowledge intensive instead of the earlier capital intensity, 
that the direct possibilities of state venturing were run out.  
The attraction of socialism and nationalisation faded during 
the 1950s, but in the 1960s the achievements of socialism made 
the capitalist countries, even the big enterprises, interested in 
the possibilities offered by medium and long term planning as 
a specific tool to achieve good economic results. In the Nordic 
countries the possibilities of planning especially the develop-
ment of the public sector were seen as optimistic. 
In the socialist countries, on the other hand, there was an in-
creased interest to combine the market information given by 
prices to the implementation of the plans. These developments 
were both a cause of and an inspiration to the theories of con-
vergence discussed especially by the New Left in the west and 
to theories of market socialism in the east. 
It seems that in Finland the regulation of prices and of the 
foreign trade together with the active founding of state owned 
enterprises was a surrogate for systematic economic planning 
until the end of the 1950s. In Hungary these were effectively 
used to dilute the ideas of the New Market Mechanism advo-
cated by its liberal supporters in the 1960s.  
The price distortions caused by the abrupt rise in oil and en-
ergy prices in 1973 and again in 1979, however, restored the 
ideas of applied planning in Finland, as in general in the west, 
and dreams of market socialism in Hungary, in the previous 
models of economic policies. It is difficult to say whether the 
ideas of NEM were a prelude of the entire collapse of the eco-
nomic system of planned socialism at the end of the 1980s. 
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